

# METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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## ART. I.—RALPH WALDO EMERSON.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON was born in Boston on the 25th day of May, 1803. His father was the Rev. William Emerson, pastor of the First Church of Boston; his mother's family is not known to us. His ancestry had a strong leaning toward theology, since for eight generations there had ever been a minister among them. Of the intellectual and moral traits of Emerson's immediate ancestors nothing is known to the public. His father died young. We have no glimpse of the domestic life of the youth. He has a brother living; another, though sleeping in a West Indian tomb, still lives in the tender verse fraternal affection has consecrated to his memory. These are the only data we have been able to gather up in regard to the domestic conditions under which Emerson had his early development. His education was begun in one of the public grammar-schools of Boston, and was continued in the famous Latin School of that place. Here his preparation for college was made. In his fifteenth year he entered Harvard College as freshman, and was graduated there in August, 1821. He won no special distinction in the regular studies, but is said to have been unusually well-informed in English literature, and to have made ample use of the college library. He showed much ability in composition, and gained prizes for declamation and dissertations. His taste for letters declared itself in juvenile poems, and in a steady attention to imaginative literature.

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He was chosen poet for the exercises of class-day. For six years after leaving college he was engaged in teaching school. The only glimpse we gain of his life during these years is his own record of a visit he and his brother made, in the family of the elder President Adams, on invitation. Our school-master, then, had dignity and worth and social recognition in 1825. During the next year he was authorized to preach the Gospel; which implies that he had attended with some care to the study of theology. From ill-health, or other causes, he was not settled in the work of the ministry until 1829, when he was ordained as colleague of the Rev. Henry Ware, Jun., in the pastorate of the Second Church of Boston. Glimpses of his studies, doubts, difficulties, and conclusions, during this period, we have none. Mr. Emerson was elected to this position on the 11th of January, 1829, and was ordained the 11th of March ensuing. He had already supplied the pulpit of the Second Church for some time with general acceptance. Mr. Ware, who was deemed a good judge of men, records his favorable impressions of the young minister in two letters. To Mr. Barry he writes: "I have the great satisfaction of leaving my people well provided for, as they are about ordaining Mr. Emerson as colleague." Somewhat later he writes to his brother William: "My colleague has begun his work in the best possible spirit, and with just the promise I like. The few who talked of leaving the society are won to remain, and it is as flourishing as ever. We have given up hired singing, and employ our own men and women."

Mr. Ware sailed for Europe in great peace of mind, since he left a brave and good young minister behind to watch over the harmonious and prosperous Church he loved. The hired singing, too, was well out of the way, so that the traveling pastor expected to hear only tidings of success from the beloved flock. These expectations were made good. Eighteen months later, Mr. Ware, in a farewell address to his Church, says: "Providence presented to you at once a man on whom your hearts could rest." In February, 1831, Mr. Ware attended the funeral of Mrs. Emerson, who died a few months after her marriage. The next reference we have to Emerson records the fact that, in 1832, he resigned his pastoral charge on the ground of differences between himself and the Church on the communion



question. What the nature of this difference was, and how Mr. Emerson bore himself in the discussion, are things left wholly in the dark; but the fact itself is noteworthy, because it shows that, when his ministry was closed and his relation with the Church dissolved at his own request, Emerson had not broken with the Christian religion itself; for, whatever the communion question may mean, it does not touch the basis of the Christian system. When he visited Coleridge, in 1833, he felt compelled to state, in view of severe strictures on Unitarianism, that he had himself been born and bred in that faith.

Emerson characterizes his general reading up to this date as narrow and desultory. The "*Edinburgh Review*" had quickened his intellect, and stimulated his original inclination to letters. Through its pages he gained a vague, but alluring, outlook upon the world of literature. Yet so incurious was his temper, that he declares there was no man living in Great Britain, in 1833, whom he cared to see, except the writers Coleridge, Wordsworth, Landor, De Quincy, and, above them all, Carlyle, and the lion-hearted soldier, Wellington. This shows that, at this early date, literature was five sixths of the world for him. Thus was his true vocation declared.

After less than a year's absence Emerson returned home, with freshened health and vigor, to enter upon his unique and remarkable career. His first public appearance after his arrival was in the character of a lecturer on water. For several consecutive years he gave courses of lectures in Boston and other places. Thus, in 1833-'34, he gave biographical lectures on Michael Angelo, George Fox, Milton, Luther. Then followed, in as many successive winters, a course of ten lectures on English Literature, one of twelve on the Philosophy of History, one of ten on Human Life, one of ten on the Present Age; and, in 1841, another of seven on Human Life. Since the last date he has written and delivered many lectures on a wide variety of themes, and has ranged over the United States and visited England to reach his appropriate audience. Few men have spoken so much from the platform, and nobody has discussed more serious topics. He has always taken pains to give his maturest thoughts their most brilliant expression before claiming the public ear. The response must have been exceedingly gratifying, since no other speaker has been so well

received, for so long a period, by the thoughtful public. In this respect his example has been high and salutary.

In 1835 Emerson was married to his second wife, Miss Lidian Jackson, of Plymouth, Mass., and fixed his permanent residence in Concord, Mass. He presently began to publish his writings. The lectures on Milton and Michael Angelo appeared in the "*North American Review*." They give evidence that he had not yet reached the peculiar opinions in philosophy and religion with which he was soon to startle America. They also show that he had not yet acquired the condensed, epigrammatic, and brilliant style for which he is renowned. Probably for these reasons those papers are not included in his collected writings.

Somewhere between the resignation of his pastoral office, in 1832, and the publication, in 1834, of his prose-poem, "*Nature*," Emerson had rejected the Christian religion as an authoritative and ultimate revelation of the will of God. His nature is taciturn, and we have no disclosure of the motives that drew him on to so momentous a conclusion. The only hint we have in the matter is contained in his account of his earliest visit to Carlyle at Craigenputtock: "We went out to walk over long hills, and looked at Criffel, then without his cap, and down into Wordsworth's country. There we sat down and talked of the immortality of the soul. It was not Carlyle's fault that we talked on that topic, for he had the natural disinclination of every nimble spirit to bruise itself against walls, and did not like to place himself where no step can be taken." This shows that Emerson insisted on the discussion of the question, like a man who has doubts and seeks help, or at least sympathy, from any quarter; while Carlyle, having tried that bog on his own legs and found it mere shifting quicksand, would fain keep off it. Both were convinced that no step can be taken in this question. One would be glad of fuller notes of that memorable parley—would willingly know what convictions and what perplexities each brought to the conversation, and how each was affected by the other. We know from other sources that Carlyle had rejected the faith of his fathers some time prior to Emerson's visit. Hence there is reason to think the former gave the mind of his confiding and admiring friend a powerful impulse toward religious unbelief. Emerson was

not then directly acquainted with German neological literature. It is true, he somewhere speaks of the destructive criticism of Germany as rendering intelligent Christian faith impossible. Still, he does not hint any early, nor show any late, acquaintance with it, nor any marked effect from it upon his way of thinking.

Why should we look so far away for the sources of his skepticism? Among the few hints of his interior history in these early years is the following:—

A single odd volume of the Essays [Montaigne's] remained to me from my father's library when a boy. It lay long neglected until, after many years, when I was newly escaped from college, I read the book and procured the remaining volumes. I remember the delight and wonder in which I lived with it. It seemed to me as if I had myself written the book in some former life, so sincerely it spoke to my thought and experience.

This avowal is precious. Emerson himself has taken Montaigne as the type of the skeptic in his "Representative Men." True, Emerson does not deem Montaigne the absolute skeptic Pascal takes him for, but rather a man who set himself with care to see things as they are in entire contempt of consequence. Montaigne's emblematic scales, and his motto, *Que sais jes*, meant, as Emerson thinks, Though thrones, altars, and governments totter and go down under honest scrutiny, I will scrutinize them all. But Pascal points out that the old Gascon attempted to discredit the very axioms of mathematics, and grew indifferent to certain vices, and that his virtues had no root in strong conviction. Pascal was surely more just in his judgment of Montaigne than Emerson. In a later essay Emerson confesses that his love for the old skeptic had cooled. In the "History of Port Royal" Sainte Beuve aptly defines Montaigne as the type of the old man, that unregenerate humanity, upon which no transforming influence has descended from the cross. Here, too, he has affinity with Emerson. There is not a word in Emerson's writings to show that he ever had any true conception, not to say experience, of the Divine energy which has made the Church the mother of the saints. Christ was never understood till Emerson came, if we may trust the testimony of one who shows that he never understood him, a conclusion which would make the grandest life ever lived on earth the most stupendous failure in history!

What then could have been looked for when Emerson, unregenerate and skeptical, was put to the study and estimation of Unitarianism as the highest form of Christianity? What, but the rejection of the entire system as insufficient for the religious needs of mankind. The founders of New England Unitarianism had been at work upon the Christian system, with the utmost zeal, to show that, since one cannot be three, a trinity in unity is not possible; that, since Christ is not divine, the worship of the Church is mainly idolatry; that the Old Testament is largely unreliable and mythical, and that human reason is arbiter in all articles of faith. They had thus contrived a system nearly as dry and artificial as themselves, in which they hoped all good, respectable young men would rest satisfied. A large proportion of the abler and nobler men who have entered the ministry of that communion have deeply felt its weakness as a religious scheme. The men who have been reasonably content with it have not been its princes in intellect. Ware, Francis, Noyes, Lampson, Greenwood, Hill, Gannett, and Walker, belong to this class; excellent and able as they are, they are all alike stamped with a peculiar narrowness. An abler set, like Norton, Hedge, and Bartol, has remained in the denomination, but has made no account of its restraints. Everett, Parker, Huntingdon, took each his own road out of that fold. The atmosphere of the sect was charged with doubt to such a degree that a natural skeptic like Emerson, as he grew up in it, was coaxed and urged to ask all manner of questions. Then there was nothing in its doctrines to appeal to and satisfy certain other dispositions in Emerson. No skeptic is a pure skeptic. It often happens that minds which lie most open to unbelief also lie open on other sides to the enticements of faith and the raptures of mysticism. John Henry Newman had an early tendency to liberal opinions in religion, and has ended in the most complete subjection to ecclesiastical authority. Emerson, under other conditions, might have come to a similar position. He is religious even to mysticism. Where he sees cause to accept and abide by a wonder, the most enormous obstacles are no hinderance. No man in our generation has made so light of hard questions, when he supposed he had some good interior basis of conviction, as he. To this side of his nature Socinianism made no appeal.

It was a Christianity without Christ, a worship without mystery or spiritual elevation, a dry drill in barren moralities, a chilly and polar suggestion of summer instead of the tropical glow of faith and love. It was inevitable that Emerson should fall out with pure and simple Unitarianism. As it never occurred to him to test the question whether any other form of Christianity is superior to that, he naturally rejected it in the lump. But either he was not well satisfied with the grounds on which his proceeding was based, or the result was reached in a way so peculiar and personal as not to be transmissible to other minds. That the process was somewhat gradual we have already seen. That he strove for a time to rest his opinions upon some logically satisfactory grounds is sure. It was while he was groping to and fro among these perplexities that there came on a revolution in his system of thought in religion.

The first distinct notice Emerson gave the world of the quality of his new views was contained in his essay on "Nature," published in 1836. Here the first words are significant: "Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. . . . The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight, and not of tradition; and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs?"

This language betrays clearly enough the conviction of Mr. Emerson as to the chief evils under which we suffer, and his hope as to their removal. He deems the history and the institutions of the past so oppressive as to stifle our proper life, and hinder our spontaneous spiritual development. To thwart this tendency he would have each man interpret the facts of the universe for himself. Only so can man enjoy an original relation to nature. The philosophical basis of this scheme is simple. Nature includes whatever is not the soul, the body, other souls, the material universe, and the over-soul, or what we call God.

Emerson perceives that something must be put in place of the Church, the Bible, and Christian creeds. He involuntarily asks himself, What should it be? The only good answer he can hit on is, The soul. Emerson holds that the progress of the soul is from within outward, from the consciousness of self to the

consciousness of things external to self; hence from self-knowledge to knowledge of things remotest from the soul. The soul is in close and essential relations with the Universal, the Eternal, and the Absolute. Hence it is oracular, and yields the wise listener the best attainable knowledge on all topics. This thought is so fundamental and so dominating in Emerson's writings that we exhibit it in several citations. He writes:—

Meantime, while the doors of the temple stand open night and day, it is guarded by one stern condition: this, namely, it is an intuition. Truly speaking, it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from another soul. What he announces I must find true in me or wholly reject; and on his word and as his second, be he who he may, I can accept nothing. . . . Once man was all; now he is an appendage, a nuisance. And because the indwelling supreme spirit cannot wholly be got rid of, the doctrine of it suffers this perversion, that the divine nature is attributed to one or two persons, and denied of the rest, and denied with fury. The doctrine of inspiration is lost. . . . Miracles, prophecy, poetry, the ideal life, the holy life, exist as ancient history merely.

Here the individual soul is, with the most deliberate purpose, declared to be of divine nature, and of paramount authority within its own domain over all other souls, and over all truth. This stout affirmation of the pre-eminence of each soul is grounded on Emerson's conception of its nature:—

There is a deeper fact in the soul than compensation, to wit, its own nature. The soul is not a compensation, but a life. The soul is. Under all this running sea of circumstance, whose waters ebb and flow with perfect balance, lies the aboriginal abyss of real being. Essence, or God, is not a relation, or a part, but the whole. Being is the vast affirmative excluding negation, self-balanced, swallowing up all relations, parts, and times within itself.

While this passage would require no little comment, some things are clear. If the soul be of divine nature, oracular, and in communion with the infinite and eternal All, it need not go abroad for truth. The few pregnant sentences on this subject, in "Nature," are the following:—

Undoubtedly we have no questions to ask which are unanswerable. We must trust the perfection of the universe so far as to believe, that whatever curiosity the order of things has awakened in our minds the order of things can satisfy. The intellect



searches out the absolute order of things as they stand in the mind of God. While we behold unveiled the nature of justice and truth, we learn the difference between the absolute and the conditional, or relative. We apprehend the absolute. . . . Man is conscious of a universal soul within or behind his individual life, wherein, as in a firmament, the natures of justice, truth, love, freedom arise and shine. This universal soul he calls Reason. . . . The visible world and the relation of its parts is the dial-plate of the invisible. Idealism sees the world in God. It beholds the whole circle of persons and things, of actions and events, of country and religion, not as painfully accumulated, atom after atom, act after act, in an aged, creeping Past, but as one vast picture which God paints on the instant eternity for the contemplation of man.

It is not easy to imagine the perplexity which these passages, and others like them, stirred up in the readers of Emerson's book. In certain pages there was a distinct and positive elevation of the individual mind, or soul, to the seats of authority which, in Christian lands, had been long conceded to the Bible and the Church. But, as there was no direct and formal rejection of their claims, room was left for hope that he still held the ordinary opinions. The essay, too, though really pervaded by a very earnest didactic purpose, was so remarkable in its form, so enticing in its poetic beauty, that many were too much occupied with its charms to give critical heed to its teachings. Others would naturally hope that the writer had indulged in a license of expression for literary effect, for which he would not care to be held to a very rigid responsibility. But when we recall the subsequent career of Emerson, there seems no reason to doubt that he had taken up his ground with extreme care, so as to act in the most direct and powerful way upon public opinion. When he spoke the next year at Cambridge, before the Phi Beta Kappa, he had no chance to hide his real drift under poetic forms and licenses. He did not develop his strange thoughts, save in one or two instances, beyond what he had done in "Nature." He spurned bibliolatry, but left it to be inferred that he deemed the current reverence for the Bible bibliolatry. He indirectly repudiated the Christian system by telling his hearers that all the duties of the scholar are comprehended in self-trust. In urging this duty, he showed apprehension that he might not carry his listeners on to his own conclusion, yet he ventured to hint that the primary reason is that it is one soul which animates all men. Here there is an

apparent unwillingness to speak out, as though some uncertainty lingered in his own mind, or he disliked to wound the feelings of others. Meantime, much private discussion and agitation of the new views arose. In the fall of 1836 a company of advanced Unitarians began to meet to discuss these and other questions. That the interest of their debates sprang mainly from this theme appears in the fact that the club was called "The Transcendental Club." This name was meant to indicate the general conviction of its members as to the pre-eminence of the soul over books and Churches and written revelations as a source of truth. We have no precise information as to its leading members, or the character of its usual proceedings; but it is plain, from many indications, that Emerson soon became its master-spirit. Such a company naturally stimulated the development of the new opinions. Its members acted on each other through encouragement and sympathy, and thus prepared the way for a wider and more public announcement of these revolutionary doctrines. A general curiosity went abroad to learn more about the new and radical ideas. On all sides it was foreseen that a hot controversy would arise. Hence, when it was known that the senior class of the Divinity College at Cambridge had invited Emerson to deliver, in 1838, the customary annual sermon, expectation was on tiptoe. The occasion, and the challenge to speak out his inmost thought, were such as would not be likely to occur again; and, though conscious that he must give pain and offense to many, they were not to be declined. Accordingly, on the evening of Sunday, July 15, 1838, the memorable "Address" before the Divinity School was delivered to a deeply attentive audience. The preacher felt the critical character of his situation. He knew that an open declaration of his sentiments, which he could not well avoid, would stir the public mind and arouse much bitter feeling. Still, a duty was laid upon him and he showed no wish to shun it. His Address was prepared with great care. It abounded in happy thoughts and felicitous expression. It was simple, direct, manly. It avoided a directly polemic form; but the antagonism between the current notions of religion and the new faith was sternly drawn. It was a critical hour and a critical act. It was an arraignment and denunciation of the weaknesses and errors

of Christian Churches as they appeared to Emerson, and an indication of what he thought a better way. Premising that our account gives no hint of the beauty and charm of the discourse, let us attempt a statement of its doctrinal positions. The preacher surveys man as a being capable of knowledge, capable of obligation, percipient of virtue; cognizant, through intuition of the moral sentiment, of the perfection of the laws of the soul, and related through his own choices to all possible good or evil. These facts have always suggested to man the sublime creed that the world is the product of one will, of one mind; that one mind is active every-where, in each ray of the star, in each wavelet of the pool; and that whatever opposes that will is every-where balked and baffled because things are made so, and not otherwise. It is the perception of this law which awakens in us the religious sentiment, our highest happiness. It teaches man that the spring of all good is in himself, that he is an inlet into the deeps of Reason. This sentiment is the basis of society, and successively creates all forms of worship. Access to it is free to all, but under one stern condition, namely, it is an intuition. The evils of the times grow out of neglect of these principles. So far the discussion was general; but the preacher next proceeded to point out two gross errors in the administration of Christianity. He paused to give his conception of Jesus. He was a true prophet.

He saw with open eye the mystery of the soul. . . . He saw that God incarnates himself in man, and ever goes forth anew to take possession of the world. He said, in this jubilee of sublime emotion, "I am divine. Through me, God acts—through me, speaks. Would you see God? see me; or see thee when thou thinkest as I now think." Thus was he true man, and the only soul in history who rated man at his true worth. Hence, popular Christianity errs by making too much of the person of Christ, by insisting that men shall subordinate their natures to his. That which gives me to myself is best. The sublime is excited in me by the stoical doctrine, Obey thyself. Others help us only by stimulating us to this duty. Thus, and thus only, can Jesus aid us.

The second great error of the Church lies in her inquest for light on personal duties and public questions; not in the moral nature where God speaks, but in a written revelation.

From these positions the preacher naturally went on to say that faith was high extinct in society. "The soul is not preached.

The Church seems to totter to its fall ; almost all life is extinct. It would be criminal complaisance to tell you that the faith of Christ is preached." "In the soul, then, let the redemption be sought. . . . Yourself a new-born Bard of the Holy Ghost, cast behind you all conformity, and acquaint men at first hand with Deity." The remedy for existing ills "is, first, soul ; and second, soul ; and evermore, soul."

One cannot easily conceive the mingled emotions of delight and vexation awakened in the audience by such a discourse, according as men accepted, denied, or doubted its doctrines. Here was a distinct and unequivocal negation of the authority of Church and Scripture, and such an exaltation of the soul as had never before greeted men's ears in America. No wonder that prudent men were startled, and even rash men held their breath. The thing had not been done on the sly, and could not pass without protest. That evening Henry Ware, Jun., expressed to Emerson his approval of portions of the address, and the next day sent him a letter to forestall a possible misunderstanding. Ware says :—

It has occurred to me that since I said to you last night, I should probably assent to your unqualified statements, if I could take your qualifications with them ; I am bound in fairness to add, that this applies only to a portion, and not to all. With regard to some, I must confess that they appear to me more than doubtful, and that their prevalence would tend to overthrow the authority and influence of Christianity. On this account I look with sorrow and no little anxiety to the course which your mind has been taking.

Emerson replied :—

I could not but feel pain in saying some things in that place and presence which I supposed might meet dissent, and the dissent, I may say, of dear friends and benefactors of mine. Yet, as my conviction is perfect in the substantial truth of the doctrine of this discourse, and is not very new, you will see at once that it must appear to me very important that it be spoken ; and I thought I would not pay the nobleness of my friends so mean a compliment as to suppress my opposition to their supposed views out of fear of offense. I would rather say to them, these things look thus to me ; to you, otherwise. Let us say out our uttermost word, and be the all-pervading truth, as it surely will, judge between us.

Two months later Mr. Ware sent Emerson a copy of a sermon of his aimed at pantheistic views, with certain explana-

tions. He says he knows not how far the sermon and the Address will be found in conflict, since he does not clearly understand Emerson's positions, or "by what arguments the doctrine that 'the soul knows no persons' is justified to your mind." This drew a reply from Emerson so characteristic and important that it must be transcribed entire:—

CONCORD, October 8, 1838.

MY DEAR SIR: I ought sooner to have acknowledged your kind letter of last week, and the sermon it accompanied. The letter was right noble, and manly. The sermon, too, I have read with attention. If it assails any doctrines of mine—perhaps I am not so quick to see it as authors generally—certainly I did not feel any disposition to depart from my habitual contentment that you should say your thought while I say mine.

I believe I must tell you what I think of my new position. It strikes me very oddly that good and wise men at Cambridge and Boston should think of raising me into an object of criticism. I have always been, from my very incapacity of methodical writing, a chartered libertine, free to worship and free to rail, lucky when I could make myself understood, but never esteemed near enough to the institutions and mind of society to deserve the notice of the masters of literature and religion. I have appreciated fully the advantages of my position, for I well know that there is no scholar less willing or less able to be a polemic. I could not give account of myself if challenged. I could not possibly give you one of the "arguments" you cruelly hint at, on which any doctrine of mine stands. For I do not know what arguments mean in reference to any expression of a thought. I delight in telling what I think; but if you ask me how I dare say so, or why it is so, I am the most helpless of mortal men. I do not even see that either of these questions admits of an answer. So that, in the present droll posture of my affairs, when I see myself suddenly raised into the importance of a heretic, I am very uneasy when I advert to the supposed duties of such a personage, who is to make good his thesis against all comers.

I certainly shall do no such thing. I shall read what you and other good men write, as I have always done, glad when you speak my thoughts, and skipping the page that has nothing for me. I shall go on just as before, seeing whatever I can and telling what I see, and, I suppose, with the same fortune that has hitherto attended me; the joy of finding that my abler and better brothers, who work with the sympathy of society, loving and beloved, do now and then unexpectedly confirm my perception, and find that my nonsense is only their own thought in motley. And so I am your affectionate servant,

R. W. EMERSON.

We get another glimpse of Emerson in those stirring days from the Journal of Dr. Francis: —

September, 1838. Spent the night at Mr. Emerson's. When we were alone he talked of his discourse at the Divinity School, and of the obloquy it had drawn upon him. He is perfectly quiet amid the storm. To my objections and remarks he gave the most candid replies, though we could not agree on some points. The more I see of this beautiful spirit, the more I revere and love him; such a calm, steady, simple soul, always looking for truth, and living in wisdom and in love for man and goodness, I have never met. Mr. Emerson is not one whose vocation it is to state processes of argument; he is a seer who reports in sweet and significant words what he sees. He looks into the infinite of truth, and records what there passes before his vision. If you see it as he does, you will recognize him for a gifted teacher; if not, there is little or nothing to be said about it. But do not brand him with the names of *visionary*, or *fanatic*, or *pretender*; he is no such thing—he is a true, Godful man, though in his love for the ideal he disregards too much the actual.

We may well be thankful to foolish Francis that he did not blab his own commonplaces altogether, and leave Emerson standing there in the dark, wholly dumb. Such men teach us the worth of a Boswell. But some value attaches to Francis's report, since he was probably a mere echo of Emerson's notions about himself, as we gather from the similarity between Francis's record and Emerson's letter to Ware a few weeks later.

In the lecture on "The Transcendentalist," Emerson reports that Kant showed—

There is a very important class of ideas, or imperative forms, which did not come by experience, but through which experience is acquired; that these are intuitions of the mind itself, and he denominated them *transcendental* forms. The extraordinary profoundness and precision of that man's thinking have given vogue to his nomenclature in Europe and America to that extent, that whatever belongs to the class of intuitive thought is popularly called at the present day *Transcendental*.

Although, as we have said, there is no pure Transcendentalist, yet the tendency to respect the intuitions, and to give them, at least in our creed, all authority over our experience, has deeply colored the conversation and poetry of the present day; and the history and genius of religion in these times, though impure, and as yet not incarnated in any powerful individual, will be the history of this tendency.

We now have all the materials needed in order to see where—in the new religious views of Emerson are in conflict with the Christian faith. Emerson rejects written revelation as impossible and unnecessary, denies that the Church is the pillar



and ground of truth, repudiates the peculiar divinity, supreme religious authority, and redeeming work of Christ, and brands as encroachment any attempt at enforcing the claims of Christian creeds. He affirms that the soul is the only oracle of truth; that it has access to all truth; that its clear decisions are of final authority; and that it perceives truth by direct contemplation or intuition, and not by logical process. Hence, it appears that Emerson had broken totally with Christianity on the vital question, What is the ultimate authority in religion? His repudiation of arguments, as of no force in regard to the questions raised in the Address, is worthy of especial attention. It shows that he rests his assertions on intuition as their sufficient basis; for surely arguments are of great consequence in all matters which do not fall under the immediate notice of the soul. He not only represents man as an inlet into all reason, but tells him, "In yourself slumbers all reason," and makes it a duty to worship the soul. "Nature and man are of one root; and that root—Is it not the soul of his soul?" "I conceive man as always spoken to from behind, and unable to turn and see the speaker. In all the millions who have heard the voice, none ever saw the face. . . . That well-known voice speaks all languages, governs all men, and none ever caught a glimpse of its form. If a man will exactly obey it, it will adopt him, so that he shall not any longer separate it from himself in his thought—he shall seem to be it; he shall be it. . . . His health and greatness consist in his being the channel through which heaven flows to earth; in short, in the fullness with which an ecstatic state takes place in him. It is pitiful to be an artist, when, by forbearing to be an artist, we might be vessels filled with divine overflowings, enriched by the circulations of omniscience and omnipotence. Are there not moments in the history of heaven when the human race was not counted by individuals, but only as the Influenced, was God in distribution, was God rushing into multiform benefit?" In one place he complains "that the community in which we live will hardly bear to be told that every man should be open to ecstacy or a divine illumination, and his daily walk elevated by communion with the spiritual world;" in another he boasts that "it almost seems as if what was aforetime spoken fabulously and hieroglyphically was now spoken plainly, the

doctrine, namely, of the indwelling of the Creator in man." In another place he distinctly repudiates the ancient religion, and says: "I stand here to say, Let us worship the mighty and transcendent soul."

These sentences contain the pith and marrow of the Emersonian doctrines. The most careful analysis of what he published before the first series of the essays appeared will reveal no other general principles. They are stated with the utmost beauty, and with all possible variations of emphasis; the results which are ultimately to ensue from their adoption are also stated:—

We are to revise the whole of our social structure, the State, the school, religion, marriage, trade, science, and explore their foundations in our own nature; we are to see that the world not only fitted the former men, but fits us, and to clear ourselves of every usage which has not its roots in our own mind. What is a man born for but to be a reformer, a re-maker of what man has made?

The poems repeat the same thoughts:—

"Out from the heart of nature rolled  
The burdens of the Bible old;  
The litanies of nations came,  
Like the volcano's tongue of flame,  
Up from the burning core below,  
The canticles of love and woe;  
The hand that rounded Peter's dome,  
And groined the aisles of Christian Rome,  
Wrought in a sad sincerity;  
Himself from God he could not free;  
He builded better than he knew;  
The conscious stone to beauty grew. . . .  
The passive Master lent his hand  
To the vast soul that o'er him planned;  
And the same power that reared the shrine,  
Bestrode the tribes that dwelt within.  
Ever the fiery Pentecost  
Girds with one flame the countless host,  
Trances the heart through chanting choirs,  
And through the priest the mind inspires."

Again:

"Thou seek'st in globe and galaxy;  
He hides in pure transparency.  
Thou askest in fountains and fires;  
He is the essence that inquires."

He is the axis of the star;  
 He is the sparkle of the spar;  
 He is the heart of every creature;  
 He is the meaning of each feature;  
 And his mind is the sky,  
 Than all it holds more deep, more high."

Before going on to show what results Emerson has reached, let us try to see what his method is:—

Our thing is a pious reception. Our truth of thought is therefore vitiated as much by too violent direction given by our will, as by too great negligence. We do not determine what we will think. We only open our senses—clear away, as we can, all obstruction from the fact, and suffer the intellect to see. We have little control over our thoughts. We are the prisoners of ideas. They catch us up for moments into their heaven, and so fully engage us that we take no thought for the morrow; gaze like children, without an effort to make them our own. By and by we fall out of that rapture, bethink us where we have been, what we have seen, and repeat as truly as we can what we have beheld. As far as we can recall these ecstasies we carry away in the ineffaceable memory the result, and all men and all ages confirm it. It is called truth.

The same thoughts are expanded in these words from "The Over-Soul:"—

We distinguish the announcements of the soul, its manifestations of its own nature, by the term *revelation*. These are always attended by the emotion of the sublime. For this communication is an influx of the divine mind into our mind. It is an ebb of the individual rivulet before the flowing surges of the sea of life. Every distinct apprehension of this central commandment agitates men with awe and delight. A thrill passes through all men at the reception of new truths, or at the performance of a great action, which come out of the heart of nature. In these communications the power to see is not separated from the will to do, but the insight proceeds from obedience, and the obedience proceeds from a joyful perception. Every moment when the individual feels himself invaded by it is memorable. By the necessity of our nature a certain enthusiasm attends the individual's consciousness of that divine presence. The character and duration of this enthusiasm varies with the state of the individual, from an ecstasy and trance and prophetic inspiration, which is its rarer appearance, to the faintest glow of virtuous emotion. . . . A certain tendency to insanity has always attended the opening of the religious sense in men, as if they had been "blasted with excess of light."

Such are the fundamental principles which Emerson felt moved to proclaim to the world. He had renounced the pulpit; he was incapable of regular and methodical production, and admission to suitable journals was not easy to obtain. He sought to establish an organ for the new views, but the enterprise always failed. Hence he was more and more driven to lecturing. These lectures were afterward worked up into book form, and aided in creating for him a small but appreciative audience. His writings are full of poetry, with the exception of his poems. He thinks in images. Hence his most illogical essay abounds in beauties which would make the fortune of any writer. His pages bristle and are alive with pictures and allegories. These always please those who do not puzzle themselves with his peculiar doctrines, but give themselves up to his imaginative splendors. For thirty years the poet in Emerson has procured toleration for the philosopher. Curiously enough, too, he has fancied the philosophy the main thing, while the wiser public has humored his whim for the sake of something far better. In another article we shall show the results to which these doctrines have led, and test their philosophical worth.

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## ART. II.—SKEPTICISM AND FAITH CONSIDERED AS MOTIVE POWERS.

### SENSE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND REASON CONSIDERED AS AUTHORITY FOR FAITH.

This is the age of materialism. Never before has it lifted its head so high, or exerted so large an influence over the popular mind. Science has been pressed into its service, very openly and very effectively. Great men have lent the influence of their names to its support. The doctrines of the correlation of forces, microscopic examinations of the nature of protoplasm, experiments seeking to determine the nature of organic life, all conducted by experienced and skillful men, have been pressed into the service of completing the fascinating generalizations of the age. The modesty which the scientific man usually exhibits, while interpreting the results of his ex-

ploration in his own peculiar domain, sometimes abandons him ; especially when he ventures upon the less familiar ground of metaphysics and theology. Here, the candid, cautious bearing of the physicist is too often replaced by the blustering self-sufficiency of the egotist.

That scientists, in their own domain, are as earnest, capable, and honest as any other class of men, may be freely admitted. But sometimes they wander away from home—these princes in physical science—and, in their new surroundings, cannot realize that they are simply strangers ; distinguished, indeed, but unqualified to judge or dictate. When Prof. Huxley boasted that skepticism had done more for the world than faith, he was either exceedingly ignorant or exceedingly careless. A man of less prominence might use words in that loose way without attracting much attention ; but Prof. Huxley cannot take such liberties without causing alarm. The Professor's deservedly great reputation will give, not only currency, but authority to the preposterous idea among the thousands of less eminent men who are ever ready to echo any infidel sentiment.

But what can the Professor mean when he attributes to skepticism the functions of a motive power ? What example can he give of doubt or disbelief ever prompting to any kind of action ? Does not the experience of any one tell him that, just in proportion to his skepticism in any direction, is his tendency to act in that direction diminished ? Skepticism, in regard to religion, has never been known to make one anxious to secure his peace with God, any more than it has ever stimulated one to become a philosopher when it has been directed toward science.

The strange assertion can hardly be explained to mean, that skeptics in religion have done much more for science than believers in religion have done, and that, therefore, skepticism must receive the credit for scientific progress ; because it was not skepticism in religion, but rather faith in the productiveness of scientific exploration, which was the stimulus to, all such labor. Skepticism may represent stagnation, but never action. All the powers which it covers droop and die ; all the energies which it touches are paralyzed. One may as well say that inertia accomplishes far more in the physical

world than momentum, as say that skepticism does more than faith.

If, on the other hand, the learned Professor really meant to say that skeptics have done more for the world's progress than believers, it is time to appeal to the evidence of history and fact. In this examination it matters not if, sometimes, the religion were false, if the people believed in what did not exist, and expected what could never happen. The fact that scientists labored for ages, and are probably yet laboring, to establish theories which are false upon the basis of principles which are imaginary, is no reason for saying that the efforts were not for the cause of science. So in this case, what has been done for the world through the impulses of religious faith is of equal weight, whether the faith were or were not well founded.

Consider, then, the influence of religious faith upon the *Architecture* of the world. In every nation and in every age the temple of worship is ever the most grand and impressive structure which meets the eye. Faith built the cromlechs and the pyramids, the pagodas and the mosques. Faith erected and adorned the Christian churches of Italy, Germany, France, England, and America, and gave them such beauty of proportion, richness of decoration, and grandeur of effect, that they are the pride and wonder of the world.

What has skepticism done for architecture? What has it done to command the attention of the world? Where are its trophies? It evidently furnishes no adequate motive for what is truly great or noble in this art.

The *sculpture* of the world is equally the product of faith. What else could have inspired the genius of those great men who symbolized in stone the divinities of Egypt, Syria, Greece, and Rome? What but religion could furnish such subjects as those of Jewish history, from Moses to Christ?

*Painting* is also indebted to faith for its highest triumphs and its most glorious conceptions. Christianity led the art from darkness to light. Before the advent of Christ the art of painting was hardly in existence; its forms were crude and unnatural, and its execution unskillful and inexpressive. The grandeur of Bible history furnished the fitting subjects, the sublimity of Christian ideas gave the inspiration, the demand



of the Christian world for the highest efforts of art, afforded the requisite occasion.

Where are the sculpture and the painting of infidelity? Infidelity can furnish no motives or inspirations for art. It has no place in the galleries.

In the department of *poetry* it shows to no better advantage. What lofty theme has it afforded to the poetic muse? Very manifestly there is no poetry in infidelity. Its home is in the latitudes of perpetual congelation, where no flowers bloom and no balmy breezes blow. On the other hand the poetry of faith covers the world. Not only did Job, Moses, the Hebrew prophets, and Psalmists worship God; but Milton, Dante, and the modern poets, utter their noblest strains at the bidding of faith.

Literature, in all its departments, acknowledges its chief indebtedness to the same power. Examine the libraries of the world for proof that the best exertions of the greatest masters in language, metaphysics, history, and morals, have been developed under the dominion of faith. All this may be said without deteriorating from the credit due to such skeptics as have honored science and literature.

Not many ages ago all learning in the natural sciences—as well as in all other things—was in the hands of the clergy. To-day, the colleges and universities of the world, with the higher academies and scientific schools, are nearly all under the control of the religion of the world. Not only their founders, but their professors and teachers, act under the influence of faith. These higher institutions were organized, endowed, and carried on as the instruments of religious zeal for the enlightenment and elevation of the race.

But, chief of all, consider the *home*—the family. Is it not faith which has organized it, as it is found in its best state of development? Has not faith thrown her protecting arms around virtue, made home sacred, and given the enlightened world a domestic life infinitely above the loftiest dream of skepticism? Infidelity cannot appreciate this life. It has contributed nothing toward either its material, its advancement, or its stability. On the contrary, whatever effort it has made to mold either the social or domestic institutions of the world, has invariably comprehended in its plan either the breaking down of the

barriers between vice and virtue, the overthrow of the Christian Sabbath, or the weakening or sundering of the bonds of conjugal life. If infidelity had its own way it would soon reduce the world, not merely to a state of barbarism, but to one of brutality. The triumph of skepticism would be the death of civilization. It is the faith of the world which keeps it from universal stagnation and corruption. The history of the world does not at all support the idea that skepticism has done more for it than faith.

In direct contrast to skepticism, faith is a true motive power. In its broadest sense it is the basis, not merely of all the moral and religious movements of individuals or communities, but also of all other enterprises and undertakings of every description. The statement of a few cases will sufficiently illustrate this position.

The husbandman laboriously prepares the soil, scatters the precious seed upon it, and waits. He knows that air, warmth, light, and moisture, are necessary to a harvest. He knows that he cannot control one of these agents, or make a single seed grow, but he *believes* that there will be a harvest to repay his toil. This faith makes his disposition to labor possible.

The merchant invests his fortune in goods, commits the goods to a ship, that they may be carried over the uncertain sea and sold advantageously in a foreign land. He does not understand navigation; he cannot control the winds or the waves; but he has *faith* in the skill of the captain to so manage the sails and the vessel that, whether the winds blow from the north or south, or east or west, they will waft his goods to the desired haven.

The physicist carefully interrogates nature to learn another of her mysteries. He experiments, even through the hours which give sleep to others. He is surprised by the morning, before he can cease to watch and listen for the words which he longs to hear—every sense awake, every faculty on the stretch. Again and again he retires from the oratory of nature, trembling and exhausted; still unsatisfied, but still courageous. Why does he labor and suffer so much? Because he *believes* that he will be answered, promptly and truly, whenever he asks aright; because he believes that the interpretation of

these answers will do good in the world. His faith upholds him in all his efforts.

Into whatever department of human enterprise we look, we see that faith is the power which moves all the energies employed in the work.

In previous numbers of this "Quarterly," Dr. Jewell very forcibly exhibited the carelessness of statement and looseness of definition indulged in by some leading scientists even when treating upon their own professional subjects. This shows that there is some need of a re-investigation of the fundamental conditions of knowledge. A good thinker once said that "embarrassed, obscure, and feeble language is the result of embarrassed, obscure, and feeble thought." Is it possible to clearly state the difference between believing and knowing, between faith and science? At least, may there not be given a description of the circumstances under which one can really know, or merely believe, and of the organs and faculties concerned in these several acts? This description, if successful, may enable us to see the true basis upon which knowledge and faith must rest.

By knowledge is not meant guesses, surmises, opinions, or probabilities, but absolute *certainty*. What one knows he cannot be made to doubt by any process of reasoning, or by any considerations whatever. For example, a man meets his friend on the street, takes him by the hand, converses with him, exchanges views with him on items of business known only to themselves. It would be impossible to persuade this man that he had not encountered his friend. He *knows*. The certainty of this knowledge can be neither increased nor diminished.

All the objects of knowledge are evidently comprehended in the two classes, objective and subjective—the outer world and the inner. God's design in creating man could not be accomplished without this power of knowing, and he therefore gave him certain organs and faculties accurately adapted to this purpose. No one has been bold enough to question this adaptation in any particular. No one has ever seriously suggested any improvement in the construction of a human being. He is made right.

Regarding the outer world, all that can possibly be known

must have relation to the existence and the action of matter, and to the expression of the mental states and acts of others. The physical organs through which all this knowledge must come are called organs of sense; the mental faculties upon which these physical organs act directly are called the senses. That a knowledge of the existence, properties, and action of matter can come only through the senses needs no exemplification; but some may doubt if the action of other minds approaches through the same channels. But how does one human being act upon another? Only by language, natural or artificial. But all language, whether spoken, written, or printed; whether it consist of gestures, inarticulate sounds, or play of countenance, is the result of muscular action alone, and, therefore, can appeal only to our senses. We are so constituted that we cannot resist this appeal, any more than that of matter. In both cases the reception of knowledge through the senses is direct, automatic, and *infallible*.

In examining this subject two sources of error must be carefully avoided.

The first is found in the tendency to confound the organ with the sense. They are radically different. The eye is the organ of sight, but not the sense. Even a telescope or a microscope might be called at least an artificial organ of sight, since either will enable us to see what cannot be seen without it; but it would be absurd to call them senses. The true distinction between the sense and the organ appears to be that the organ is always external, belongs to the outer world of matter, and is the *creation of the higher nature*; the sense is always internal, belongs to the inner world of mind, and has power to prepare the physical action of the organ for the use of the higher nature.

If, therefore, the organ be imperfect or diseased, and yet capable of acting upon the sense, it may transmit a knowledge of its own condition, as a part of the outer world, in connection with whatever other intelligence it may have to report. For example, if the eye be jaundiced, it is quite as important that a correct knowledge of this state of the organ be conveyed to us, as that we should know the condition, as to its action on light, of any other portion of the outer world. This knowledge is also absolute. It would be as impossible to persuade

a jaundiced patient that he does not see a yellow tint spread over all objects before him, as to persuade him that he does not see the objects themselves. What he receives from both is knowledge—absolute certainty. The fact that he knows that a sheet of paper is white, does not in the least interfere with his knowledge that, to him, it now appears yellow.

The second error grows out of a tendency to confound the results of judging and reasoning with the sensations. The voice of a person out of sight might remind the hearer of the voice of a friend. He listens; compares it with his conceptions of his friend's voice; finally, judges it to be really his, when it proves to be the voice of a stranger. An object may be seen at a distance so great, or in a light so uncertain, that the form is only obscurely defined to the sense. The observer is not satisfied with this. He wants to know precisely what it is. He compares, judges, reasons it out, to be a man. He approaches nearer. It begins to take definite form, and he finds it to be only a stump. In both of these cases the senses gave exact information of the action of the outer objects upon them, but hasty judgment, and reasoning upon these false judgments, drew wrong conclusions from the sensations. It is the judgment and reason which commit these mistakes, and not the senses.

May it not be concluded, therefore, that the knowledge derived from the senses consists of the action of the outer world upon them; that we are constructed in such a manner that the action upon an organ of sense is followed by the corresponding mental state, as certainly as the motion of the weight of a well-constructed clock is followed by the motion of the hands; and that the will, the judgment, or the reason, has nothing to do in the case? What the senses report we cannot help receiving. If the organ be distinguished from the sense, and the reports of sense from the efforts made to interpret them, there can be no difficulty in seeing that the evidence of the senses is infallible.

On this sure foundation rest all the facts of physical science, and by far the greater part of those of common life. Notwithstanding the most elaborate proofs of the uncertainty of the action of the senses, and of the impossibility of being certain of even the existence of matter, we implicitly rely upon the

testimony of our senses, and *know* that their testimony is true. However erroneously we may reason on the facts, the facts themselves are invulnerable.

A brief examination of the reason, and of the circumstances under which it acts, will show its value and reliability as a source of knowledge. So far as the process of reasoning is concerned, it is evidently infallible. But, as the conclusions are always based upon the comparison of two judgments, and these judgments may be erroneous, it follows that the conclusions, though accurately inferred from the premises, may be false. This liability necessarily results from finite knowledge. To render the deductions of reason infallible requires absolute omniscience.

Again, the action of reason is always voluntary. This is also true of the judgments upon which the conclusions are based. But, if voluntary, the process can be arrested at any point of its progress, and the conclusion fail to be reached. Even when the judgments are complete, the process may still remain unfinished. It would appear that this is practically true in a vast majority of cases. A change of purpose, the arresting of the attention by something else, or indifference as to whether a conclusion be reached or not, will always be sufficient to arrest the process. If we add to this the difficulties which attend the process in the many complicated questions of science, and in the still more intricate labyrinths of the events of common life, it will cease to be wondered at that we often tire of the labor, and either jump at conclusions before the half of the reasoning necessary has been accomplished, or abandon the task in despair.

If to the above considerations be added this also, that one never reasons but at the instigation of desire, the way is prepared for a proper estimate of the rank and authority of reason. Let any one examine himself carefully, and note when and why he reasons upon any subject, and he cannot fail to see that the reason is entirely subject to the desires. Without discussing the functions of the will in this place, it may be sufficient to ask whether it can do any thing more than merely act as the messenger that carries the commands of the *ego* to the faculties which do the work. One thing is certain, the reason always obeys this messenger implicitly, promptly,



and with the required energy. No matter how vile, how polluting, how degrading the work it is commanded to do, it enters upon it as readily and energetically as if it were the most holy. The slanderer or murderer obtains as ready service from his reason as the apostle or the philanthropist. It has never been claimed that the reason of wicked men was any less ready to plot for the success of wrong, than that of righteous men to plan for the accomplishment of right.

And yet many talk of reason sitting on a throne and swaying a scepter! Is there not more poetry than fact in this assertion? Examine the reason candidly. Has it one attribute of freedom? Is it not the veriest slave of which we can form any conception? Did not God intend it to be the servant, and not the master, of the man; and do not all the facts corroborate this position? It has its special work, however, which cannot be performed by any of the other faculties, and it is endowed with adequate and corresponding powers. At the bidding of desire it can "take the wings of the morning," and explore the uttermost parts of the sea; it can penetrate the depths of the earth, examine its structure and condition, and reveal the mysteries of its regions of fire; it can travel backward through periods of time, under the contemplation of which imagination staggers, and find how matter was created, how the universe was built, how elements were formed, how the stars were lighted, and how systems of worlds were bound together. It can mount higher still. It can approach the Almighty and Eternal God, and reverently study his unsearchable, incomprehensible glory. But, wherever it may be sent, whatever treasures of wisdom it may collect, it brings them all home and lays them at the feet of the master whose behests it has obeyed. God made the reason a ready and faithful servant. It is true, that in all this work there are elements of uncertainty, but the results are, nevertheless, immensely valuable. In the process of reducing and refining this material gathered by the reason, fine gold is often found in the bottom of the crucible; and in the process of washing, diamonds of pure luster are seen to glisten among the worthless sands.

The science of mathematics is so peculiar as to deserve a brief description. Its peculiarities are these: it does not depend upon any actual existence; there is nothing in it which

the mathematician did not put there himself; it has no existence or foundation outside of the mind of the mathematician. It is not wonderful, therefore, that he can define exactly what has no existence but in his own definitions, and manage the relations which he himself establishes. Out of these peculiarities grows the fact that this science admits of certainty. In both material and management it is eminently finite. It deals often with infinities—that is, with certain phases of them—but always in an exceedingly finite manner. One other peculiarity deserves special notice—the idea of force or causation does not exist in the science. It takes cognizance solely of certain classes of relations.

Although not depending upon any actual existence, it is capable of most important applications; and, as an instrument of investigation in certain directions, its value can hardly be overrated. The sensitive lines of its analysis, arising from correct data, are capable of the most astounding accuracy of indication.

In the study of natural objects or real events, the reason operates on a totally different material. The philosopher did not endow these objects with their being and properties, or establish the relations which exist between the events. As he can never be certain that he knows all the properties, and that he makes proper allowance for every influence, his judgments must be liable to be erroneous and his conclusions doubtful. In the fields of physical science and real life, he is an explorer and not a master; he deals with force and causation, rather than with abstract definition; he studies the manifestations of the power of God, and not theorems spun from the minds of men. Infinite knowledge, the condition of absolute reliability here, does not exist, and therefore the conclusions are fallible. As authority for faith the senses are infallible, the reason fallible.

The same philosophers, who consider the evidence of the reason more reliable than that of the senses, appear disposed to place its authority above that of consciousness also. The infatuation for the "supremacy of reason" appears to make them forget that the floods of erroneous theorizing, which are always overflowing the world, are the work of reason, and that all which endures is fact. The consciousness has its world of facts, as well as the senses. That man should have reliable in-

formation of all that transpires in his own inner being, is necessary to the compatibility and harmony of his nature. To control and guide his mental states and acts, he must *know* them all. Probability will not do. There must be no mistake here, and, like the beating of the heart, this knowledge must be independent of the will. The bare possibility of error in this matter would destroy all human responsibility, and prove that the great Creator of heaven and earth was less wise than the creature which he had made. Such blasphemy can hardly be supposed to exist.

The faculty whose function it is to report to the *ego* all internal states and acts has been named the consciousness. Its action, like that of the senses, is wholly involuntary and automatic. We are so constituted that the evidence of this witness is irresistible. It is simply absolute, and cannot be either weakened or strengthened by any means whatever. When consciousness tells you that you are thinking certain thoughts, are affected by certain emotions, or distinguished by certain desires, you *know* that the testimony is true. Nothing can weaken your confidence in its accuracy. If it should be asked, How much of the testimony of consciousness is true? the answer must be, Every particle of it. No mistakes can ever be made by it. Its evidence is as true as the voice of God—it is *infallible*.

Desirous to know more of the mental state than consciousness is able to report, the judgment and reason are often employed to supplement this report, and decide upon the origin and other relations of the state reported. In this case, as in regard to the senses, they sometimes greatly err, and the error is wrongfully attributed to the consciousness. A person may have certain thoughts whose origin he does not know, and he erroneously considers them a revelation from God. This error is not the fault of consciousness. One may deceive himself to any amount in these things as well as in regard to objects of sense. He may see visions, dream dreams, and experience raptures which neither the senses nor the consciousness had any thing to do with originating. He has used imagination and reason for the purposes of self-delusion, and has succeeded in confounding their work with that of the higher witness.

This grave error is possible, however, only in one direction.

A person may suppose that the sense, or the consciousness, is acted upon when it is not, but he can hardly suppose that it is not acted upon when it is.

The possibility of sometimes misinterpreting the evidence of consciousness militates no more against the reliability of that evidence than the same possibility regarding the evidence of the senses militates against its reliability. If the evidence of the senses is properly regarded as a sure basis on which to build the noble structure of the physical sciences, the evidence of the consciousness must be regarded as an equally sure basis on which to erect the more noble structure of the metaphysical sciences. If the metaphysician is in duty bound to accept the statements of the physicist concerning the phenomena of matter, the physicist is equally bound to accept the statements of the metaphysician concerning the phenomena of mind.

If it be objected that metaphysicians often show themselves ludicrously ignorant of physical phenomena and principles, it is equally true that the physicist shows himself, full as often, ludicrously ignorant of the phenomena and principles of mind. Fairly considered, metaphysics rests upon as firm a basis as physics. The evidence of consciousness is quite as reliable as that of sense, and quite as authoritative considered as a basis of faith.

Among the various classes of phenomena reported by consciousness, one deserves a separate and distinct recognition. It is that class of phenomena called religious. The whole of religion, like the whole of science, whether historical, revealed, or experimental, rests upon evidence. It will be at once conceded that experimental religion, like experimental science, is a widely different thing from either of the others. As one may be profoundly versed in the history of the sciences and know nothing of them experimentally, so one may be deeply versed in the historical and revealed lore of religion and be utterly destitute of the experimental knowledge which is the basis of its history.

It is not the purpose of this paper to present the evidences upon which the Scriptures claim to be a revelation from God, but only to examine the foundations of experimental religion. Experimental physics rests upon the evidence of sense, experi-

mental religion upon the evidence of consciousness. Reason has nothing to do with either, and can add nothing to the certainty of either. Faith, in one as much as in the other, rests upon direct and *infallible testimony*.

The idea, that faith can exist without evidence, is so preposterous that it may fairly be questioned if it has ever been seriously and thoughtfully entertained by any man. But some cultivated men talk as though faith were the opposite of reason, and that it signified believing without evidence. They also talk as though reason must furnish the only evidence sufficient to command belief; and yet, when the deductions of reason conflict with the facts of either sense or consciousness, all the world admits that it is the reason which is wrong, and not the facts. How many beautiful theories have been compelled to succumb to facts! The reasoning appeared to be perfect. Not the slightest flaw could be seen. It stood the test, perhaps, for ages. At last a fact is found which is incompatible, and the theory falls.

It is supposed that a little reflection will easily remove the idea that reason furnishes the only appropriate evidence in every case. What reasoning convinces us that the sky is blue, or gold yellow, or iron malleable? Reason could never originate such ideas. Instead of increasing the authority of sense, the inductive syllogism actually diminishes it. For example:—

When every part of a homogeneous substance, which has been examined, uniformly exhibits a certain property, it is *probable* that all other parts of the same substance will, if examined, exhibit the same property.

But every piece of gold which has been examined is yellow; therefore, *it is probable* that all the rest of gold is yellow. It appears, therefore, that, from the *certainty* of the evidence of sense, reason can produce only *probability*.

The same is true when applied to the consciousness. Every theory, however beautiful; every induction or deduction, however finely wrought, must yield to the authority of this witness wherever there is a conflict.

Knowledge is obtained directly by consciousness, just as it is obtained directly by the senses. Whoever wishes to know just how one feels when he receives an electric shock, must him-

self receive such a shock. No words, however well chosen, can give him the idea; no reasoning, however clear, can supply the plan of experience. If, on the other hand, one desires to know how the learned Newton felt when he made his great discovery, his only way is to make a similarly overwhelming discovery. Without this his efforts will be in vain.

Applying this principle to religious experience, it follows that the desire to know the feelings of one who "has fellowship with the Father," or who has the "witness of the Spirit" that he is "born of God," or in whom "Christ is formed, the hope of glory," can be gratified only by actually having this fellowship, by having Christ actually formed within him, by really having the witness of the Spirit that he is born of God. Until he has this experience he must remain ignorant of this class of ideas. Even Christ did not attempt to communicate them to the ruler who came to him by night, by any verbal formulas, but only impressed upon him, by illustration, the impossibility of learning them in any such manner. He knew that he had created man according to a model which must render such a task impossible, even to himself. Reason is not concerned at all in this evidence any more than in proving that grass is green, or gold yellow. The evidence of such states or experiences belongs wholly to consciousness. One who has never had such experiences knows nothing about them. He is as incompetent to judge or reason accurately concerning them as a blind man would be to criticise a painting, a deaf man to judge of the effectiveness of an oratorio, or a living man to judge of the experiences of the dying.

The physicist rightly holds that one unacquainted with his sciences is incompetent to judge them; the Divine claims, with equal justice, that he who has never complied with the commands and invitations of the Gospel, is quite as incompetent to judge concerning its claims. If one wishes to know what repentance is, he must repent. If he desires to know what forgiveness includes, he must sincerely plead the promises of the Gospel before the mercy-seat of God in the name of Jesus. God will pardon him, will "regenerate" him, and give him the "witness of the Spirit," while his own consciousness will give the corresponding testimony, that this work has been done in him, thereby authorizing him to "rejoice with



joy unspeakable." There is no other way in which correct ideas of these experiences can be obtained.

Should a skeptic claim that he has no faith in the Gospel; that he does not believe in God, or in Christ; and that, therefore, he cannot be affected by the Gospel, or properly obey its calls; the reply is, first, that he has rejected religion without any adequate knowledge of its nature, or examination of the evidence on which it rests. He has overlooked the fact, that experimental religion is not a set of opinions, or a theory of God and our moral relations to him, but a fact of consciousness; that it is not of such a nature as to demand, for its reception, a highly cultivated intellect and extraordinary powers of reason—for the weakest and least tutored intellects, as well as the strongest, are included in its call.

The weakness of abstract reasoning regarding matters of fact is aptly illustrated by the case of the great English philosopher, who proved most conclusively that it was impossible to cross the Atlantic ocean by steam at the very time when a steamer was actually doing that very impossible thing. In this case, however, Dr. Lardner did not cling to his reasoning and repudiate the fact. The reasoning was very conclusive, but the fact was overwhelming. When certain observations were lately disputed by one who was not an experimentalist, the other very aptly asks, "Why did you not observe for yourself? It needed only a nettle and a microscope—things easily obtained—to settle the point." In like manner, why does not the skeptic experiment for himself in religion? It does not need even a nettle and a microscope. An ever-present God supplies every need.

In the second place, the influence of infidelity, in the direction of experimental religion, exhausts itself merely in *inaction*. It applies only to theology. The reasons urged for the being and attributes of God, and for the inspiration of the Scriptures, may appear inconclusive to him. These reasons, however, do not support the facts; but the facts support the reasons, if they are supported at all. The most potent influence of skepticism appears to be, that it furnishes no motive to attempt either an investigation or recognition of experimental religion—the tendencies in other directions engross the attention and direct the energies. Were it not for the restlessness and misgivings

which the Spirit of God begets in even the most confirmed of this class, there would be nothing to move them toward any religious action.

Many facts appear to prove that, if a candid skeptic would place himself under powerful religious influences for a few days, or even a few hours, his speculative infidelity would be very little in the way of his being speedily and soundly converted to God. Many an infidel has attended the prayer-meetings of humble and, it may be, unscientific Christians, expecting to stifle the "still small voice" within, and to be strengthened in his unbelief. But, as the religious fervor of the meeting increased, an irresistible conviction of the sincerity of the worshipers, and of the reality of their experiences, steals over him, his sympathies begin to move; he at length begins to be convinced; he is met by the power of God; his consciousness reveals a new force, in the presence of which his speculative theories melt like wax before the flame, or vanish like dreams before the light of day. Reason cannot resist for a moment the higher evidence of consciousness. His astonished and joyful utterance is, "One thing I *know*, that, whereas I was blind, now I see." It is an ignorant or a dishonest heart, rather than speculative errors, which keeps a man from the Saviour. One whose speculative creed is orthodox, but whose life is false and dishonest, is harder to be won than an infidel of candor and honesty.

On the evidence of the senses reason constructs theories and builds up systems of philosophy, to stand or fall according as they harmonize with existing and known facts or contradict them. In the flight of time how many such systems of philosophy have been overthrown! As their authors and supporters endeavor to marshal fact after fact under the banners of this sect of philosophy or that, how often does it happen that they obstinately refuse to fall into line, and the cohort has to disband. In like manner, how many theories and systems of theology has reason erected upon the evidence of consciousness and the testimony of history; and how vainly has it tried to marshal under the banner of this sect or that all the phenomena of religious life! Reason is not infallible in religious matters, any more than in those that are physical or intellectual. Mistakes are possible in either direction, and long experience has proved that they are very often actual. How

much is consumed in the trial by fire! Theories and systems are, of necessity, only provisional.

In addition to the fact of finite knowledge is there not another source of error, and one which, unlike this, might be greatly diminished or, perhaps, removed altogether? Is it not true that men who have no experimental knowledge of the matters on which they write, but who are dependent entirely on verbal description for all their ideas, nevertheless, undertake to construct systems upon this very inadequate basis, without any misgivings of their own presumption? Verbal descriptions of facts, whether of sense or consciousness, however expressive to those who have proper experiences, are, to others, always inadequate and often misleading. To one who had always lived within the tropics, how insufficient would be a verbal description of a snow-storm, of the glaciers of Switzerland, or of a polar winter! To one who has never witnessed them, what words could do justice to a volcanic irruption or a destructive earthquake! Who ever obtained an adequate idea of the beauties and wonders of the kaleidoscope or zoetrope by any form of words, however fitly chosen! How much more must this means of obtaining ideas fail, when employed to describe the religious states revealed by the consciousness of the true Christian!

One risks nothing in saying that he who has not studied phenomena, can have only imperfect ideas of their significance; that he who has never explored with the telescope or microscope, can have but feeble ideas of their revelations. For this reason much that is said in opposition to certain phases of physical science must consist, to such an author, of forms of speech without any corresponding ideas.

To an equal, if not greater, extent, this must be true of much that is said against religion. It cannot be otherwise. The religious facts revealed by consciousness are to him utterly unknown, and it would be as impossible for him to have a correct idea of them as it would be for a blind man to enjoy the beauties of a landscape. All that such an one can say of such experiences must be, to himself, sound without sense. Reason deals only with relations. The relations are stated by the judgments. The only safe basis of judgments are the facts of sense and consciousness.

The possibility of reasoning conclusively without ideas of any thing but relations is easily illustrated. For example, take this syllogism :—

All tylopherni are hypnocroids;  
But every condrargus is a tylophernus;  
Therefore, every condrargus is a hypnocroid.

This syllogism is evidently conclusive, whatever be the signification of the terms; or, even, if they have no meaning. The reason is not concerned, either, as to whether a condrargus be or be not a tylophernus. The absence of ideas, or even of truth, does not in the least impede the freely-rolling wheels of reason. But who can justify the labor of writing elaborate treatises on such a plan. Surely it is more important to judge correctly than to reason blindly.

The nature and authority of conscience as an infallible witness cannot be discussed in this paper. If it be clearly distinguished from judgment and reason, it will hardly be difficult to conclude that its evidence regarding the moral state of the person is as conclusive as that of the senses or consciousness in the several domains; that its action also is automatic; therefore necessary and infallible. Whether the standard of morals, which has been set up, be right or wrong, does not affect the case. If any one freely does what he believes to be wrong he is a wicked man, and his conscience will tell him so. The only way to change the verdict of conscience is to change the moral standard. Even when this is done the previous verdict of conscience was, at that time, right.

If the soundness of the preceding views be admitted, it appears certain that religion stands upon a basis as sure and rational as that of the physical sciences. The final appeal cannot be to reason in either case, but to facts: of sense in the one, and of consciousness in the other. Reason furnishes theories, speculations, and systems. Its work is susceptible of continual improvement as new facts and relations are discovered, and is liable to multitudinous corrections and overturns. Its conclusions must change, and ought to change, as the scenery changes to the tourist. The mountain which, at a distance, appears to close up all escape from the valley along which he has been traveling; on a nearer approach, detaches itself from one side or the other, and opens up the way to new and more glorious

scenes beyond. Systems, however useful, are only temporary ; facts are eternal.

The undue exaltation of reason has been a fruitful source of error in both theory and practice. God has given it a definite place in the human being, and definite work to perform. Surely, it is better to clearly understand this place and this work, than to make mistakes so disastrous to truth and right as those which are set forth in human history. The reason sustains a relation to ideas and thoughts similar to that which the muscles sustain to things. The muscles, directly or indirectly, build cottages and palaces, hamlets and cities, machinery and factories, steamships and balloons, halls of debauchery and halls of science. They arm the assassin with a dagger, the husbandman with a cultivator, the astronomer with a telescope, and the missionary with a Bible. Reason builds temples and palaces of thought, rears castles of theories and forges argumentative weapons, to be used for either the benefit or the destruction of truth. It has built, alike, mythologies and theologies, temples of Hindoo and of Christian cosmology—skepticism has no cosmologies ; it cannot account for the *origin* of any thing—pagodas of fashionable morals, and bulwarks of honesty and virtue. The reason is the laborer of the *ego* among the material of thought, the hands among the material of sense ; both are alike servants.

It happened once, in the history of the world, that a formal attempt was made to elevate reason to the throne to which the philosophical world thought she was entitled, and to place a national scepter in her hands. Proclamation was made to the people ; a symbol was procured, placed upon a chariot, decorated with a scepter, and presented to the people. In the extravagance of their zeal, they were not satisfied with making a monarch. They made a god. They offered incense ; bowed down ; worshiped. Proclamation was made. The voices of the infatuated people arose, louder and louder, "Reason is our God." But did all this make reason a god, or even a monarch ? When God creates a slave he makes it perfect. It has not the least attribute of freedom. So that, notwithstanding all that was done—the ensigns of royalty, the worship, the proclamation—reason was still just what God made it, the humble slave of passion and desire. It is not strange, there-

fore, that, in the name of reason, the most absurd and suicidal positions were taken, and that such atrocities were enacted as filled the world with horror. In one word, it was "The reign of terror." The reason was simply doing, faithfully, the work which the worst of passions and the most bloodthirsty desires required. Never exceeding the commands of its master, never falling short where its power is adequate to the work enjoined, reason justified the character of so true and faithful a servant. It was the degraded, besotted, and wicked people who ruled their reason, and not their reason which ruled the people.

Is it premature to say that no man ever was ruled by his reason in the sense claimed, and that God never intended that he should be so ruled? To prevent misconceptions upon this important point an illustration may be useful.

The human being may be likened to a general and his army. Suppose him and his army to be passing through an extensive and unknown country. He wishes to gather all the information he can of the resources and capabilities of this new region. He has a company of faithful and energetic scouts, and he sends them hither and thither to examine and report. They bring him most valuable reports bearing upon present and future supplies of food and water, and on the founding of villages and cities. The general hears all reports, gathers all the information he can of every description, selects what he needs at present, and orders his movements and lays his plans according to this information. Although he would be most foolish to neglect the reports brought by his scouts, no one would say that the scouts ruled the army. The general has still the entire control of both the scouts and the army, and guides the movements of both by his command. In like manner the reason is the scout, the *ego* is the general, and the *ego* rules the reason and all the rest of the man for its own purposes, and in accordance with its own condition, be it groveling or elevated, wicked or righteous.

To the thoughtful it is hoped that the preceding attempt to elucidate some of the functions of both the physical and higher nature will not appear inappropriate to the times, or wholly destitute of that symmetry which must characterize every exhibition of truth.



The following brief summary of what has been stated, or only suggested, may form a fitting conclusion to the essay. Let it be regarded as a statement of the general structure and functions of the human being.

Consider whether or not a man consists of—

1. A higher nature, or *ego*—free, responsible and supreme; having power to use for its own purposes every organ and faculty with which it is endowed.

2. Senses, to receive the action of the outer world, and to report it directly to the *ego*, these reports being automatic and infallible, the basis of all physical science, and the substance of much of real life.

3. Consciousness, to report to the *ego* all internal states and acts, such reports being also automatic and infallible, and being the basis of all metaphysical science and the greater part of all religious life.

4. Conscience, to report to the *ego* its true moral condition. This report is also made automatically, and is the basis of all ethical philosophy outside of revelation.

These three original witnesses give man all that he possess, deserving the name of knowledge, concerning actual existence and events, whether external or internal.

5. Emotions, expressing the states of the *ego* which are directly dependent upon the reports of the three witnesses already described.

6. Desires, expressing conditions of the *ego*, dependent upon such emotions as are cherished, always tending to such action as may contribute toward their gratification.

7. Reason, to elaborate the material furnished by the senses, on the one hand, and the consciousness and conscience on the other, according to the wants of the *ego*, and at its command.

8. Muscles, to execute the desires of the *ego* upon the outer world. These are the only organs which God has furnished for this purpose. We appear to have no other means of acting upon either matter or mind.

9. Will, to carry the commands of the *ego* to the reason or the muscles, for the purpose of working out its desires.

If this be a true representation of the general structure and functions of man, it can hardly be doubted that the claims made in this paper are established. Experimental religion has as

sure a foundation as physical science, and furnishes us just as competent authority for our faith. "If any man *do* his will, he shall *know* of the doctrine"—that is, experiment and *know*. Theology rests upon as firm a basis as natural philosophy, having as undoubted facts for its support and, in addition, an inspired history of many centuries, as a sample of its character, and a standard of comparison.

This brief and imperfect essay is ended. May some far abler pen, inspired by a much more lofty spirit, correct its errors and do justice to its theme!

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#### ART. III.—EWALD'S HISTORY OF ISRAEL.\*

*Geschichte des Volkes Israel.* Von HEINRICH EWALD. Bd. I. *Die Einleitung.* Bd. II. *Die Gottherrschaft.* Bd. III. *Die Königheerrschaft.* Bd. IV. *Die Heiligherrschaft.* Bd. V. *Geschichte Christus' und seiner Zeit.* Bd. VI. *Geschichte des Apostolischen Zeitalters.*

*History of the People of Israel.* By HEINRICH EWALD. Vol. I. Introduction. Vol. II. The Theocracy. Vol. III. The Monarchy. Vol. IV. The Hagiocracy. Vol. V. History of Christ and His Time. Vol. VI. History of the Age of the Apostles.

1. AT length one has arisen to do for the history of Israel what Niebuhr did for the history of Rome, and in these massive volumes we have the quintessence of historical truth distilled from the Bible. The work which the Reformation commenced, but left uncompleted, and which has been in suspense these three hundred years, has been resumed by a master and carried to its logical *ultimatum*, and now Bibliolatry lies shivered into ruins. Here is an answer to the inquiry, said to be *the* question of the hour, how to retain as a practical conviction faith in Christianity as eternal truth without the aid of the artificial prop of an infallible book, hitherto deemed essentially necessary. Here is Christianity pure and simple, freed from the incrustations and morbid growths of ages past—a Christianity all throbbing with life and glowing with moral enthusiasm, of which Christ is heart and head, and in which he shines infinitely great and glorious—but a Christianity without superstition and without idolatry. And finally,

\* We give here in an abridged form an excellent article on "Ewald," by Rev. William Salmond, from the British and Foreign Evangelical Review.—Ed.

here, in finished symmetry, we have presented to us the form of doctrine toward which all Christendom has these many years back been invisibly moving, and the goal is clearly defined toward which, from innumerable pathways, the feet of all true inquirers are making. Ewald is harbinger of the Church of the future. Is it so? Or is all this ponderous learning misdirected and erratic? Is this great and glowing book only a wild romance? Would its writer carry the Christian Church back to a hollow and unfruitful Ebionism? Can it be that the Christian centuries have been dominated by error, and their creations only the building of a tower of Babel? Is Ewald only shrinking in terror from the majesty of Christianity—nothing but a fervent arch-heretic? We raise a profoundly important question. It is already before us, and in its presence most of the controversies, the noise of which fills the air, seem sheer idleness. A beginning has already been made in the translation of Ewald's great work, and it will speedily be before the English public. It is of the kind which for the time being *magnetizes* the reader, and no one acquainted with it can doubt that it will be much read, exercise a profound influence, and make many converts; indeed, it is already discernible that Ewald is powerfully controlling theological thought. We propose, therefore, as faithfully as possible, to reproduce Ewald's view of the nature and development of Christianity as the true and absolute religion, and also to subject it to such criticism as will test its validity, and show what insuperable difficulties it has to encounter before it can hope to obtain the acceptance of Christendom; nay, how it contains within itself the elements of self-refutation and self-destruction.

2. With Ewald's negative position we may be brief. The idea of an infallible Divine book, every word of which records actual history, is superstition—one which flagrantly ignores the very aspect which the Bible wears, and can only be bolstered up by a system of pious fraud. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is a groundless tradition, and, to modern criticism, even a self-evident absurdity and impossibility. The Athanasian creed is idolatry. The Prophets of Israel were only the embodiment of the theocratic spirit, and the Apostles only Christians who had drunk most deeply into the mind of Christ—

otherwise entirely creatures of their age, with all its imperfections and limitations. There is no such thing as prophecy in the sense of a supernatural knowledge of the future. Its utterances are only the intuitions and forebodings of religion evolving its contents and aiming towards self-completion, or sure calculations on the ground of the relation of the eternal righteousness to the world. Nor is there any such thing as a miracle. What seems a miracle is only a higher law—the dynamic force of spirit over matter; and narratives of miracles only show how religion, looking back, idealizes and glorifies its own manifestations in life and history. There are no angels, and there is no kingdom of darkness. The idea of angels is the poetry of religion, and the idea of devils is of foreign growth, one which obtruded itself on Israel, and, from a combination of circumstances, unhappily obtained possession. The true religion is no supernatural revelation, but only the culmination of a natural historical process—for the human mind has a natural determination toward it—and Christ is therefore only ideally from heaven, but really only the ripe fruit of humanity. God's relation to the world and method of dealing with men is uniform from age to age, and fixed as nature's course. In all past time history pursued its course as now, and all the history of the past was shaped by the same forces which shape modern history. There never was a cessation of supernatural interventions, for there never was a supernatural intervention. But all this is only the shadow cast by the body of Ewald's positive doctrine, and therefore it chiefly concerns us to apprehend his affirmations.

3. The point of departure is found in the conception of religion. Religion is a fact in the world—not simply a theory or speculation, but a fact of immediate consciousness and experience. Every man who has found it would as soon question his own existence as its reality, and wherever it reveals itself it makes itself known as the highest and greatest of all the possessions of the human mind. Although the impulse toward religion is native to man, and he cannot be otherwise than religious, it is at the same time necessary that he should be quickened from without—for the most part by the pressure of physical and spiritual wretchedness—that his higher self may awake and seek God. When in such an hour a man descends into the

unsearchable depths within himself he finds God already there, who reveals himself to him as the Holy One and the Saviour—at once as a flaming fire consuming the evil, and, as inexpressible love, lending health and might to the spirit, whereby it swings itself away over all evil, and feels itself blessed, saved, redeemed. He who has attained this experience becomes a new man, is henceforth spiritual, (*pneumatikos*), and, indeed, in the measure of the intensity and purity of his experience, is a prophet and light of men, for has he not seen God and heard his voice, even with the same certainty with which his eye has seen the face of man and his ear heard the sighing of the wind? There neither is nor can be any inspiration but this, and this, too, is revelation.

4. Such, then, is religion. Now, every truth which is destined to become the possession of many, or the common possession of the race, must first of all become, most inwardly and firmly, the possession of one man, in whom it reveals all its glory and all its might. Such a man arose. The man Moses attained to this experience, which is true religion, in such a manner as no other before him had done, and as no other after him did before Christ came—possessed it with unexampled intensity, purity, might, and clearness; and also by a reflective act made its substance the conscious treasure of his spirit as it never before had filled any human spirit. Also, he obeyed it with the most rigorous earnestness, following its guidance into thought and action with undeviating truthfulness. Once, in deepest silence and hiddenness, the divine fire shone before his eyes and thrilled his spirit—he saw God and heard God, and his hour had struck. The shepherd becomes a prophet, and arises to obey the voice which speaks within—a prophet and man of God, having obtained the true religion as fully as the age rendered possible, was sent to put his mind on Israel, and make his individual possession first the peculiar treasure of that nation, and then of all nations.

But it is not to be supposed that Moses was the first man who found the true religion. It had been found by many of his ancestors, and without the inheritance which he had received from them, he could not have become what he was. Nay, in all ages and among all nations men have sought religion and found it. In Egypt, in China, in India, there have been men

who were not inferior to the patriarchs—possibly little inferior to Moses. How was it, then, that Moses became the founder of the true religion? How came he to leave his mark on universal history? The age was ripe for him, and circumstances favored him. The very fascination of the false religion of Egypt, by its sharp antagonism, developed the true religion with unexampled precision; and while all nations have more or less striven to reach the true religion, so much so that it was only as it were by accident that Egypt did not become its home, yet Israel possessed the purest religious instinct and ripest religious genius, and was at that time in such a condition, externally and internally, that it only awaited the summons of the prophet's voice. However, let it be understood that when we speak of Israel we do not speak of a nation which literally sprang from Abraham; for Israel was the collective name given to successive tribes which had at various times emigrated southward, and at last, attracted to the rich and cultivated land of Egypt, had there been fused by a common religious disposition.

Never did man betake himself to a task of greater magnitude than that which now awaited Moses. The religious antagonism between the Egyptians and the Hebrews had at length developed itself to such proportions, that either Pharaoh must utterly crush Israel into submission, or Israel must be permitted to quit Egypt and seek for itself a new home. There arose a religious war. The actual history of it no longer exists; but we cannot picture to ourselves as too sublime the man who, in such an unequal struggle, gained the victory, and his antagonist is an ever-memorable illustration of the vanity of man's rebellion against truth and right. Israel went forth to seek a new home. Having gained in the struggle in Egypt, and in a wonderful deliverance at the Red Sea, such an experience of the hand of the invisible God fighting for them, that trust in the unseen arm became an imperishable treasure of the people, and in all the future a conviction shaping their history.

But now, what will Moses do with this race which his hand has rescued? Into what shape will he mold them? Whither will he lead them? The soil of the national mind had indeed been prepared for him. Israel was in such a condition of religious susceptibility and elevated enthusiasm as made it possible for Moses entirely to fill it with right conceptions of the



true God, the true religion, the true worship, and the true morality; and the great thoughts of his spirit passed from his lips as a glowing fire, fusing Israel, and enabling him to cast it into the mold which henceforth distinguished it from all other nations. The sublime picture of the giving of the law at Sinai exhibits to us a nation thrilled, from the center to the circumference, with pure religious enthusiasm, and proclaims to us that now, for the first time, the true religion has ceased to be a sporadic phenomenon, and has become so interwoven with the existence of a nation that it can never more perish, unless that nation can be annihilated: religion will henceforth be interwoven with history. We can therefore well understand how the government of this people became a theocracy, nay, how it could become nothing else than a theocracy; for it was a religious idea which had fused it into a nation, and the central formative passion of the national mind and heart was to serve the invisible King who had delivered them, and whom it felt ever near in his might, purity, and grace. The theocracy was a sublime and truly gigantic conception, one possible only to a young people glowing with fresh enthusiasm; one, however, which raised them to a giddy and dangerous height, and which would prove itself inoperative when a Moses was no more, when the oracle was dumb, and the heart of the nation had grown old.

All the higher possessions of the human spirit can only blossom, nay, can be retained only, amid civilization, order, peace, and external well-being—according to the vision of the Apocalypse, “the earth helps the woman.” A home had therefore to be found for Israel. On Canaan all eyes were fixed, and to Canaan Moses would have quickly led the people had they been altogether worthy. They required, however, long probation, and time for consolidation. Although the generation which came out of Egypt did not reach Canaan, nothing can convincingly demonstrate the earnestness and purity of the national heart, and the depth of the educational guidance of Moses, than the spectacle of the fervor, prowess, fidelity, and young energy of the subsequent generation, who pursue their way with songs of rejoicing, (Numbers xxi,) whose faces were as the faces of lions, and their feet swift as the roes upon the mountains. Moses departed this life without bringing his work fully to completion, but not without the joy of seeing around him

a people altogether of the right mind and heart, and a leader in whom he discerned his own spirit reproduced. Joshua, without delay, led the nation to the conquest of Canaan; and such was the martial enthusiasm with which their religion inspired them, such might did it lend to their hands, such rapidity to their feet, that in a very short space of time they had made for themselves a secure habitation. On looking back, it seemed to them that the very river had become dry ground; that, upon their battle-shout, the ramparts of walled cities had fallen down with a crash; that the stroke of their sword had been like the raining of stones from heaven; that so much had been compressed into a short period, that days had surely been gathered into one, as if the very sun had tarried in the heavens till their work was done. Verily, Jehovah had fought for them. And so, at last, there is a strange new thing in the world—a nation in secure possession of a land and home, having in its keeping the true religion, and conscious of a mission to keep it as its peculiar treasure, and develop it till it is ripe to become the treasure of universal humanity. When will it be? What will be the course of such a nation's history?

5. The next great experience which Israel made was that of the absolute impossibility of prosecuting its mission and fulfilling its destination, nay, even of retaining the treasures of the past, under a theocracy. The early glory of Israel under a pure theocracy held the national imagination in such thralldom that no man ventured to blame it, and every man said that hope and help lay in returning, not in advancing. It required centuries of experience before the nation learned to utter the thought, "It is because we have no king that we are as water spilt upon the ground; give us a king, that we may be united and strong, and, in secure possession of external peace and well-being, prosecute our high mission." The theocracy was only a sublime ideal—like other ideals, unworkable, and requiring conditions which, in the nature of things, could not long continue. The successive judges, whom the necessities of Israel called forth, were imperfect attempts to supply the requisite bond of unity to the nation; for, in spite of heroic lives like those of Gideon, Jephthah, and Samson, Israel fell deeper and deeper, till it felt itself ready to perish from internal anarchy and outward hostility.

It is to Samuel belongs the honor of at last clearly discerning what Israel required, and of peacefully accomplishing the revolution. During his earlier life he had thought that the salvation of Israel lay in restoring the age of Joshua, and anew building the theocracy on the great truths which he had anew apprehended in all their grandeur, and which he labored to imprint on the national heart through the agency of the school of the prophets. He was fully aware of the demand for reformation, but opposed it with all his energy, till at last—recognizing its imperative necessity—he became himself the reformer, and introduced the new era. The age of the theocracy ceases, and the age of the monarchy begins; or rather, the monarchy was superinduced upon the theocracy, and there began the era of Basileo-Theocracy. It is important to mark the distinction, for a king in Israel must be other than a king of a heathen nation. He only was competent to be anointed king of Israel whose inmost soul was theocratic, in whom was concentrated the peculiar spirit of Israel, who was imbued with a profound sense of the peculiar mission of the nation, and who was entirely devoted to the mind and will of Jehovah. It was indeed nothing else than the Messianic hope which burst into expression in the cry, *Make us a king*. Israel must have such a theocratic king, and if ever he seems not to come, yet ever must be demanded and waited for.

Saul failed—failed to be a true theocratic king; went so far as to show that he would usurp also the prophetic and priestly office, and found an arbitrary autocracy. The true king of Israel was found in the son of Jesse, and his life-work showed how truly Samuel had discerned what alone was wanting to the nation. David was a warrior-patriot, because he inmostly felt and clearly perceived that Israel's national existence and well-being were one with the existence and triumph of the true religion, and that in fighting for Israel he was fighting for God, for truth, for right, for humanity, for redemption. David handed over a magnificent heritage to his son Solomon, and during his reign nothing seemed to be wanting that the true religion should ripen to perfection and take possession of the earth. Wherefore did it tarry? Has not Israel attained its ideal height?

The sad issue of the reign of Solomon reveals in an aston-

ishing manner at once the sublimity and the overwhelming difficulty of the task assigned to Israel. External prosperity produced its usual demoralizing influence, and made the nation worldly and effeminate. The monarchy gradually ceased to be theocratic in its spirit, and became heathenish and worldly, after the pattern of Egypt. Solomon prematurely introduced universal toleration of religious beliefs and usages, when as yet the true religion was too little conscious of its nature to resist the fascinations of idolatry, and too weak to stand as a purely spiritual might. Thus was brought about a divorce, nay, a fierce antagonism, between the Prophets and the Court—between the former as representing the pure theocratic spirit, and the latter as representing the secular rule. Had these two powers only wrought harmoniously, how soon might the grand issue have come! How totally different might have been the history of the kingdom of God! But the nation was brought to the dust by the struggle between prophet and king, a struggle in which each acted tyrannically, and neither knew that love must reign in God's house. Thus the issue of Solomon's reign is, after all, only to show that the perfect theocratic king of Israel who could lead it to its destination had not yet come—must, when he comes, be greater than David and greater than Solomon. Would he never come? Will not the next who sits upon the throne of David be he? This cry is the deepest impulse in the time which now begins. Further and further seemed to recede the greatness and glory of the past, feebler and feebler became the hope of their recovery; but deeper and more plaintive became the yearning for the true king, and the conviction that he must come unless the religion of Israel be a lie, and its vision of a sublime destination a delusion. Still he came not. The house of David became a ruin and Jerusalem a desolation, and still he came not. These long trials and awful calamities were the means of deepening and purifying the Messianic hope, and were rewarded by this conviction, that Israel can attain its destination only by the coming in absolute perfection of that religion of which it had the beginning; that the only true king of Israel must be the perfect man, who should perfectly realize the life of true religion, and in virtue of it rule over all with divine power; wherewith also was connected the humbling

persuasion, that the form of perfect religion had never yet been seen upon the earth, that there must be a new law and a new covenant, for all that had been was a shadow.

After the captivity the nation entered anew into possession of the land, with high hopes of recovering all its vanished power and glory, but was doomed to disappointment, ever renewed disappointment, and sank into greater external weakness and wretchedness. Its recollection of a magnificent past, its sense of a sublime world-wide destination, still remained, however, glowing secretly and concentrating, till at last the national pride found its exponent in the mind and arm of Judas Zelotes, and in his vain effort to hurl back heathendom as once David did.

The experience of these centuries was a bitter trial and heavy temptation. It had upon a great part of the nation the effect of producing an almost skeptical tone—at least, languor and indifference—in regard to the Messianic hope. Such a book as *Ecclesiastes*, which belongs to this time, shows how the wretchedness of the age and the apparent uselessness of any longer waiting for the hope of Israel, had led even deeper natures to seek satisfaction in a speculative and practical wisdom all tinged with sadness, and in which the Messiah has no place.

But yet, indeed, the Messianic hope was as imperishable as religion itself. Wherever the religion of Israel revealed itself in its divine light and might, the Messianic hope burst forth as an irrepressible fire. And there always was a true Israel hidden in Israel.

In individual religious life the soul often makes an experience like this: its passionate searchings seem only to remove God further and further away, and to open up a deeper and ever deeper mine of darkness and sin within the heart; greater and more glorious seems the prize which it seeks, and although it seem to recede, deeper and more earnest grows the yearning of the spirit, till at last the blessing comes from out the infinite distance in answer to an unutterable cry. So was it with the true Israel now. It learned more and more to discern the imperfections which adhered to its religion, and its inability either to remove or correct them; and thus was led to feel that Messiah must be something absolutely new, accom-

panied with hitherto unknown power, and must be allured as from out of heaven by such a general religious fervor as had hitherto belonged to isolated men. The hidden ones cried and waited; and yet the perfect One tarried—age after age, tarried—seemed to recede further and further, even as the yearning for him grew softer and more impassioned. Israel was learning to sublimate and glorify (*die Verhimmlichung*) the conception of the King. When he comes, he can be nothing else than perfect religion beaming forth in heavenly luster and with mighty power. In proportion as he seemed to bury himself in the depths of heaven, and the conviction that he *must* come intensified itself, they began to think of the Messiah as an eternal necessity of the universe, as hidden in God from all eternity, as above all limitations of earth and sense, as the ideal Son of God and archetype of humanity as it should have been holy and sublime, never yet had been—as the Word of God whose coming would be the perfect revelation of the hidden Divine Being. Thus, on the one hand, the image of the Messiah grew more lustrous, and the longing for him more profound and plaintive, till at last the hour came. All this was at length concentrated in a small circle of elect souls, represented in such as Simeon and Anna, but with fullest intensity in John the Baptist, in whose spirit the image of the King of Israel shone with ravishing beauty, and who gave himself to make ready a people for Him whom, with fasting, meditation, and ceaseless prayer, he strove to allure as from out the unsearchable depth of God's mercy, struggling as if he would charm living fire from out the stones of the evil time. It was impossible that He could longer tarry. If he had tarried longer the human spirit had been chilled with the night of despair, Israel had perished, and the world's hopes.

6. At length He came—quite otherwise than was expected, and yet perfectly responding to all the thoughts and desires of the past—the perfect man, the incarnation of the true religion, its ideal perfection, the true King of Israel. Out of the unsearchable spirit of man had the greatest and best at last blossomed into being. From the first, Jesus of Nazareth had a divine destination and plenipotence for the work of the Messiah. He saw the task which the age imposed, and for which the age was ripe; it revealed itself to him at once in



its overwhelming difficulty, and its inexpressible charm and infinite gain, so that he had no rest in his spirit till he grappled with it. It was the voice of John which developed in Jesus to fullest self-consciousness his calling to the Messiahship. With his spirit-glance John recognized his sinlessness, and beheld the immeasurable grace of the Holy Ghost radiating from his person, and, hailing him as King of Israel, the spirit of Jesus cried Amen to his voice. It was the hour for which the ages had waited. "The kingdom of God is come because the perfect man is here—purest embodiment of true religion, most complete union of the divine and human," is the message which now sounds forth into the world, the *Gospel*. "Behold it and believe it, I am he!" It goes forth as the triumphant shout of a King. It never waxes feeble even in death. He steps forth announcing *himself* and the kingdom of God in him, and acts and speaks with royal plenipotence and glory.

All the working of Jesus resolves itself into the revelation of himself as perfect man of God, or personification of true religion in its ideal glory. The perfect religion shone forth in all his condescending love and royal graciousness, and it radiates forth in the light, power, tenderness, depth, and heavenly purity of his words. A word, a look, from him kindled enthusiasm, and awoke a divine life where an inward susceptibility existed. So from age to age, every little act, and every word, stamped with his unique incomparable impress, is found to be charmed with moral force to quicken a higher life and raise men to God. What can compare with the faintest quivering echo of his voice and footfall?

He was a King. His acts could not be common and ordinary. The kingdom of the perfect and true religion must break the power and destructive consequences of sin, and with sin are inseparably connected all human ills, even the corporeal. Into the abyss, therefore, of all the monstrous evils of that hour, Christ descended with all the love and might of his Spirit. He healed physical evils by an intensified spiritual influence, profoundly thrilling the spirit of the patient. Why should it be incredible? Who can lay bare the hidden links of connection between moral and physical evil? between spirit and matter? Who can set limits to the triumphant power of spirit

over material force? Who can measure the forces which lay in *that* spirit, in which was realized the highest possible union of God and man? But let it not be imagined that he wrought his marvelous works in order to attract attention, allure followers, or make converts. He was only revealing himself as Messianic King in showing mercy, and wished to be accepted because the light of his spiritual glory was shining with self-evidencing power.

If Israel had but known its King! If his own had but received him! But it soon became manifest that as a nation Israel was impenetrable, irrecoverably lost, and both unable and unwilling to own him. Christ therefore proceeded to gather round him a band of elect souls—the disciples—the most susceptible whom his eye could discern, upon whom his image might be imperishably imprinted, and whom he might fashion into the living stones wherewith to lay the foundation of the kingdom of the true religion. In proportion as the hostility of the world increased, he concentrated his activity; and, while the world was threatening his work with utter destruction, he was laying its foundation so deep in a hidden circle of souls that the gates of hell could not prevail against it. The greatest part of his earthly activity consisted in the training of the twelve—the creation of a body in which his Spirit would continually live and work, and from which it would propagate itself till it filled the whole earth.

Still the world which had once seen and hated Christ would not leave him alone. Its hatred grew fiercer, and as it grew he answered it only by uninterrupted self-revelation, by ever fuller outstreaming of the whole wealth of his love, purity, and power. Thus on the one hand the image of sin and darkness rose up in its perfect hatefulness, and on the other hand the image of perfect religion rose up in its divine beauty, and there were revealed the abysses of hell and the depths of heaven.

Christ exhausted every means to overcome the hostility of the world, and give a peaceful triumph to his cause. But recognizing at last its impossibility, and discerning that he had now so filled with himself the souls of that select band, which was the germ of all the future, that his cause would triumph even without his personal presence, he quickly ad-

dressed himself to meet the inevitable end, nay, even joyfully, for he saw how temporal ruin would become everlasting glory, how his innocent death would most majestically reveal the glory of his person as King of the true religion, would prove itself a power to thrill the whole old-world fabric to its very foundations, and break the power of the sin and guilt of Israel and of wide humanity. Such was his death on the Cross, the glorification of the Son of man, the world conquering force, the sacrifice of love for a world needing redemption. It was finished, and Christ disappeared from the stage of time. The world had done its worst, but no power could henceforth destroy the spiritual thing which he had created. He died in shame and woe, to be eternally glorified in spirit through his image in believing souls.

The hour in which the merely temporal and the purely spiritual in Christ were sundered was the birth-hour of a new world. As a kind of natural glorification passes upon every human life at death, for all that was impure and imperfect is now clearly recognized and put aside, and all that was pure and good shines more brightly and works more powerfully, so was it with Christ in the highest degree. He was now glorified. "Glorification" is a word to express the might of the purely spiritual influence of Christ when his whole self-revelation, within time and space, was beheld with the eye of the spirit. The tragic and humiliating death of Christ, for a few days, cast the minds of the disciples into a state of utter stupor and despair; but speedily they felt his glorious image revive in their hearts, their faith and clear intuition of him as Messiah and Son of God awoke as from the dead; they had power to apprehend him as the ever-present and glorified, with such intensity of emotion and inward certainty that it was as if they had seen him, heard his voice, felt his hand and the breath of his mouth. The narratives of the appearances of the risen Christ present an exact parallel to the theophanies of the Old Testament. They are the forms in which the recollections of his spiritual resurrection clothed themselves—embodied expression ravishingly declaring the *imperishable* impression made by his whole self-revelation—and in the presence of this great idea, it is but idleness to ask what literally became of Christ's body. Every high experience or

religious enthusiasm and ecstasy, having reached its culminating point, is followed by a sense of rest and soothing in which the substance of the experience quietly nestles down into the heart for an everlasting joy; so also was it with the disciples—such is the import of the narrative of the Ascension, of the vision of Christ peacefully and with benedictions passing away into the eternal glory and highest heavens, there to dwell.

7. Our limits forbid us carrying the narrative into the apostolic age; nor, indeed, is it for our purpose necessary. Ewald's conception of the nature and development of Christianity, as the true and absolute religion, must now be sufficiently clear. But we feel it to be further necessary, in as few words as possible, to refer to his biblical criticism, or rather to his views concerning the origin of the sacred writings, and the reasons which have determined the shape and character of their contents.

We have heard that the Red Indian, by noting the bending of a twig or blade of grass, can tell who has passed, and track his foe with unerring step; and that a Cuvier, from one little bone, will name and describe the animal to which it belonged. Ewald seems to feel himself endowed with a similar critical faculty, and, from indications which the common eye cannot see, to be able to trace the origin of a book, a psalm, nay, a single verse, with an incommunicable tact or instinct. Thus he knows that the book of Deuteronomy was written by a prophet whom the persecutions of Manasseh had made a fugitive in the land of Egypt, and with a view to revive the theocratic spirit of the age of Moses; that the ninetieth Psalm is a penitential prayer, belonging to the last days of the perishing monarchy; that the forty-fifth Psalm was composed in honor of Jeroboam II., son of Jehu. As a magnet can sunder the particles of steel from a heap of dust, so he puts his hand, now on this chapter, and now on that verse, and shouts, "pure and very history;" as, for example, with Genesis xiv. He knows that the Pentateuch and the Gospels exhibit successive strata of composition, and passed from hand to hand before they took their present shape; nay, he can discriminate the strata as keenly as geologists the formations of the rock, and mark the change of hand in paragraphs, verses, and phrases. There is undoubtedly a

critical faculty of this sort, and who can limit its possible perfection?\*

The idea which lies at the foundation of Ewald's work is that the narratives of Scripture are not history, but that history looks through them. A great personality, like that of Abraham and Jacob, made an indelible impression, and took captive the minds of men; but, in proportion as the actual circumstances of their lives were forgotten, the imagination clothed their image in some adequate historical form. A great action or event leaves an imperishable recollection, and the imagination glorifies it till, for example, the war in Egypt becomes a procession of miracles, the giving of the law a visible descent of God, the sustenance of the nation in its wanderings a story of bread from heaven and water from the rock. More and more the earthly, the imperfect, is forgotten, and the pure idea, the ideal glory, the eternal truth wrapped up in an incident or series of incidents, alone remain, and the narrative assumes a form of ethereal beauty and grace, as in the history of Joseph. An idea, a feeling, weaves for itself an historical dress, as, for example, where the repugnance of Israel to Moab and Ammon expressed itself in the story of Lot and his daughters, or when the impression of Christ's uniqueness and sinlessness clothed itself in the narrative of his conception by a virgin. So it comes to pass, that the veritable history—actually "what happened"—is found more faithfully in the Psalms, Prophetic books, and Epistles than in the professed histories, for they are productions of the hour, not reproductions of a vanished hour. The histories of the Bible are therefore traditions, with a kernel and background of historical truth, which have passed through the glorifying (*vergeistigend*) process of time, imagination, and religious idealism. Nor can they possibly be anything else, unless we suppose—what is absurd—that miracles, theophanies, and angels are facts, and that there has been a supernatural influence exercised upon the mind and memory of man—insane suppositions of what Ewald names "*die falsche Heuchelei der Unwissenschaftlichkeit*," which may be translated,

\* It is only just to notice here, that Ewald's work is disfigured by a spirit of most audacious arrogance. We hear him constantly asserting, "I am, and none else beside me;" for example, that sentence, "Men, such as Hengstenberg, Delitzsch, and Keil, stand beneath and outside of all science," (*unten und ausser aller Wissenschaft.*)

"the falseness and hypocrisy of the barbarians." This is the only view of the sacred writings which can justify itself to science.

8. The theory which has been thus rudely sketched is no solitary phenomenon of our age. It does not materially differ from De Wette's and Hase's.\* Probably the theory of the author of *Ecce Homo* is substantially the same. Ewald is outdone by others, and viewed as still in the bondage of tradition and "Unwissenschaftlichkeit" by many of his compeers, by Spinozists, Hegelians, and Positivists, who loudly beckon him to follow them. But there are reasons for believing that he will exercise on the next generation a unique and very profound influence, and will be heard when many fail to obtain a hearing. His immense erudition, the glow of enthusiasm which pervades his volumes, fusing the masses of his learning into the witchery of romance, the finished symmetry of his theory, the great wealth of positive truth which it retains—retaining, as many will say, all that is necessary for religious life, not to mention the almost sublime certainty of conviction with which he speaks—will all conspire to win acceptance. The modern mind is clearly in such a condition that thousands will welcome Ewald's voice as that of a prophet, and feel that he has articulately uttered the words for which they waited. The soil is prepared for him. His work wonderfully falls in with many of the most powerful tendencies of modern thought. It will be recognized as a daring and brilliant application of the modern historical method, and illustration of the marvelous results of its pregnant touch. There are thousands who cannot part from Christ and Christianity, but labor under an invincible repugnance to the supernaturalism of evangelicalism; who feel that their head and heart have parted company; who own themselves "heathens in the head and Christians in the heart;"—and these will welcome Ewald as one who points them the way to an inward unity and self-reconciliation. While so many things promise success, we cannot ignore the fact that the Evangelical Church is in many respects unprepared worthily to answer for itself and repel the foe, while the time has passed for declamations and the vociferations of ignorance. The ade-

\* De Wette's "Biblische Dogmatik;" Hase's "Leben Jesu;" Hase's "Dogmatik: Christus in der Geschichte—Christus im Gemuth—Christus in der Kirche."



quate learning is wanting in many quarters. A sufficiently profound religious life is wanting. There is want of consolidation in the Evangelical ranks. Nay, within the Evangelical Church there are active tendencies already in league with the enemy, tendencies which a little rigorous logic (*Folgerichtigkeit*) will speedily develop to Ewaldism. An example may be found in the indefinite character of prevailing views on the nature of the Inspiration of the Scriptures. There are those, perhaps, who maintain an infallible book and an infallible text; those who maintain only one originally infallible book and text; those who surrender the idea of unerring accuracy in names, and numbers, and subordinate details; those who extend this reserve further and further, in gradually widening circles, and retain at last only infallibility of moral and religious truth; those who boldly say the Bible is not, but *contains*, the Word of God, and so on, gravitating downward till they reach a position which Ewald would accept. Another example may be found in the unsettled state of opinion on the nature of the atonement. There are those who maintain the commercial or huckster theory of the atonement; those who say that the sufferings of Christ were a satisfaction to vindictive justice, as a necessary attribute of God; that they were a compensation to the outraged honor of God; that they were rendered necessary by an emergency in the Divine government; that they were a dramatic representation to the universe of the purity of God's law; that they were an exhausting of the curse of the world in an historical process, a bearing of sin in an internal sympathy with its misery—the ethical theory, in endless modifications, retaining as long as possible the idea of satisfaction, till at last it vanishes; and, finally, those who say that divine righteousness demands only the destruction of sin, and that the cross of Christ satisfies it, because it is a moral force to expel sin from the heart and universe—to which Ewald would give unqualified assent. When it has once come to this, the mind awakes to discover that the idea of the proper divinity of Christ is altogether superfluous, and that the Christ whom Ewald depicts is adequate to our needs. We might therefore well be induced to fear that the age will fall an easy prey into the hands of Ewald.

But, on the other hand, one may boldly affirm that the

triumph of Ewald's theory, and its general acceptance by Christendom, is a thing incredible and impossible. The Evangelical Church feels itself greater than Ewald, recognizing that there is not a single important element of positive truth in his theory which is not already included in its belief, and that it rejects only his negations. Nothing is fitted so quickly to sap the foundations of our belief in Christianity as eternal truth, and in Christ as heaven's crowning boon to the race, as to hear it said, that from the hour in which Christ disappeared, having finished his work, the Church commenced to run a career of the most wild and extravagant error, and must now proceed to undo the work of ages. We might be prepared to learn that the Church had hitherto erred by defect, and had not yet sufficiently appropriated its own treasures; but to hear that its errors have been all errors by excess, imagining God's words and works more magnificent than they really were, and Christ too great and glorious, startles the mind, and awakes revulsion. As we ponder Ewald's plausible and fascinating theory, there comes over the mind a feeling that it somehow has wrapped up within it all the superficial and plausible errors in regard to the nature of God and his relation to the world—human nature and man's sin and heaven's remedy—with which in ages past the Church grappled victoriously. We cannot imagine that the promise of the Holy Ghost to guide the Church into all truth can have been so awfully belied, and our heart answers back, while our intellect is stunned, "We cannot thus part company with the apostles, the fathers, the confessions of all Christendom, the utterance of the universal Christian consciousness." There is no use of saying that it is only a completion of the Reformation, or a second Reformation. There is no parallel between what Luther did and what is now proposed. It is utter destruction of the past, and entire revolution. The beliefs now threatened have so grown together with Christendom that, before Ewald's theory can ever be dominant, the existing Church of Christ must be swept away as the waters of a deluge.

9. Ewald's work imposes a serious and very arduous task upon biblical criticism, showing, as it does, how the highest questions of doctrinal truth are inseparably connected with its inquiries and conclusions. Biblical criticism has been too

much esteemed among us a hewer of wood and a drawer of water. Its place is that of a son in the house, for it is apparent that even so momentous a question as that of the person of Christ is inseparably connected with it; that if the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch cannot be maintained and the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels defended against all comers, the proper divinity of Christ will also have to be surrendered, and Christ henceforth counted only the perfect man, or probably only the least imperfect hitherto. Let biblical criticism then to its task, and let us tolerantly give it room. Meanwhile we do not seem to have much to fear. We can meet Ewald confidently with a verdict of "Not proven." His peculiar opinions are accepted by very few, even of his own countrymen, and his theory of the composition of the Old Testament books is regarded as in the highest degree arbitrary. The views of those who reject the traditional opinion are legion. We may rest till their self-contradictions are hushed, and meanwhile leave them alone, as we do the biologists. The objections, on the other hand, urged against the inherited views do not seem very formidable, and seem to press lightly on the minds of thoroughly competent scholars; while the external and internal evidences in their favor are such as to shield us with strong battlements. For example, Ewald's view of the origin of Genesis and Exodus seems a sheer impossibility in the face of the minutely accurate personal knowledge of the usages of Egypt, its laws, religion, character, and climate, which every-where appears in the most artless manner. But whether the traditional opinions can be maintained or not, it is plain that such views as those of Ewald concerning the nature of the biblical narrative can never commend themselves to the popular mind—meaning, by that, sound and vigorous common sense. It will quickly answer him by saying, He makes the sacred writers no better than fools and liars, drivellers and forgers of pious frauds. Did they, or did they not, suppose themselves to be writing history and narrating facts? If they knew that the truth of the matter was as Ewald represents, then they were gross impostors—impostors, verily, of a strange sort; for who can reconcile such a supposition with the purity, guilelessness, and *naïveté*, which lend such a charm to their compositions? And if

they did suppose themselves to be writing history, then they were only driveling idiots, and upon them falls the charge of the "falsche Heuchelei der Unwissenschaftlichkeit." Nor can we shelter ourselves from the horns of this dilemma by saying, It was a primitive age, to which we must not transfer our historical sense—for Ewald supposes the sacred writings to be the work of the sublimest spirits of an age of highest culture. If we could thus shield the writers of the Old Testament, what of the writers of the Gospels, who speak as eye-witnesses? If John was simply, as De Wette says, a "Geistes-trunkener," or, as Ewald says, like a musician who, having caught a melodious strain, draws it out and rings changes upon it till it becomes a flowing symphony, then he has perpetrated a most audacious falsehood in the name of the Holy One.

10. Nothing could possibly be more suicidal than Ewald's treatment of the question of miracles. He is in the unhappy position of one who can neither altogether accept them nor absolutely reject them, and lays himself open to attacks from before and from behind. On the one hand, he cherishes a deep repugnance to the idea of miracles, starts back from them as if scared, and resolutely explains them away; but, on the other hand—and this is most apparent in his treatment of the Gospels—he has too fine and truthful an historical instinct, and too profound a sense of the glory of Christ, to endeavor to reduce even the wonderful to the common. His idea of a dynamic power, latent in spirit, potentialized in Christ to the highest possible degree, which can accomplish what transcends the normal limits of man's power, may have in it a kernel of truth. Nay, it probably contains a great and sublime truth—the truth which will be fully revealed in the glorified body and in the spiritualized heavens and earth. But if this idea be true, would it not be sufficient to conduct him to an unqualified recognition of all the miracles as literal facts? For *into what*, after all, *does the idea of the miracle resolve itself but this*—that *all the laws and forces of nature are the expression of the will of the eternal Spirit who fills the universe, whose breathing is its life, and for whom all nature is a vail and garment*; that as man's spirit can enter in among the forces of matter, and mold and bend them, so the eternal Spirit, into the energy of whose will all forces are to be

resolved, can in a moment so direct the currents of his will that a new phenomenon shall start into being, and the *natural world is not a granite wall defying God and man, but a plastic substance, nay, a spiritual living thing, born of the eternal Word, and having an ear to hear God's voice.* But Ewald refuses to carry his own idea to its legitimate length. It is truly pitiable to hear him explaining away the miracle of Cana of Galilee with the trite remark, "Christ's spirit at all times turns our water into wine;" and that of the feeding of the multitude with the remark, "The true faith and love despair least where the want is greatest, and in joyful giving and receiving convert want into superfluity;" and, at the same time, gliding over the narratives in a manner so saponaceous that one can scarcely tell whether he affirms or denies the miracle. What can he expect but, on the one hand, to awake sorrow in the hearts of all who adore Christ, as he himself also does; and, on the other hand, to be greeted with the jeers of those who have advanced to an unqualified rejection of the miraculous in every shape and in every degree? We only add here, that the untenableness of Ewald's whole position in regard to the miracles is most apparent in his treatment of the resurrection of Christ. The whole question of the miraculous may be staked on the point, Was that a literal historical fact? Is there any thing in all history established by a greater weight of evidence? Can we be expected for a moment to believe that, when the apostles speak of Christ's resurrection, they meant it in Ewald's sense? Were they raving, and did they not know the meaning of words? And if that was a fact, all the miracles are facts. Ewald's narrative betrays his sense of a vast difficulty here. Who, for example, can reconcile these expressions: "Nothing is more firmly established, historically, than that Christ rose from the dead and appeared to his disciples." . . . "This condition of ecstasy through the vision of the risen one, however nearly it may border on sensible experience, was purely spiritual."—Vol. vi, pp. 69, 76. With the first of these sentences Ewald overturns his whole theory; with the second he shows how slippery the ground is on which he treads.

11. We approach a still more momentous question when we proceed to consider Ewald's view of the person of Christ.

In the most unqualified manner he rejects the doctrine of his pre-existence and proper divinity, the incarnation and miraculous conception. "Never did Jesus, as the Son and Word of God, confound himself or presumptuously put himself on the same level with the Father and God."—Vol. v, p. 498. He reproaches the Churches with making of Christ "an idol, who will forgive their sins if they feign before him with vain words."—Vol. v, (Vovrede.) In what sense he understands the expressions commonly supposed to express his divinity and habitually used as such, we have already shown, (p. 114,) attaching to them only an ethical or ideal meaning, and denying to them any metaphysical and ontological background. Christ was simply the culminating production of humanity in its religious development, for every tendency of human nature works onward irresistibly till one appear who perfectly embodies it. Christ was literally son of Joseph and Mary, probably from one side descended from Judah and on the other side from Levi, distinguished from other men only by sinlessness, and, as such, purest expression of the true religion and of humanity according to its archetype, (Urbild;) of God also in whose image man was made, and therefore king of Israel, Lord of the kingdom of heaven, leader and commander of humanity, eternal light and Saviour, verily "the way, the truth, and the life," and "the first-born among many brethren."

Here again we have an example of the unhappiness of any man who tries to occupy a middle position, laying himself open to attack from before and behind. Ewald must advance or he must retreat; Christ is less than the perfect man, or more.

"Distinguished only by his sinlessness." But how do we know the fact of his sinlessness? From the impression which his whole self-revelation makes upon our souls, awaking on the one hand a perfect consciousness of sin, and on the other hand a quenchless aspiration to attain that ideal of holiness and blessedness which we behold in him. But there are those—such as F. W. Newman and Theodore Parker—who avow that Christ makes upon their souls no such impression of unique and transcendent moral perfection; and what answer would Ewald give to them but this: "You have not seen and known him enough; *my* Christian consciousness gives a totally different verdict on the value of Christ's self-revelation."



What manner of answer, then, will he himself give to the witness of the Christian consciousness of centuries, when it rises up and says to him, "*You have not seen and known him enough; we cannot rest but in a much higher answer to the meaning of Christ's self-manifestation.*" Will the question thus resolve itself into one of religious life and experience? Must the true and final answer be given by a profounder and intensified religious feeling? \*

12. It is scarcely necessary at any length to notice Ewald's conception of the work of Christ, as it really forms an integral part of his conception of Christ's person. He does not regard him as in any proper sense a Saviour; not in the sense of procuring redemption, or alone making a life in communion with God possible to sinful man. Man could always attain the true religion without him, only not perfectly. He is king in the kingdom of the true religion, and his whole self-revelation is an infinite and inexhaustible force to raise all who yield to it to moral perfection and everlasting blessedness. Holding such a view, it is still quite possible habitually to use most of the biblical and ecclesiastical language concerning redemption, to call Christ Saviour and Mediator, to find in his cross the meaning of the Old Testament ritual, to speak of his blood as cleansing from sin, and of himself as ransom and sin-bearer; in short, to propound an ethical view of the atonement as good as that

\* In the above paragraph we have twice permitted ourselves to use the expression "Christian consciousness." It is time the expression were fairly accepted and naturalized, for it compactly expresses a fact for which we have no equally pointed word. The expression is Schleiermacher's, but the idea of the word is as old as Christianity. It is no more mystical than these words of Scripture: "He that believeth hath the witness in himself;" "The sheep follow him for they know his voice, and a stranger will they not follow." Owen has expressed the idea as nearly as possible in these words: "There is a great answerableness and correspondency between the heart of a believer and the truth that he doth believe. As the word is in the Gospel, so is grace in the heart; yea, they are the same thing variously expressed. . . . The doctrine of the Gospel begets the form, figure, or likeness of itself in the hearts of them that believe; so they are cast into the mold of it. The principle of grace in the heart and that in the word are as children of the same parent, completely resembling and representing one another. Grace is a living word, and the word is figured, limned grace; as is regeneration, so is a regenerate heart; as is the doctrine of faith, so is a believer—*such a soul can produce a duplicate of the word and so adjust all things thereby.*"—On the 130th Psalm, ver. 4. Reckless charges of mysticism, and such like, are sometimes found striking nearer home than those who make them are aware of.

of many who profess belief in the Athanasian Creed. Nevertheless, it is all non-natural language and an emasculated doctrine, and the Church will refuse to own it as reflecting its sense of redemption, or as a true reproduction of apostolical experience as mirrored in the Epistles.

13. We have adduced reasons enough to justify our refusal to become Ewald's disciples; shown sufficiently what insuperable difficulties still lie in our way. It were enough to induce us to remain standing, that we see in the theory presented to us no finality; that, by inevitable steps, it conducts further, to pure Deism or to Spinozism, nay, to Positivism, nay, to Darwinism. We are well aware, however, that the difficulty just lies here. Many see clearly enough that, if once they leave their moorings, they plunge into a bottomless abyss, and therefore remain. But they are still unhappy, and feel as if some strong force were impelling them away. The central difficulty scarcely admits of being reasoned with; it is a deep-rooted repugnance to the idea of the supernatural, not a repugnance directly based on arguments, but a kind of moral creation of innumerable currents of influence coming from many quarters, which is so fixed in thousands of minds that the Old Testament narratives awaken a sense of the ridiculous, and seem as incredible as stories of ghosts and witches. It is *the* characteristic of our age and time, and one of our deepest wants is an influence to counteract it. Ought we not to look for help to the higher mental philosophy? May it not be that Locke and Reid and Mill have been tyrannizing over modern thought? What if the truth should be found yet in some form of philosophical idealism? Or, seeing that the repugnance to admit the supernatural is to a large extent a creation of our abundant wealth and physical well-being, our material progress and our commerce—what if we need some awful baptism of blood and sorrow to loosen our grasp of material things, and compel us to own that man is spirit, and that Jehovah is greater than mighty ocean billows? Meanwhile the tendency is there, and ere long it will not only count it ridiculous to believe in Balaam's speaking ass, and in the water which issued from the jaw-bone which Samson found, but also find it as much the mark of a weak mind to believe in God and in prayer, as to believe in the mediæval legends.

We shall now conclude this paper by indicating the services rendered by these volumes in making clear what are the pending theological issues, and what questions are most urgently demanding consideration. (1.) Not undeserving of notice, first of all, is the powerful manner in which they protest against the one-sided abstract theological tendency, and recall theology to the historical basis on which it rests. Christian truth comes to us, not as scholastic abstractions, but as the life-breath of a history. Only by the Gospel history can we approach our highest conceptions of Christ—the historical Jesus is the bridge leading to the theological Christ. But from many quarters attention is being called to this point. (2.) Ewald makes it clear that the key of the position in the present war between Evangelicalism and Rationalism is the historical veracity of the Old Testament, and, in special manner, of the Pentateuch. Every thing is lost if that must be surrendered. (3.) He makes it also manifest that these two questions, What is the Bible? and, Who was Christ? are inseparably linked together, and that the answer given to the former must determine the answer given to the latter. (4.) His hand has therefore completely torn asunder the thin veil which now separates Rationalists from Unitarians, shown where a few steps of consecutive reasoning will land the former, and how illogical is the position of those who have surrendered the proper Divine inspiration of the Scriptures, and still repeat the Athanasian creed. (5.) He has shown, therefore, that the question of questions for the hour is, What is the Bible? and that no one can render a greater service than by more thoroughly grounding the doctrine of Divine inspiration, and confirming the tottering faith of the Churches in the truth and divinity of the Bible contents. It is amazing to what an extent belief in the divine origin of the Scriptures is at this hour a mere tradition in Evangelical circles, and how few can give an intelligent answer to the question, Why do you believe the Bible to be the word of God?\*

We part from Ewald with strangely mingled feelings—with such feelings as a son may be supposed to have toward a father,

\* On a point of so much importance, we may be excused for calling attention to two works, "The Reason of Faith," by John Owen; "Einleitung in das System der Christlichen Lehre," von J. T. Beck. Beck's German is untranslatable, but his ideas might be reproduced.

whose sins and errors he cannot ignore, and whom he yet tenderly reverences and loves. There is in his volumes such earnest truthfulness and noble courage and fearlessness, such fervent piety and moral enthusiasm, such a sustained recognition of inward religion as the true glory and treasure of the human soul—aye, such adoration of Jesus Christ—that one's mind is spell-bound; and while you feel that you cannot and dare not surrender yourself, you cannot but wonder, admire, and reverence. We know that most of us live far beneath our great and sublime beliefs, and that they are often rather a beautiful remote vision than an inward light and power; but there are fervent natures that inwardly appropriate every element of positive truth which they hold, whose souls refuse to allow as truth that to which they are unable to give a place in their spirit's life, and who are often greater and better than their formal beliefs. Such a one is Heinrich Ewald; and of such it is written, "To him that hath shall more be given, and he shall have abundance."

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#### ART. IV.—DR. BENDER ON THE NEW TESTAMENT IDEA OF MIRACLES.\*

PREPARED FROM THE GERMAN BY PROF. J. P. LACROIX.

[ARTICLE FIRST.]

THE question of miracles falls, first of all, into the hands of historical criticism. But after criticism has done its work, and verified the traditional assumption that the primitive records of Christianity do actually contain miraculous elements.†

The dogmatics of the past has manifestly been largely shaped by a belief in miracles; and though the dogmatics of the present lays considerably less stress on their worth for the practical religious life, still they are of really great significance

\* Dr. Bender is Professor of Ethics and Hebrew at the Gymnasium of Worms. The essay, of which the first half is here presented, embraces the substance of a stout brochure published in Frankfort in 1871.

† The question whence these elements spring, and upon what religious conception of the universe they rest, still remains to be examined.

for the construction of our modern Christian ontology. Dogmatics will always have to look to the history of Jesus for the elements out of which to construct its system of religious truth. Now this history, as is universally admitted, is so interwoven with miraculous occurrences, that every one who assumes any relation to Christianity at all is forced directly to face the question of miracles. In confronting this question criticism must act frankly and fearlessly. It must be indifferent as to the definitive result. It must settle the antiquity and character of the Evangelical narratives, just as it judges of other historical writings.

It has done this. It finds the antiquity of the Gospels to be such as in ordinary cases to establish their credibility. But this is an *extraordinary* case. The import of the Gospels is, in part, of a quite unheard-of character. Hence criticism takes another step. It compares the Gospels with other writings of marvelous contents—with legends and mythology—and attempts to reduce them to the same category. But if it fails in this—if it finds traits in the Gospels which sharply distinguish them from ordinary myths and legends—then it concedes to them the right to a separate and special treatment as records of miracles, thus restoring to them the honor of being regarded as authentic history, which for a moment they seemed to have lost because of their unheard-of contents.

Thus far literary criticism renders efficient service. But now we need other help. We need now to inquire, how the Gospel writers came to their conception of miracles: whether they invented the miracles by their own formative fancy; whether they transformed into miracles mere natural phenomena; or whether their conception of miracles sprang from actual occurrences. If the latter proves to be the fact, then we can rationally proceed to examine the miracles themselves.

Now criticism affirms that miracles are, in general, a *religious* phenomenon of the nature of a reaction of the spiritual influence of Jesus upon the realm of nature. If this be correct, then it follows that miracles are legitimate material wherewith to help to the construction of dogmatics; and also, that dogmatics may be called upon to help in the construction of the idea of miracles. But as all dogmatizing, in such a case, is fruitless save in so far as directly based on the historic records, it is first of all

requisite that we seek for the naked New Testament conception as our starting-point.

To this work we now proceed. And,

# I. WHAT CONCEPTION OF MIRACLES DID THE AUTHORS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT FORM?

This question may be resolved into these two:—

1. How do these writers represent miracles?
2. How do they conceive of them as being wrought?

In answer to these questions very little help is afforded either by the particular *words* by which the miracles are designated, or by other general allusions to them.

The most common expressions for miracles are words which designate merely the unheard-of, the inexplicable. Such is this oft-recurring expression, *σημεία καὶ τέρατα*, (signs and wonders.) Both words are applied to the same occurrence, and appear merely to regard it from different stand-points. While *σημεῖον* (*signum*, sign) refers to the unseen world which reveals itself in the miracle, and which thereby invites the thoughts of the spectator toward invisible things, the other word, *τέρας*, (*portentum*, marvel,) expresses merely the effect of an unheard-of occurrence upon the earthly spectator. St. John prefers the simpler term *ἔργα*, (works, deeds.) But neither of these words contributes any thing to the notion of a miracle, as all of them may equally well designate works of magic.

Also the other stronger expressions, some of them referring to the cause of the miracles, are little more helpful. Thus the expressions: *σημεία μεγάλα*, (great signs,) *δυνάμεις*, (forces,) as instrumental causes or individualizations of the *δύναμις*. Also the seemingly more specific phrases: *ἔργα θεοῦ*, (works of God,) *σημεῖον ἐκ οὐρανοῦ*, (sign from heaven,) are still of so general a character that they could be used just as well of natural occurrences as of miracles.

Not finding the character of miracles in the words used to designate them, we therefore turn to the examination of the miraculous occurrences themselves. And for the sake of convenience we classify them thus:—

1. Miracles of Healing.
2. Visional and Phenomenal Miracles.
3. Miracles in the Realm of Nature and in the Person of Christ.



## 1. MIRACLES OF HEALING.

That Jesus and the apostles wrought *cures*, and that these cures attracted great public attention, is abundantly attested by the New Testament. But also here the mere words used have no miraculôus import. The most frequent word is *θεραπεύειν*, (to heal;) for example, Matt. iv, 22; ix, 35; Acts viii, 7. Then the like-meaning word *λάσαι*; for example, Luke xiv, 4. Or the more general terms, *σῶζειν*, (to rescue;) for example, Matt. xvii, 42; *χαρίζεσθαι*, (to give;) Luke vii, 21; *ποιεῖν*, (to do;) John iv, 45. Of the healing of the "possessed," the phrase *ἐκβάλλειν τὰ δαιμόνια*, (to cast out the demons,) Matt. xii, 27, is used in accommodation to the notion of the times as to the nature of this mysterious ailment.

Here also, therefore, we shall have to seek for the miracles proper, not in the mere words used, but in the circumstances of the occurrences. For, according to the spirit of the New Testament, the miracle is not *that* Jesus and others healed, but *how* they healed.

First, then, *What kinds* of sick were healed? They were mostly such as had been given up as hopeless by the physicians of the day—such as were considered past hope; for example, Mark v, 26. Among them were the "possessed"—utter outcasts from society; the chronically lame; the deaf and dumb; the blind; the born blind; the leprous.

Now though we cannot ascertain the precise virulence of these ailments, so as thence to infer their incurableness, yet we do find certain attendants upon their cures which imply the miraculous element.

(a) Nearly all of the cures are wrought *without previous examination* of the patients. It seems utterly indifferent what the precise ailment may be. The cure takes place without any medical diagnosis, and usually *suddenly*.

(b) Neither Jesus nor the apostles heal *as physicians*; but Jesus heals *as the Messiah*; and the apostles heal as standing nearest to him and being the *best endowed* with the graces of the Messianic kingdom. The cures are wrought in the interest of the *spread* and *edification* of this kingdom.

Hence the cures belong among the *signs* of the *advent* of the *kingdom of God*, and have, therefore, an ethical worth, in addition to their physical result. Hence they imply, both in the

healers and in the patients, a spiritual effort; in general, a *faith* in the result; and, as the result is guaranteed solely by the character of Jesus as the Messiah, a faith *in him*. Indeed, it is directly said that this faith itself effected cures. See Luke vii, 50, *et al.* This faith constrains Jesus to accomplish cures, (Matt. xv, 28,) and encourages his apostles to attempt them. Acts xiv, 9. And unbelief is an obstacle to the cures, both on the part of the healers and of the patients. Jesus stigmatizes his disciples as *γενεὰ ἀπιστος*, (faithless kind,) when they proved unable to heal a demoniac. In his own home he was unable (*οὐκ ἠδύνατο*) to work miraculous cures because of the unbelief of the inhabitants. He directly exacts faith that he is "able to do so" as a condition of his cures, and he heals in virtue of this faith. Matt. ix, 28. And the operativeness of the healing power increases with the increase of faith. For example, Matt. viii, 5. The faith of the people and of the patients invites and aids the faith of the healers, but never takes the place of the personal faith of the latter in their own ability to heal. For example, Mark ix, 19. This faith, which the Messiah never, but the disciples often, lacked, was simply a rock-firm conviction of the success of a great work. Luke xvii, 5. Such was the faith of Jesus; hence he removes mountains, and casts them into the sea. And this faith has nothing in common with the deceptive, cunning mysteriousness of magic, or with the heated imagination of the fanatic; it seeks its power in prayer—in sober, rational prayer. It is a faith in God, who alone is the ultimate author of the cure; a faith of such character as, without him can do nothing, and with him every thing. John xi, 23-42.

This is that which distinguishes the New Testament cures from all other cures: it is their Messianic, their religious, character. We meet, in the person of Jesus, with a gift of healing which seems to come into play at first from inner Divine necessity without the conscious design of him who possesses it; (for example, Mark i, 21, *sqq.*;) and which then, heightened by its first successes, and by the awakened and confirmed faith of a people, advances step by step in potency, until finally it stamps upon the majestic brow of its possessor the seal of conscious creative power.

This gift of healing the New Testament authors interpret too deeply and earnestly to admit of its comparison with the em-

pirical skill of a physician, or with the lunacy of an enthusiast. They represent it really as a grand religious performance, awakening among the people a wide-spread Messianic movement. Like a mighty stream, it pours its efficacy upon a whole nation, and raises a stupid, discouraged population to the height of religious faith: the kingdom of God had come. This religious character of the cures was so prominent in the minds of the writers that they could see in them scarcely any thing else. This is little or none less the case, even where there is mention of curative *means*. And precisely the consideration of these means is very helpful toward a clear view of the New Testament idea of miraculous cures, as they clearly show that Jesus and his disciples healed, not as physicians, but as bearers and sharers of the Divine Spirit.

These *means* fall under four heads:—

a) Jesus and his disciples heal through their uttered will, or their word.

b) They heal by physical means, especially spittle and oil.

c) They heal by a union of words and physical means.

d) They heal by contact with their miraculously-gifted persons.

a) The cures effected by the mere *uttered will* are by far the most numerous. In these cases a curative power is associated with the uttered words. But what the precise relation between the words and the Divine efficacy was, the narrative does not inform us. It declares simply, realistically: Jesus spoke, and the cure occurred. Luke naïvely says, that Jesus drove the fever from Peter's mother-in-law by a mere *threat*, (*ἐπετίμησε*,) iv, 39. Generally Jesus uses the simplest words, but sometimes he uses more ceremony, examining the condition of the patient and uttering a more solemn formula. Thus, with demoniacs, Mark ix, 25.

The patient needs not to hear the healing words; they can act from afar. Matt. viii, 13. Here, though the uttered word cannot, as word, affect the patient, yet the healing will of Jesus does not dispense with its verbal expression: the verbally-uttered will and the effected cure coincide in time. Luke v, 13.

So thoroughly did Jesus pass as possessing miraculous power, that the general consciousness of the public found expression in the words, "If thou wilt, thou canst." This is seen in Luke xvii, 14. The ten lepers had no sooner said, "Have mercy

upon us!" than Jesus formally directs them to present themselves, as healed, to the priest. It is only while on the way that, suddenly or gradually, the leprosy disappears. The simple word, "Look up!" heals a blind man. Luke xviii, 42.

Of the apostles, also, a number of cures by mere word are recorded. But while in Jesus the miraculous power appears first as a permanent endowment from God, and then as a full personal possession, the miracle-working faith of the apostles is much less unhesitating, and is based in their presumed confidence that Jesus had endowed them with such a power. Hence we observe in their miracles, not an appeal directly to God, but to the Messiah as the bearer of God's power. Hence their words are not the utterance of their mere personal will, but of their will as seeking its power in union with the will of Christ. They even literally attribute the causation of their cures directly to Jesus. Acts ix, 34.

Thus, however much it might seem as if the sacred writers in some cases represented the uttered words as an auxiliary means of the cures, it is yet clear that they really mean to attribute them to a spiritual power which was *native* in Jesus, and which was conferred upon his disciples as a *grace*. The uttered word appears, thus, not as a real means at all, but simply as the unessential sign of the solely operative Divine will.

b) As to the *physical means*. While the cures through uttered words are represented as taking place suddenly, they assume here the form of an organic process. We cite especially the cure of the deaf and dumb man, Mark vii, 32. Jesus takes him aside, puts his fingers "into his ears," and touches his tongue with spittle. Then he announces the accomplished cure under the form of an absolutely confident prayer. Here the spittle and the hands of Jesus are represented as *conductors*, that is, as media of the healing power. In the case in Mark viii, 22, the eyes are spit upon, and the vision returns only quite gradually. In the case in John ix, 6, spittle mingled with clay is put upon the eyes, and the patient directed to wash in the pool of Siloam. This does not seem to be a mere trial of the patient's faith; the more prominent intention seems to be, to give the means a longer time to operate.\*

\* Were not these complex "conductors" rather formal methods of signaling the connection between the Lord's act and the healing result?—Ed.

In these cases we are forced to one of two inferences: either we must hold that at that period this spittle and this oil had healing efficacy, and hence regard these cures as merely natural, or we must admit that the narrators intend to place them in the same rank as the cures effected through uttered words, and thus place their real causation in the personal power of God.

c) The union of uttered words and of physical means. Such are especially the cures effected by words *and* the imposition of hands. It is true, in many of these cases the laying on of hands is manifestly merely symbolical; in a few of them, however, the cure is fully as closely associated with the physical contact as with the uttered words. For example, Luke iv, 40.

d) Through *mere contact*. This is the highest intensity of the notion of cures through physical means. For example, the case of the woman with an issue of blood, Mark v, 30. Jesus is in the midst of a throng. Doubtless he had been many times accidentally, and even unpleasantly, touched. But he sharply distinguishes between *those* touches and the touch of the cure-seeking woman. But he observes this peculiar touch only after it had wrought its effect, for he perceived that "virtue had gone out of him." The woman, in full faith that miraculous power dwelt in his body—and induced, perhaps, by seeing him work cures, to believe that this power was set to work by mere contact—attempts to obtain the healing efficacy of Jesus, as it were, by *stealth*. The question whether Jesus had not recognized the woman's faith in the peculiarity of her contact, and hence whether the cure was not effected by his unpronounced will instead of by the mere contact with his person, can hardly be decided. The natural sense of the narrative, however, implies the contrary. It makes the person of Christ the healing power, and the faith of the woman the appropriating means.

To what result, then, do we arrive? How do the evangelists represent these cures as effected? It is clear that while in some cases they approach a physical conception of their causation, yet in general the spiritual conception preponderates. And are not the former cases readily explainable as an accommodation of the narrative to the popular impression of the day? What right would one have to expect here a strict scientific discrimination

between the healing power and the healing means; between the healing spiritual power and the virtue-charged body? How plausible that this body was not a mere dead organ in the hands of the healing spirit! How very natural that the whole person of Jesus came to be looked on as a miraculous fountain of healing; and that the people, in thinking of the cause and means of the cures, contented themselves with the tangible and visible—his body! In fact, were it not that the majority of the cures were seemingly effected by his mere word, we would not have been surprised to find the physical notion the sole one given. As it is, however, we find this notion give way on the one side to the spiritual conception, and degenerate on the other into the superstition that the mere touching of the clothes of Jesus obtains a cure, or that it even suffices to step into the mere shadow of an apostle. Acts v, 15.

From this examination of the New Testament conception of the miracles of healing we reach the following inferences:—

1) It is unquestionable that the cures made an altogether exceptional and unique impression—an impression based on their differentness from all medicinal cures; on the absence, or merely incidental character, of the means; but especially on the undefinable religious character and superhuman power which actuated those who performed them. Equally unquestionable is it that the conception entertained by the first Christians and the evangelists, of the manner of the occurrence of these cures, was based upon the direct objective impression made upon the spectator by the cures themselves. The sacred narrative is, therefore, not scientific, but popular and realistic.

2) This conception, however, is twofold. It is never that of a purely physical influence, though sometimes that of a purely spiritual one, but mostly that of both combined. While little stress is laid upon the merely physical means—spittle and oil—perhaps because they were known not to produce the same effect in the hands of others, we observe a predominant tendency among the apostles to attribute the real source of the cures to a miraculous spiritual power *inherent* in the person of Jesus, and *imparted* as a grace to his disciples. This power was regarded by the populace as obtainable through mere physical contact; but the evangelists tend toward a higher view.

3) The fact that the cures are wrought equally readily, utterly



irrespective of the inveteracy of the ailment, strongly suggests their spiritual source. This admission of their spiritual causation helps toward the acceptance of their historical reality. The condition of the cures was faith in the Messianic movement that went out from Jesus. The cures were moral acts on the part of healer and the healed. The emphasizing of this moral character by all the sacred writers is additional evidence that these writers regarded the ultimate ground of the miracle-working power as possessing a spiritual character.

The healing power exerted by Jesus and his apostles reached its climax in the *reanimation of the deceased*, four instances of which are recorded—three accomplished by Jesus and one by Peter.\*

The text which relates them is no less genuine than any other portions of it, there being as much reason for accepting it here as elsewhere, save alone the contents of the text.

These four cases are:—

a) The raising of the daughter of Jairus, related by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, with slight variations. The records do not admit of supposing her merely apparently dead. She is raised in response to the faith of the father. In the presence of the parents Jesus cries out, (seemingly to her,) "Maid, arise!" whereupon, adds Luke, naïvely, her "spirit came back." Food is at once furnished for her, thus reinstating her case into the natural order of things.

b) The raising of the youth of Nain, Luke vii. Though wrought in public, it seems to be occasioned by the chance meeting of Jesus with a funeral procession. Sympathy with the grief of the widow at the loss of her only son is the motive to the act. Jesus shows no fears of unsuccess. He calls on the procession to halt, comforts the mother, and bids the youth to arise.

These two cases are very far from being mere miracles of display. It is a touching misfortune which, in the first case, comes to Jesus for help; and which, in the second case, Jesus spontaneously or incidentally meets. The motive of compassion is *given* in the one, and is naturally supposable in the other. Though seemingly higher, the writers place these miracles on the same footing as the other cures. They do not

\* Would not Eutychus be a fifth case?—Ed.

emphasize them; they attempt no explanation. Their conception of miracles is not thereby in the least heightened. It is the same Jesus who calls back life into dead limbs, and who calls back souls into dead bodies.

c) The raising of Lazarus, John xi. The catastrophe of Jesus' life is at hand. He has to avoid the hostility of the Jews. When he hears of the sickness of his friend he declares definitely, but mysteriously, that the case would not turn out fatally, but to the glory of God. It is perhaps the news of a relapse that induces him to start for Bethany. A mere cure was probably what he now proposed. But while on his way he learned, we know not how, that Lazarus was dead, and he foretold his rising. He even rejoiced that he had not been present, for his disciples would now have their faith confirmed. To Martha and Mary, who meet him with the news of their brother's death, Jesus said their brother should rise again. He strengthened himself for the act by prayer: "Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me." Then, with a loud voice, he called into the grave, "Lazarus, come forth!" and at once he was obeyed.

We cannot regard this account as a parable. It shows no marks of being invented as a mere "allegorical proof that Jesus is the resurrection and the life." We cheerfully admit that the tendency of the writer is not to emphasize the miraculousness of the incident, but only to set it in its proper light. But this tendency does not affect the simple realistic narration, and proves nothing against the actuality of the miracle.

d) It remains to mention the raising by Peter of the benevolent Christian lady, Dorcas, of Joppa. Acts ix, 36-42. Peter happens to be in a neighboring village. He is invited, probably, to the funeral. The corpse is in an upper room, surrounded by mourners. Peter is shown the garments which Dorcas had last made. No hope is expressed that he would raise her. He himself seems to have come upon the thought all at once. He immediately drives all out of the room, and, falling upon his knees, prays for the miracle. The word of faith, "Arise," gives back life to the dead. She opens her eyes, and begins to rise. He helps her, and then presents her alive to the others.

That in these four cases the writers intend to record real

miracles, real raisings of the dead, is not to be doubted. Though the miraculous factor is here so much greater, still the conception of the occurrence is precisely the same as with the mere cures. The writers describe the unheard-of, with even more naked simplicity than the lesser, miracles. This we can explain only as a solemn suspension of judgment in the presence of the indescribable magnitude of the occurrence. Where there was the greatest occasion for rhetorical coloring we find the greatest absence of it. Hence we cannot regard them as feats of display. They are not wrought to *make an impression*. They are not volunteered, but are called forth by cases of great distress. They are the fruits of faith in God. Mysterious as is their cause, they yet take place within the realm of nature. They are born of the same moral character as are the minor cures of the sick, and they are wrought by the same means—the word of faith. Only in one point do they differ from the cures: in the cures, the faith of the patient co-operated with the faith of the healer; but here, the healer stands alone in the presence of passive death. Doubtless, therefore, there was here a much greater intensity of faith required on the part of the healer, an intensity that was reached only on a few occasions. Hence, perhaps, the reason that so few raisings from the dead are recorded.

## 2. VISIONAL AND PHENOMENAL MIRACLES.

a) The visions proper. It is significant of the life of Jesus that only one vision of this kind is ascribed to him—his baptismal vision. It is given by the synoptics, and is cited as giving Jesus the stimulus to his entrance upon his public ministry. John needed not to mention it, as he begins with Jesus when already fully conscious of his Messianic character. But he mentions one that was given to the Baptist. We need not pause to reconcile the two visions. We seek only the conception that is implied. This conception of an incident that belongs chiefly to the inner soul-life of the receiver is found, naturally enough, to be quite variant. Mark conceives of the vision as a mere *inner seeing* and *hearing* on the part of Jesus, intended to certify to him his Divine call. (i, 9.) Note especially the word *εἶδεν*, (he saw,) and the address to Jesus alone: *σὺ εἶ*, (thou art.) But he also conceives

of this vision (however occasioned by the Messianic nature of Jesus and by the popular expectations awakened by the Baptist) as having its real cause, not in Christ's personal life, nor in the popular expectation, but in the *general life of God* that hovered over them both. It is, then, this Spirit of God—to which Jesus freely yields the guidance of his personal human life—that now takes possession of him, and impels him into the desert for self-collection and self-examination. Matthew, on the contrary, does not relate that Jesus *saw* the heavens open. With a view of indicating the objective reality of the Divine impulse, he says, "The heavens were opened." But the additional remark, "And he saw," places the center of the occurrence into the sphere of Christ's subjective life, and it is uncertain whether the Divine voice was audible to all, or to him alone. The tendency to affirm the objective reality of the miracle is much more evident in Luke. To this end he describes it under the "bodily form" of a dove descending upon Christ. But he also makes the voice from heaven audible to Jesus alone, and gives to his narrative the essential features of a spiritual inner vision. Finally, John represents a Divine voice as directing the attention of the Baptist to the descent of the Spirit of God "like a dove" upon Jesus as the sign whereby he should recognize him as the Messiah. Here the conception is most nearly that of a real sensuous seeing, for it was by the tarrying of the dove that the Baptist was to be helped to the recognition.

Now, though we do not find here the same conception in all four evangelists, yet their variations are very easily reconcilable. Moreover, we stand here in the presence of absolutely undefinable occurrences, occurrences which those who experienced them could by no means fully understand. Hence the writers cannot be justly charged with gross materialization, from the mere fact that they threw the transaction into a visible form. The essential features of their conception are these: *a*) They place the scene of the vision in the inner soul-life of Jesus, or of the Baptist. *b*) They find the cause of the vision, not in the subject in whom it occurs, nor in any external incitement, but in a spiritual reality which reaches into the life of the subject, namely, in God. *c*) This Divine impulse occasions a reflex movement back to its starting-point,

which the plastic phantasy can grasp only by giving it some sort of form. For this act of *forming*, in which the subject is plastically active, the dove, the well-known symbol of the Divine Spirit, was the most natural pattern. We have, therefore, here a vision proper—although this word really describes only the last act in the process—that is, we have a psychical state which is generated, not by the will and knowledge of him who experiences it, but by a spiritual reality outside of the subject; and the transcendent nature of this generating cause becomes the occasion of throwing it into form and place. Hence the visional beholding is really not the essential spiritual process, but only a result of it.

Quite similar to this baptism vision is the vision of St. Stephen, Acts vii, 55. Stephen had just been holding up before the Jews the mirror of their own history, perhaps in full anticipation that this frankness would cost him his life. Filled with the Holy Ghost, for whose voice the Jews had no ears, he looked up at the close of his address, as it were seeking approbation for what he had said, and he "saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand." "Behold," said he to the unbelieving multitude, "I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God." Evidently the Holy Ghost is here conceived of as the cause of the vision; but this Spirit, also, as intimately in union with his own. It is the burning central thought of his discourse that now presents itself before his spiritual eyes in transfigured supermundane form. We see so clearly into the personal genesis of this spiritual beholding, that it is not very difficult to follow it step by step. This vision is, much more readily than the baptism vision, comprehensible as a psychical process; for though the Divine factor, the Spirit, is present also here, yet we readily see how, through the inspired speech of Stephen, this Spirit pours itself over into the soul of the orator, and then causes this soul to behold, in a spiritual vision, that which agitates it within. Of course, here also the inner picture naturally projects itself without, and seeks form and place outside of the subject. Another example of how readily an intense spiritual emotion assumes the form of a concrete picture is furnished by the utterance of Jesus, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven," Luke x, 18.

In this place belong, also, certain recorded *visional addresses*. These, though widely differing from the visions proper, yet resemble them in having their cause outside of the subject. But back of the spiritual impression made by them stand not only the word-form, in which they clearly clothe themselves, but also the bodily shape of Him who, though *per se* without form, is yet beholdable by man under some assumed form. In several passages it is said that God, or the angel representing or personifying God, spake "in a vision" to the bearers of his revelations. For example, Acts viii, 26; ix, 10; xviii, 9. These are doubtless to be understood in the spirit of the above remark. We need only allude here to the analogous psychical process whereby all inner impressions at once shape themselves into words and images.

Accordingly, we think we do no violence to the spirit of the sacred writers in asserting that they really locate the miracle proper in the Divine proto-cause, as affecting the personal life of the beholder of the vision, that is, in the spiritual process, of which the vision itself is but the effect. But just as, and for the same reason as, in the case of the cures, they give not directly the incomprehensible first cause, but the more visible instrumental cause,—so also in the visions they abide by the formal manifestation. Hence in these cases the real miracle is no more the outer vision than are the outward means the miracle in the case of the cures.

But how fully this spiritual seeing is an integral part of the life of Jesus and of his disciples, and how much we should beware, even where it attains to its climax in spiritual visions, of strongly emphasizing, or of finding the miracle proper in, the special form and the sensuous colorings in which the sacred writers had to receive and present them, is manifest from John i, 51, where the Lord promises to his disciples as a permanent gift of Divine grace that they, with him, should see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man.

It is still more easy to form some conception of the genesis of a *dream-vision*, such as is found, for example, in Acts xvi, 9. But readily as we may understand how the vision of this man of Macedonia, calling Paul to come and preach in that country, should rise up before the mission-filled soul of the apostle,



yet this dream is specifically different from others, in that it induced Paul and his companions to feel that God had *thereby* specially called them to a specific duty. The peculiarity lay, doubtless, in its definite intensity.

b) Visional ecstasies. Though doubtless no vision can be conceived of without an ecstatic state, yet the ecstasy itself is sometimes so emphasized in itself, or so distinctly mentioned as accompanying the vision, that we feel justified in making this subdivision. And by an ecstasy we mean, in general, the withdrawal of the soul from the totality of its immediately surrounding and influencing relations, by the concentration of its attention upon one single all-absorbing object.

We have to consider here especially the Pentecost miracle, (Acts ii, 1,) and the visional ecstasy which forced Peter to renounce his Jewish prejudices, and to carry the Gospel into a Gentile house, Acts x, xi.

The narrative in Acts ii, does not inform us of the incidents that preceded the wonderful phenomenon of Pentecost. It does not appertain to the naïve grade of historical composition represented in the New Testament, to seek out the logical causal *nexus* of the incidents described. The narrative is for the most part a mere successive enumeration of objective facts; and it remains the duty of ripened Christian thought to seek and explain influences and chains of causation which are only remotely explained in the sacred text—chains which were yet hidden from the writers by the sensuous objectivity of the occurrences. Whether or not in that "accordant assembly" burning words had been uttered which refreshed their memories of the risen Christ, and intensified their glowing expectation of his return among them; and whether, at the moment of such intense spiritual emotion, the fullness of the Divine Spirit was not poured out, which thenceforth rested upon the disciples, the writers do not inform us. But even if, as is probably the case, such a relative preparation had taken place, yet we should do the greatest violence to the spirit of the narrative were we to place in this mere preparation the actual cause of that Spirit-outpouring, the essential and divine fullness of which is so manifest in its effects. For the real miracle is not placed in the intensified God-consciousness of the disciples, but in this consciousness as suddenly and freshly gifted by an

outpouring from above. Now, although this coming into the soul of new Divine energies, this awaking of the soul by a Divine inspiration from without, was the real significance of the pentecostal phenomenon, yet it is very natural that the realistic description of the same should stop at the sensuously visible extraordinariness in which the spiritual miracle immediately reflected itself. It is a general experience that the impressions which strike our senses stir us most deeply, even though also most transiently; and it is undeniable that our descriptions of all spiritual processes are largely made up of mere materializing and personifying expressions. How natural, therefore, that the unscientific historical consciousness of the evangelist should pause longest at this sensuous phase of all earthly reality! And how readily explainable that his description should appear more helpless, and even clumsy, precisely where it touches upon phenomena which have purely spiritual causes, and which, therefore, are all the less definable, and all the more vague in outline!

Hence the curious circumstance, that what we scarcely allow to the Christian artist of the nineteenth century as mere visible symbols, we yet find quite excusable in the pen of the Christian writer of the first century, as a first attempt at the description of the indescribable—we mean the “divided and fiery tongues,” and the Spirit that “settled upon each.” The sensuous reflex which was produced in the transfigured countenances and burning tongues of the pentecost Christians by this extraordinary effusion of the Spirit, appears, indeed, more simply and beautifully described in Acts vi, 15, as an angelic glowing of the face. But doubtless the first glow of the Spirit shone more vividly in the eyes and on the lips of its first heralds than on later occasions. Thus we can partially understand why the thunder-like roaring of the wind, and the trembling of the earth, should have more violently struck the sensuous consciousness than did the invisible beginning of a new spiritual life; and thus we can also understand why these physical attendants should be placed by the writer in the foreground of his description. That the writer has in mind a real trembling of the earth, as attendant upon the effusion of the Spirit, appears clear from verse 6, where he seeks in this natural phenomenon the cause that brought together a multitude

of people around that birth-house of the Christian community. It is equally clear that the writer means to say, that this first mighty fullness of the Spirit broke course for itself before the collected multitude in languages with which the speakers were but very slightly acquainted.

We have here, accordingly, a visional ecstasy which, as described by the historian, has the following characteristics:—

a) It was produced by a substantial cause lying outside of the will and consciousness of its subjects. It was wrought suddenly, though not without the intervention of means. Its cause did not merely intensify the God-consciousness of its subjects, but actually implanted in their expectant souls, qualitatively, new divine life-forces—forces which formed the basis for the actual Christian life of the Church.

b) It not merely throws a beaming reflex upon the physical being of its subjects, but it also, at the moment of its entrance into their personal life, sets free and awakens spiritual capabilities, which seem again to have disappeared with the subsidence of the first over-pressure of this spiritual effusion. The so-called speaking with tongues, elsewhere mentioned in the New Testament, is uniformly explainable after the analogy of prophetic-apocalyptic imagery.

c) It reflects itself in a convulsion of nature; but we are not informed whether that convulsion stood in a merely accidental, or in a necessary, or in what sort of, connection with the effusion of the Spirit. It, however, furnishes an illustration of how spirit and matter are, in the last analysis, moved by the same almighty God.

The term "visional ecstasy" applies less literally to the miracle of pentecost than to the *vision of Peter*, Acts x.

This vision is all the more noteworthy as it appears to have been forced upon Peter without the least predisposition in him for it, in order to break down his obstinate prejudice, that the Gospel was to be preached first to the Jews, and then imparted to the Gentiles only as perfected Judaism. Peter had gone up upon a housetop just before noon to pray. While in a state of hunger he is suddenly thrown into an ecstasy, and made to see that well-known vision intended to teach him that nothing that God has created is unclean. This significance of the vision becomes clear to him only by its strict coincidence with the mes-

sage from Cornelius. If it be insisted that the hunger was a predisposing cause for this vision, it is still very difficult to explain, from this cause, how the offered meal should be one that was so unpalatable, and even disgusting, to any Jew. On the contrary, the purpose of the writer is to show that the whole vision, with its (at first not understood,) meaning, was directly sent to Peter by God. This is evidenced by the subsequent conduct of the apostle, by whom it is so difficult to regard the Gentiles as no less prepared for Christianity than were the Jews. We have here, therefore, as it appears, the first instance of an entirely unmediated miracle—a Divine hand grasping into the totally unprepared, nay, even resisting, personal life of the apostle. However, that which seemed to be lacking in the preparation is made up in the result. The impulse that Peter receives at first as a violent shock is afterward fully overcome; the mission that is imposed upon him becomes, at last, his deepest personal conviction; and fruits of it all are the Christianized Gentile family.

The nature of this vision must, according to the spirit of the whole account, be regarded as a purely inner one. Here, then, as also in the pentecost miracle, we see in the vision a direct sensuous reflex of the Divine impulse.

The chief additional feature is the address which Peter hears. Of course we are no more bound to lay here great stress upon the articulated words which are represented as attending the vision, than upon the sensuous forms and colors in which it is portrayed. It is quite conceivable that the vision itself, *as such*, impressed him who saw it, and that he, then, shaped this silent speech into the words in which alone he could understand it. So also in the case of the vision of Ananias, (Acts ix, 10,) the essential miracle is the injunction to go and help Paul; the form in which this direction was given—the minute naming of street, etc.—may be the work of the man himself, who, perhaps well-acquainted with the stopping-place of Paul, naturally enough attributes the naming, etc., to the author of his dream. Compare also Acts xxiii, 11; xxvii, 23. For the understanding of these visions, the passage 2 Cor. xii, 1 is of weight. Paul glories here in his “visions” and “revelations” as of quite frequent occurrence, and as constantly attending his life. He cites the case of, as it seems, a friend of his who was “caught up to

the third heaven." And Paul adds the noteworthy remark, that he knew not whether this friend was "in the body" or "out of the body." Thus, therefore, we have here a conception of those ecstasies according to which the entranced soul may, with the object of its Divine longing, rise entirely above its earthly body.

c) Visional apparitions. In the middle space between visions proper and ecstasies on the one hand, and real miraculous appearances on the other, there stand a number of visions which apparently result from a real apparition. Of course the sacred writers were just as unable as we to draw a definite distinction between the visions and the apparitions. But certainly we would go too far should we conclude, from their lack of critical ability and of clear conceptions of space, reality, essence, and phenomenon, that they were totally incapable of distinguishing between the reality of a vision projected into the outer world from their own inner life, and the reality of an apparition influencing from without upon their whole personal life. For the clearness of one's conception of space is by no means the measure of the correctness of one's judgment as to the reality of an apparition. The plain, natural judgment of uncultured man is not easily deceived as to whether an impression arises purely from within, or is wrought by a real cause outside of the subject. And it is quite indifferent whether this cause produces its effect outside or inside of the subject. The person affected will always distinguish it from himself, and project it outside of himself, if he is convinced of its substantial objective reality as different from his own being. Whether philosophical reflection discards sensuous objectivity as a medium for these seemingly unsensuous apparitions, and regards them, like visions proper, as falling merely upon the spiritual retina, is here quite indifferent. Enough that the sacred writers recognize, in addition to the above discussed visions, also such ones as, in their view, are produced by appearances to which they seem to attribute a reality quite other than that of the appearances in the acts of visional phantasy. This is evident also from the fact that they regard these appearances, not as the results, but as the causes of the visional state.

1. Among these middle phenomena, between mere visions and real apparitions, are the cases which are introduced by the

words "in a vision." Thus it is related of the Roman centurion Cornelius, (Acts x,) that he saw an angel in a vision in broad daylight. The objective reality of the vision is vouched for by the terror with which it inspired him. But that these apparitions are seen, as it were, with other eyes than those which see ordinary things, is clearly implied in the expression "in a vision," that is, in the ecstatic state. The cause of the appearance seems, therefore, previously to prepare the person to whom it appears for the act of beholding; that is, it must itself initiatively bring about the mysterious conditions under which alone it is visible. This itself distinguishes it essentially from the vision, which only projects, as it were, an inner experience upon the enlarged retina of the phantasy. The apparitions are beholden in the visional ecstasy, but they are the *cause* of this ecstasy, and they thereby have claim to a higher reality than that of the visional phantasy. However probable it may be that this "seeing in a vision" implies that the appearance is unsensuous, and perceptible alone to the spirit, (2 Cor. xii, 1-7,) this much is quite unquestionable, that to this "appearance in a vision" a different reality is ascribed from that of the "appearance of the vision."

The sudden "trance" that fell upon Peter enabled him to see that great sheet full of unclean beasts; the "appearance" that had occurred to Cornelius raises his condition to that of ecstasy. The reality of the apparition is evident also from the seemingly strange, or at least unexpected, requirement to send for Peter. But, as already observed, the difference between a miraculous vision and a miraculous apparition is vague and fluctuating. In the case in Acts xxii, 17, the distinction would be difficult to make.

2. This is now the proper place for the consideration of the scene of the Transfiguration. The expression *δραμα*, (vision,) which Jesus himself applies to the strange occurrence, may as well designate the thing beholden as the beholding of it; hence it argues no more strongly for the visional than the substantial character of the incident. The conception of the sacred historians is, however, most unquestionably, that the *δραμα* was primarily produced by a change which took place in the person of Jesus. The decisive word here is, *μετεμορφώθη*, (he changed himself,) Mark ix, 2. Luke (ix, 29) adds the significant obser-



vation, that this change in the appearance of Jesus took place while he was in the climax-act of the spiritual life—in prayer. Of course this change in Jesus is meant in a quite different sense from the angelic-appearing countenance of Stephen. And yet we cannot be justified in taking the face that shone “as the sun,” and the raiment gleaming “like snow,” as other than a practical attempt to utter an unutterable reality, sublime above all poetry.

Thus far we have before us unquestionably the real miraculously spiritualized and clarified appearance of Jesus, which reveals its inner glory through the crude materiality of earthly garments; an appearance that is certainly to be understood in close analogy with the subsequent appearances of the Resuscitated, whose higher nature already here gleams through its “earthly house.” But now there immediately join him the heroes of the Ancient Covenant, in order expressly to recognize him as the Messiah in the presence of the disciples. Peter, impressed with the objective reality of the miraculous occurrence, raises the rash query whether he shall not build tents for them. And though Mark excuses this question by the observation that Peter, from fright, knew not what he said, yet this does not imply that Mark conceived the occurrence as less objectively real than the other evangelists. The audible Divine voice, which here solemnly ratifies afresh the Messianic character of Jesus, and which coincides in time with the appearance of the mysterious visitants of Jesus, causes the disciples to lose consciousness of the outer world, and they fall powerless to the earth; and when Jesus arouses them with cheering words the vision has vanished.

3. Also the conversion of Paul is represented as occasioned by a real appearance of Christ. No other miracle of the New Testament is better vouched for than this. However much Paul may have been prepared for a sudden change in favor of Christianity, still to take this preparedness for also the *cause* of his conversion, or even for that appearance of Christ which occasions it, and upon which he bases his apostolic authority, would be a gross violation of all the laws of life and of thought. Both the narrative and the apostle himself place the decisive impulse which casts the Jew to the earth and causes him to rise a Christian, in an apparition to him personally of the ascended

Saviour. This apparition is seen by Paul alone, and not by his attendants; a fresh confirmation of our previous remark that a visional appearance imparts to its subject a higher and more spiritual power of vision. For this heightened ability there must of course be a prepared ground in the nature and character of the persons receiving it.

While the appearance was of a spiritual character, yet it also presents itself in its physical effects as in some manner sensuously perceptible: Paul becomes blind from the rays of a light suddenly falling upon him. Also, the attendants of the apostle *hear* a voice, though without understanding it.

The undefinableness of the occurrence appears also in the judgment of Paul himself. While the declaration that God had revealed his Son "in him" seems to favor the visional explanation, other expressions, such as, "I saw the Lord," assure us of the objective reality of the appearance, without which, in fact, neither his prostration to the earth, nor his being blinded, nor his subsequent thorough change of life, can be accounted for.

4. The conception of a real angel-apparition is also recognizable in the account of the rescue of the imprisoned and sentenced Peter from the power of Herod Agrippa. Compare Acts xii, 9. And the fact of the rescue, and of the overcoming of the opposing obstacles, vouch for the correctness of this conception of the historian. Even should the angel here be regarded but as a symbol for the miraculous presence of God, still the falling chains, the passing by the guards, and the opened prison door, are such an unheard-of wonder that we can hardly avoid the thought of some sort of sensibly-perceptible Divine manifestation. This presence of God leads the dreaming Peter into freedom; and this feature of the case sharply distinguishes it from any form of somnambulism.

5. The angel-appearances at the empty grave of the risen Saviour are presented in the Gospels as visions based on reality. But the circumstances were peculiarly adapted to poetic personification. Hence the slight difference in the narratives are readily explained. The process of personification seems to have grown with the remoteness of the date of the narrative. The earliest writer, *Mark*, relates, quite simply, that the women had *seen* at the empty grave a "young man." Luke describes *how* they saw him, or them. Matthew uses much more sensuous

expressions, describing how an angel "came down from heaven," and, amid a terrestrial convulsion, rolled away the stone. Evidently, here the conception of the apparition which announced the resurrection is merged into that of the angel which personified the power of nature. Compare Acts xii, 23. Also the terrifying impression represented as being made upon the woman, argues for the realistic conception of the historians. Finally, John introduces the angel at once as talking, and declaring the resurrection.

d) The appearances of the risen Christ. The appearances of the risen Saviour differ from all of the apparitions thus far examined, in the fact that they are not said to have occurred to the disciples "in a vision"—*ἐν ὁραματι*. On the contrary, they behold him with clear, cool, criticising, though astonished, bodily eyes. His appearance, although in a changed form, bears the impress of his personal character; it manifests itself in personal actions, enters into the existing state of things as if perfectly at home in them, and is looked upon as a miracle, but not as a mere spirit from the other world. In short, the appearance of Jesus, as presented to us in the New Testament, is that of a life perceivable by fleshly hands and bodily eyes.

Mary, who was one of the first to see the risen Lord, fails to recognize him at once. She takes him for the gardener; but he addresses her, and by this address she recognizes her Lord. Why he now tells her not to touch him is difficult to understand. Also, Jesus accompanies the disciples to Emmaus without their recognizing him. They take him for a man like themselves, and are astonished only at the circumstance that he seems to know nothing of the crucifixion of the Nazarene whom they had taken for the Messiah. This non-recognition is explainable from the fact that they had not clearly understood Jesus's prediction of his own resurrection, and hence they were so far from the thought that the crucified One could be alive again! But Mark observes that Jesus had appeared to them *ἐν ἑτέρῳ μορφῇ*, (in another form,) xvi, 12. Hence Jesus finds it necessary to resort to characteristic signs and acts in order to bring to their consciousness his real identity with his former self. Among these belong especially his breaking of bread and the repetition of the miraculous draught of fishes, John xxi, 2.

All these appearances are but transitory, simply sufficing to satisfy the disciples of his resurrection. He appears suddenly in the room when the doors are shut; he is in an instant in the midst of the disciples, and as suddenly he vanishes.

As the first appearances assure the disciples that their crucified and buried Lord is risen, so the later ones overcome their doubt as to the objective reality of his risen nature. This nature must, therefore, have been of a very strange, though sensuously perceptible, character, as is also evident from the manner of his appearing and vanishing. Hence, in order to banish from them the suspicion that he is *only* a spirit, he eats in their presence. Hence he causes doubting Thomas to feel the wounds in his side; and the recognition of his identity induces him to fall at his feet with the confession, "My Lord and my God!"

The expressions *ἐφανερώσεν* (appeared) and *ἐφανερώθη* (was manifested) designate, therefore, the coming into visibility of the now glorified, and hence essentially invisible, life of the risen Saviour. They seem to imply, also, that this entrance into the world of sense was of a sudden character. And, in fact, every appearance of Jesus is essentially a becoming-flesh of his exalted life. This thought furnishes the solution of many a difficult point—such as his post-resurrection eating, his being felt, his appearance in a room when the doors were shut, and his vanishing under like circumstances. As the earthly Jesus had once revealed to his disciples upon the Mount of Transfiguration the eternal essence of his life, so now the immortal Jesus reveals himself to the same disciples in order that they may learn to believe that he is the true, living, and Divine Messiah. The vision-hypothesis has, therefore, no application to the accounts of the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus.

Of the departure of Jesus from the earth, Luke says (xxiv, 51) simply, *διέστη*, (he was parted.) Mark says, *ἀνελήφθη εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*, (he was received up into heaven.) In Acts i, 9, it is said, *ἐπῆρθη*, (he was taken up.) And then is added, "that a cloud received him out of their sight"—the simplest and most evident meaning of which is, doubtless, that he disappeared in an inexplicable and mysterious manner. We may here, therefore, understand this last vanishment of Jesus

strictly in analogy with the other disappearings and vanishings of the risen Lord. The so-called ascension of Christ is accordingly simply the last appearance and the last vanishment of the glorified life of the Lord.

On glancing back now at the different kinds of miracles passed in review—at the miraculous cures, and visions, and apparitions—we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is the same Divine Spirit that pervades them all, that exalts these visions high above all baseless delusions, that gives these cures their ethical and spiritual character, and that manifests itself also morally in connection with them. These miracles, almost without exception, mark mighty epochs in the establishment and development of the kingdom of God, and they are either the direct and immediate causes which did the work, or they contributed thereto as essential factors.

As with the cures, so also with the visions and appearances. We can point to their conditionment through persons and circumstances, both in their origin and in their efficacy, as an indication of their historical truth; and we can point to their inexplicability out of any predisposition of the persons, or out of the preparedness of the ground upon which they were wrought, as also to the absolute necessity of the assumption of a new Divine creative reality underlying and manifesting itself in them, as evidence of the same supernatural power which the sacred writers also clearly implied as the true, efficient cause in the cures. Any careful examination of their narratives will leave scarcely a doubt as to the essential identity of their miracle-conception in all the varying cases of healings, raisings from the dead, visions, and objective apparitions. This will appear still more clearly further on, when we shall inquire as to the unitary cause of all miracles. We will here only allude to the fact that the New Testament is inspired both with the recognition of an especial Divine guidance of the agents and incidents of the kingdom of God, and also with the faith that the working of cures was one of the chief functions of the Messiah. The Spirit of God, which is so clearly distinguishable from the human spirit, both by its mightiness and by its irresistibleness, is presented as the guiding principle both in the life of Jesus and that of the apostles. This Spirit can fulfill its providential mission equally well by an impres-

sion upon the heart, which forms itself for the subject into the shape of audible words, or through a direct vision, whether in waking or in sleeping. This Spirit helped the disciples also by appearing under the form of angels, and by enabling the risen Lord to become visible.

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#### ART. V.—GERMANY AND THE JESUITS.

A CENTURY ago the Order founded by Loyola had succeeded in making itself so troublesome and distasteful to its own Church, that the pope of the period, Clement XIV., issued a decree for its dissolution. The nations which had been rent by intestine feuds, fomented by these universal disturbers of the peace, doubtless rejoiced over this great relief from their burdens, and fondly imagined that their descendants, at least, would be relieved from this scourge. But in this they were mistaken. The Jesuits have no such word in their vocabulary as dissolution. Defeat and discomfiture they are used to, for their history has been a most checkered one; but we fear the world will yet see many revolving years, and perhaps ages, before it will be wise enough to afford them no retreat as an arena for their wiles.

They were brought together into their organization for the special purpose of combating the principles of the Reformation, which, at the period of their birth, were making such rapid progress among all the Catholic nations of Europe; and as long as the antagonism shall exist between the Protestant and the Papist, so long there will be some spot or some cause in which they will be welcome; for the object of their creation was not to assume the pastoral relation in imitation of the great Shepherd, but rather to be the soldiers of the Church, and fight its battles against the inroads of heresy. To this end they assumed the sword rather than the crozier, and made intriguing wiles their daily weapons. They insinuated themselves into the courts of all nations, and, by political intrigues, succeeded in many in gaining so great a foothold that the temporal power, in more than one instance, was in the



hands of the Church in reality, while the State waked up, too late, to find that its scepter was passing from it.

Thus Jesuitism waged its battles in France, Spain, Italy, Germany; in all Europe, in fact, till the combined nations of Catholic Christendom arose in a body and demanded of the pontiff the extinction of the Order, which was granted, and executed by the head of the Church in 1773. The Jesuits knew that it was necessary to bend for a time before the storm which they had conjured; so they simply sought retreats where they could carry out one of the objects of their organization, which was that of propagating the religion of their Church by missionary effort, and of obtaining control of all public and private education, with a view of silently rearing up a race that would be under their command. In the line of missions, we need merely point to the labors and the conquests of the Jesuit fathers in all Canada, along the chain of our great lakes, down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico, throughout this latter country, and, indeed, all South America. It may be safely affirmed that all the Catholicism planted in this entire continent in earlier years was the labor of the Jesuit missionaries.

But many of them found retreats in neighboring lands not under the sway of the Roman pontiff, especially in Prussia and Russia. Frederick the Great took a pleasure in being able to do what other sovereigns feared to do. Though Protestant, he cared but little for the precepts of his faith, as may be seen in his admiration of Voltaire, and his intimacy with him; and therefore he seemed to take a pride in opening his doors to the exiled Jesuits, as his fathers before him had sheltered the fugitive Huguenots. If any other motive than that of pride in the liberty of his country impelled him to this deed, it was the desire to show his power and fearlessness in all combats of principle, for it does not appear that he cherished any love for their peculiar tenets. Suffice it to say, that in this way the Jesuits obtained their foothold in Prussia, and from that day to this have used the advantages accorded to them to further their own special interests, and are now stinging the bosom that warmed them into life. It is rather an interesting fact, that as the Prussians look back with pride to the martial spirit implanted by Frederick's efforts in the

hearts of his people, and whose military glory and achievements have been their pride and their inspiration, so they may attribute to his indifference in the matter of religious principles the growth in their midst of that power with which their armies and their statesmen are engaged in almost deadly struggle.

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, with all their bitter teachings and experience to the various nations of the Continent, gave the Jesuits an enviable and much-prized opportunity to work for their own restoration; and as, at the fall of Napoleon, the world was willing to submit to any action that partook of a conservative character, and to give the Church the power rather than to the State; so, thus, in the heyday of conservative reaction, the pope, who had received so many indignities at the hands of the French conquerors, was willing to embrace and restore any agents who might aid in re-establishing the power of the afflicted Church. Thus the Jesuits were restored to favor with the Holy See, and entered on a new career in the bosom of the Church. As a logical sequence, one might have expected their withdrawal from Prussia, but they were far from surrendering the Protestant ground so fortunately gained. As teachers in the schools and higher institutions, as preceptors in the families of the nobles and princes, they had gradually gained great vantage-ground, and made very fair progress in introducing the Catholic Church into Prussia. This they had done under the shield of protection to all religious faiths, which had been learned from Frederick; and thus the Catholic Church was fairly installed in Prussia, and finally enjoyed the protection and pecuniary support of the State, according to the ratio of numbers.

The sovereigns of Prussia all regarded the Catholic Church as a fair claimant for their care, and especially when the Catholic Rhine provinces were annexed to the ancient Prussian realm of the House of Brandenburg. The Jesuits were therefore allowed to pursue their way unmolested, although they were not formally recognized by the State until about 1855, and but little concern was expressed that they could be of any harm. Occasionally in their so-called missions, which are their revival seasons, they were censured for carrying their work into the midst of Protestant communities, and holding them in the open air so as to become offensively prominent to the Protest-

ant people. But beyond some little friction of this nature they met with no obstacles, and they were virtually protected by the Government with as much care as was accorded to the regular State Church. They took advantage of these unusual opportunities in a Protestant land to extend their power, and, far more than was suspected by the educational department of the Government, insinuated themselves and their dependent orders into all the schools, high and low, and thus very greatly increased the sources of their power and growth.

The fearful humiliation of Austria by the power of Prussia in the famous seven days' campaign caused, without doubt, many misgivings on the part of the Catholic Church at the rise of Protestant Prussia as the ruling power in Germany; but the conquests of Prussia affected Protestant as well as Catholic powers—as in the case of the kingdom of Hanover, for instance—and the ebullitions of religious feeling were soon quelled. When the Franco-German war suddenly burst upon the scene there was an evident desire on the part of the Catholics of South Germany to oppose Protestant Prussia in favor of Catholic France; but it was by no means so strong as Napoleon had expected and hoped that it would be; and, after a trifling hesitation, the whole German Confederation rose to the patriotic cry of the "Guard of the Rhine," and all that the Catholic priesthood could do, in blessing the departing regiments, was to appeal to them not to let the contact with Protestant soldiers weaken their Catholic faith. The astonishing and unexpected victories of the German columns soon swallowed up the whole land in one glow of patriotic effusion; and commanders and men from all sections fought side by side, and their blood mingled in one common cause, so that it was hoped no question hereafter would divide the German hosts either in council or in war.

But the very victories of the Germans bore with them the seeds of discontent. The defeat of the French arms permitted Victor Emanuel to enter Rome, at the request of its citizens, and to become its temporal sovereign; and the deposition of Pius IX. from his worldly throne was thus virtually the work of Germans. This was, of course, distasteful to the vast mass of German Catholics, who were still under the influence of the bishops; who, though opposed to the dogma at the Council,

promulgated it at home, to the dissatisfaction and discomfiture of the respective Governments. And, again, it was clear that the fortunes of war had reduced France to such weakness that the papacy need not, for the nonce, look to her for protection who could not protect herself, and therefore, if the temporal power of the pope was to be restored at an early period, it could only be done by the Germans. In the meanwhile the rapid course of events soon demonstrated that the Germans would accomplish their national unity on French soil while intoxicated with the glow of victory, and away from the intriguers who, at home, might have interposed obstacles. The policy of the Jesuits and the Vatican was instantly decided on: "We give our consent and aid to this scheme only on condition that Pius IX. shall be permitted again to ascend his temporal throne." And the powers at the Vatican knew that this scheme of German union was so dear to the German people that they would sacrifice or promise much to secure it.

A messenger was therefore dispatched to King (now Emperor) William, while yet at Versailles, to sue for his interference in the reinstatement of the pope for the *quid pro quo* on the part of the German bishops of support to the German policy of unity. Thus a Protestant prince is entreated to restore to power a Catholic ruler deposed by a Catholic people. It is not often that history presents so cool a proceeding. It is asserted that this confidential messenger was no less a personage than Archbishop Ledochowski, the famous Polish bishop who, in the sequel, has led the ranks of the Catholic opposition up to the walls of a prison-house. The German ruler is said to have met the prelate with kindness, but firmness; to have assured him that the Catholic subjects of Prussia and Germany should receive all the protection from the State that they had ever enjoyed; but that it would be impossible for Germany, and especially for Protestant Prussia, to interfere with Catholic Italy with a view to reinstate the pope in his temporal chair. And because of this very sensible and natural decision the Jesuits accuse Bismarck of having commenced this contest. But, so far from this being the case, it was the ardent desire of the great German statesman to have no embarrassing questions arise to complicate the one great work of uniting all Germany into one consoli-

dated empire, in accordance with the dreams and hopes of all patriotic Germans since the fall of Napoleon.

Even the probabilities are all on the side of this view of the question; for, without any religious complications, it would be difficult enough to reconcile all the conflicting interests of people and rulers so as actually to effect the work of practical and successful consolidation. But at the very first movement made, after the return of the principal armies and statesmen to Berlin and the other German capitals, to bring together a German Parliament which should represent the whole country, and proceed to crystallize its various elements and organize the new Government, it was very clear that there was a growing opposition on the part of the Ultramontane Catholics to the scheme of a German Empire; and it was also very clear that this opposition was led by the Jesuits and favored by the Pope. Bismarck regretted this alienation, and doubtless feared it, as well he might, and was determined to adopt every means to avoid it that might be honorable and just. He knew that if the Jesuits could control the Pope in this matter between Germany and the Vatican harmony could never be restored, if for no other reason, at least because it was impossible to get his ear for an unprejudiced hearing of the situation, believing that the alienation was more a matter of misunderstanding than intention. He, therefore, resolved to send a special ambassador to the Holy Father, as spiritual prince of the Church, who might become the avenue of frequent and direct communication between the Powers, without any Jesuit intermeddlers. And he was fortunate in having at his command for this purpose a high Catholic official in the person of Cardinal Hohenlohe, who, he hoped, would be able to represent the German interests at the Vatican without displeasing the Papal Court, and would be able, if any one could perform this task, to separate him from his Jesuitical surroundings, and convince him that the real welfare of the Catholic Church would be advanced by rejecting their counsels to interfere in the political plans with reference to the German Empire. But the Jesuits well knew that the only way to assist their sole remaining friends in France was to hound on a religious war in Germany, and this they had determined to do at all hazards, and therefore they exerted all their influence on the Holy Father against any thing like con-

ciliatory measures. They had a splendid plea in the fact that Cardinal Hohenlohe was a brother of the Bavarian prince who had spoken so freely in regard to the plans of the Council before its convocation, of its proceedings while in session, and the dogma proclaimed at its close, and therefore could not come with friendly intent. The result was that the Pope refused to accept him as ambassador before he left for his post, alleging for this measure some very frivolous reasons that poorly covered this open hostility to the German Government.

This was heralded to the world in the Italian journals as a victory of the Jesuits, and of course induced an open rupture between the Powers. It was an insult of so decided a character that it would have been sharply resented coming from any other source than the Vatican; but, under the circumstances, Bismarck thought it best to treat it leniently and judiciously; and, while announcing the fact to the Imperial Parliament, still expressed the hope that matters might not take a serious turn, although he could not see the way open to a policy between the State and the Church of a strictly just character, after the promulgation of a dogma which made the spiritual superior to the civil power. He believed, however, the affair one of so much importance that he preferred parliamentary legislation regarding it, and in the meanwhile would do all in his power to have the Romish Curia informed of the real intentions and ardent desires of the German Government, which would by all means lead to a peaceful solution of the sensitive questions separating the Confessions within the realm.

The Papal organs tried to see in the effort to appoint Cardinal Hohenlohe German ambassador to the Vatican a stealthy means of securing influence on the occasion of the impending conclave, although it is difficult to see the necessity of resorting to cunning to obtain that to which the German Empire has full and long acknowledged right from the fact that the Catholic Church is the established and supported one in a large portion of its bounds. This accusation was doubtless induced by the fact that just at that epoch were heard the first rumors of some extraordinary measures having been adopted by the Pope in regard to the election of a successor, which, as time goes on, seem to assume even a more serious aspect, and which



will probably not be entirely cleared up until the period for a new election to the papal chair shall have arrived.

In the meanwhile the Pope seemed to grow more and more irritable at every occurrence which indicated an accord of Germany with other powers, and was especially incensed at the fact that Italy was inclined to form an alliance of friendship, at least, with Prussia, then patent by a visit of the Crown Prince of Italy to Berlin, and later by that of the King. To this he was evidently incited by the Jesuit organs, some of which now became as bold in their assumptions as if the Syllabus had become the adopted code. They declared that the pontiff had made too many concessions already, and that, if the States undertook to withhold acknowledgment to the Church, the latter would be obliged to renounce allegiance to the State. In short, the Jesuits considered the period now to have arrived when they could resume the work in which they had failed in the early part of the seventeenth century—the suppression of Protestantism and the restoration of Catholicism throughout all North Germany, by rooting out Lutherans, Calvinists, and all other heretics that might be found in the way of this project.

The Pope became so free in assuming a position of hostility toward the Germans that he openly announced to a deputation which paid him a visit of congratulation, that he hoped soon to see rolling the stone that might crush the foot of the Colossus in their rebellious land, after the manner of the dream of Nebuchadnezzar. It mattered little whether by this Colossus was meant Bismarck or the new empire, the spirit of hostility was the same; and this demonstration on the part of the pontiff now began to do its work in France, which suddenly became enraptured at the boldness of the Holy Father, and resolved to sustain him in his work of crushing the power which had risen on their ruins. The word went forth in France to stop all opposition to the Church and the Jesuits; even Renan declared it the best policy for France to support the Pope and the Jesuits, who would undermine the civil structure of the Germans, and so weaken it by the time that the French would be able to undertake their crusade of “revenge,” that a slight push would finish the work. The Ultramontane organs of Germany began to speak in the same tone, and declare that

the only means of peace in the Fatherland could be found in a unity of faith, and that this must consist in the return of the country to the bosom of the Catholic Church, and to submission to the infallible Pope.

These may seem wild ravings, but they were acceptable to those for whom they were written, and their audacity gave courage to the classes whose power was appealed to in their columns. They were, indeed, no more arrogant than were the assumptions of an aulic councilor of Baden some twenty years ago, who declared that they would surround the stronghold of Protestantism in Prussia with a circle of Catholic associations, and firmly bind these together by a numerous chain of cloisters, which would smother Protestantism and relieve the Catholic provinces from the rule of the Hohenzollerns. Such utterances of course emboldened the Jesuits in their work of creating disloyalty toward the State, and they showed themselves and their doings with less reserve in the educational institutions where they had so long been sowing the seeds of their opposition to Protestantism. This was especially the case in the ancient Jesuit College in Cologne, the first on German soil, founded about the middle of the sixteenth century by one of the Jesuit fathers. It seemed exceedingly proper that this pioneer in the work of regenerating Germany should be canonized at a period when his descendants were about to resume the contest with vigor; and rumor was rife through all the lower Rhine provinces that the pope would gratify the general demand.

Hitherto Protestant Germany had been indifferent to the movements of the Jesuits in its midst, in the belief that it was safe from their intrigues within its domains, and the Prussian Government had even permitted the papal appointments of bishops, etc., to go on without that civil indorsement which the authorities of purely Catholic States secured by Concordat treaties. The German Parliament of 1848 made great progress in the line of religious liberty to the various sects, and under its banner the Jesuits had made large advances unmolested; so much so, that even now a reaction in sentiment is taking place in regard to the general principle of religious liberty, in the fear that it may leave an open door to all sorts of intrigues against the national welfare. And this is not to be

wondered at in the present state of the conflict between the Ultramontane Church and the Prussian Government. For the present papal hierarchy places itself above the State, as it has always done over the laity, and claims the highest judicial power on the earth. It assumes to punish, and to free from punishment, and is by no means willing to give to Cesar what is Cesar's. And as the Pope, in his recent correspondence with the Emperor, claimed jurisdiction over all Protestants, although they may be for the time being in rebellion, so the Jesuits now claim that every thing belongs to the Pope, and that in every collision between the temporal and the spiritual power his children must obey the latter. And since the proclamation of the famous Dogma of Infallibility, the way is short indeed to the exercise of the most refined tyranny on the part of the papal priesthood.

It now became clear that the Germans had two masters, both of whom it was not very easy to serve. The Prussians, especially, had simply nurtured their worst enemies in their own bosom, by giving them a refuge when all Catholic countries discarded them; and, adder like, they were now stinging the bosom that had warmed them into life again. They had never, indeed, acquired the legal right to settle and spread in Prussia until the year 1855; but previous to this period they had been actively engaged in what they call "Missions" in all parts of the country. They had been so offensive in these Missions in strictly Protestant regions that the Government at one time found it necessary to check them, and also to prohibit the study of Prussian students in the Propaganda at Rome without permission of the Minister of Public Worship.

But these momentary checks seemed only to spur them to greater activity, and it was very soon apparent that they were diligently working in the interest of the French, in the effort to build up in the State a political party, whose sole life should be opposition to it and devotion to the effort of preventing the much-desired German unity. And, what made this procedure the more galling to the Prussians was, the fact that a goodly number of these Jesuits were not citizens of the country, and were there simply as claimants to hospitality while engaged in their work, mainly in the educational institutions. The people, therefore, began quite generally to demand

that these strangers be required to leave the country ; and popular assemblies, convened in various parts of the land, addressed to Parliament petitions praying for their expulsion. These measures demonstrated the fact that the Catholics, as a Church, intended to defend the Jesuits, and in this way indorse their action. Counter-petitions were sent into Parliament signed by thousands ; and these were presented by the leader of the Ultramontane faction, in which act he virtually declared that the Jesuits were a power fully identical with the Church, and that, if they were attacked, the Catholic spirit would everywhere rise in defense of the cause on whose foundation all States repose.

The discussion thus induced on the floor of Parliament brought out some of the leading statesmen in the most scathing rebukes of this disloyalty. Wagner, a prominent member of Bismarck's cabinet, declared it impossible for a man to be a good Catholic and a loyal citizen at the same time, since the Church claimed of him a higher duty than that of the State, as the Syllabus affirmed that in contested points the Church demanded obedience to its precepts ; and he cited the case of a civil officer who had confessed that he took his oath of office with a mental reservation, and thus proved the existence of a state within a state, and deference to a foreign ruler at that. The result of a lengthy and intensely interesting debate was an effort on the part of Prince Hohenlohe, brother of the Cardinal, to present simple measures for the expulsion of the Jesuits from German soil ; he, a Catholic, declaring that the benefit which might accrue to the Catholic Church in Germany from the Order of Jesuits, held no comparison with the strife and danger which their presence would cause.

The continuance of this debate, in a subsequent sitting, resulted in a most searching investigation into the work and pretensions of the Order, in which their claims to religious activity were most thoroughly sifted. Gneist, the jurist of the House, dissected their claims to civil protection, and clearly showed, that when they had demands to make, it was on the ground that the State had duties toward them ; but when the State asked obedience, they knew no obligations, declaring that the State could make no claims on them. To satisfy the Church the State compels Catholics to have their children bap-

tized and educated in the Church, compels them to be married by Catholic priests, and to pay taxes for the support of Catholic priests and churches, and in every way protects them as Catholics; but, in return for this protection, the State laws are declared, for them, null and void when they happen to run counter to their desires; and teachers appointed with the sanction of the State, and paid by it, are excommunicated if they decline to teach doctrines which must weaken or destroy all loyalty to the State.

The result of this long parliamentary debate was the passage of a resolution, by a large majority, requesting the Government to lay before the body the draft of a law that would secure religious peace by assuring equal protection to both Confessions, while guarding the citizen from the encroachments of the spiritual power, and defining the position of certain religious orders, and the conditions of their further existence in the State, especially the Order known as that of the "Society of Jesus."

Immediately on the adoption of this action the Ultramontane organ in Berlin, the "*Germania*," burst forth into the most bitter invectives, declaring that the Jesuits would wage the war to the knife, and affirming that the Catholic dogmas are the work of the Holy Spirit, obligatory without conditions upon every Catholic, and unchangeable for all time. If these dogmas contain in themselves demands which the temporal power cannot or will not concede, then is proclaimed war between Church and State, and to the utmost. Other Jesuit organs, in different parts of Europe, joined in this tirade against the German Government, and helped to increase the bitterness. The "*Correspondence*," of Geneva, declared that the Pope had endeavored to oppose the governments by gentleness, but had already granted too much, and that the hour of mercy had passed. If the States cease to acknowledge the Church, the latter can no longer acknowledge the State; and the world must soon witness fearful cruelties, because the masses will not obey the governments.

In reply to these outbursts, the confidant of Bismarck, on the floor of Parliament, declared that Germany would meet these threats without fear; that Prussia had ever been lenient toward the Catholics, and had never raised the voice of complaint



until the "Missions" in Prussian Poland, in connection with the intrigues of the Order in France, Italy, and Austria, had effected their object in stirring up the masses in Germany, and teaching them to be hostile to the Government. Now Prussia felt the necessity of defending itself against the Jesuits; and as the oath of their Order forbids them to be citizens of any country, it could be no wrong to take them at their word, and, as strangers, request them to leave, if they were not satisfied and willing to obey the laws. One of the members declared that the contest was now clearly between Romanism and Germanism, and that the former had made the attack. If matters had remained in Rome in their former position, there would have been no strife on this question now; but under the guidance and control of the Jesuits new decrees of the Church have been declared, which have every-where been productive of hatred or discontent.

The sequel of these discussions was the adoption of the following laws, based on a bill presented by the ministry, but largely modified by a committee of all parties in the House, except the little faction known as the party of the "Center," which, while pretending not to represent the Jesuits, was very careful to protect them in debate and action.

The Order of the Jesuits, and those Orders and "Congregations" affiliated with them, are forbidden.

The organization of new Orders is prohibited, and the existing ones are to be dissolved in at least six months.

The members of these Orders and Congregations may be expelled from the empire if they are foreigners; and if citizens, may be ordered to take up their residence in limits assigned to them.

And, finally, the Federal Council was directed to execute these orders without delay.

Now this action, which has called forth so much censure and objugation in certain Protestant quarters, is nothing new in history. It was a pope who first set the example, and formally condemned and dissolved the Order as common disturbers of national peace. And, again, it was not the action of Protestant Germany alone, but that of the entire Confederation of States, which felt it necessary to rise in rebellion against the execution, within their limits, of the dictates of the



Syllabus and the commands of the new dogmas. The famous Gneist, at the third reading of the bill, made one of his most thrilling appeals, the closing sentences of which we append:—

“The last decade has witnessed the systematic creation of new dogmas, and the Syllabus and Encyclical, which curse every thing that belongs to the vital conditions of present society; but these are always arranged for a double use—a papal allocution, and beside it an official supplement, for use according to circumstances; a Latin text, and beside it a German exposition, which is always different for those who are to obey and those who have something to say. Numbered articles are so placed that one can separate or connect them, according as one speaks from above or below, from the right or the left. And, finally, came the conclusion, in 1870, with a council of marvelous composition, which alters the constitution or does not alter it, giving a new fundamental code to the Catholic Church, or merely a renewal of the ancient creeds, according as one speaks to those above or those below. This far-reaching plan has taken possession of the entire government of the Church, and has subjected to its rule the German bishops, after some opposition, by virtue of its solidarity of interest; it has planted its agitating and organizing spirit—the Order of the Jesuits—in fixed positions on German soil, and placed it in lasting connection with clergy and people. By hundreds and thousands, in divers localities, Catholic men have been enticed into separate organizations, in order to transact their civil interests, their money affairs, and even enjoy their pleasures in a sectarian way, in contrast with their heretical fellow-citizens. The battalions and regiments of Catholic men marshaled up in these monster petitions prove to us that they revere the Jesuits, as their guides and spiritual leaders, in an activity of some twenty years. A party, however, that always bears a double face, denies this connection—denies that the Jesuits called the Vatican Council; denies that the Order stands behind the growing assumptions and threatening organizations of the masses. These means, this mode of conflict, this organization, is not a spiritual, but a political one, which endangers all of a different opinion. This untruthfulness, however, which thinks to work to the glory of God, finds

the vital conditions of its rule, not in Germany, but with our western neighbors. And this double tongue has brought about the schism in the Church. The monk of Wittenberg, who could not tolerate falsity in religious things, lives still in the spirit of the German nation, which believes in religious endeavors as long as they are possible, but which finally loses its patience at the long-continuance of this ambitious and deceitful agitation. After twenty years' advance of this Romish rule in Germany—with means new and old, with self-help, self-interpretation, and artful equivocation—follows again a period in which the German nation must defend itself; and it will be sure of success the more the cause of freedom confides in law and the State secures liberty of conscience."

This closing thunderbolt of the great debate was received with enthusiastic applause from all quarters, and members of every party left their seats to congratulate the orator. The Jesuit laws were adopted by a vote of 181 to 93. They were received with general rejoicing all over the country as an evidence, on the part of the Government, that it did not fear to meet and punish traitors wherever they might be found. In addition to these, the Minister of Public Instruction soon felt it necessary to issue a decree from his department excluding the members of these clerical orders from the schools in which they were acting as teachers; for many of these, both male and female, were employed in the elementary schools of the country, and were instilling into the minds of their young pupils principles of hatred and rebellion toward the Government. In accordance with this decree, the various provinces were to report within six weeks what religious orders were engaged in the work of public instruction in their respective districts. The result of these reports showed a state of affairs that had not been suspected. In Fulda it was found that the Benedictine nuns were teaching in the higher schools for girls. In some of the provinces the congregations of the Virgin Mary, the fraternities of the Holy Family, and other religious associations, were not only teaching in the Gymnasias and high schools, but were actually enrolling the pupils among their members. The minister immediately ordered the dissolution of all such associations in the State institutions, under penalty of expulsion to those pupils who resisted the order.

He also found it necessary to forbid the teachers of the Association of the "Holy Child Jesus" to collect money in the schools from the children. In one of the Gymnasias on the Rhine it was found that special devotions to the "Sacred Heart of Jesus" had been introduced among the scholars, and that collections were there taken up for the benefit of the fraternity. The interference on the part of these persons had proved of great disadvantage in the matter of discipline, and had virtually divided the scholars into two classes, which had really become jealous of each other, where a feeling of mutual confidence and trust should alone be fostered.

To the surprise of all, there was no special protest on the part of the Pope or the General of the Jesuits against their expulsion. They thought it better to expend their efforts in devising means to lose as little as possible by the action of the Government. Father Beckx, General of the Jesuits, summoned the chiefs of the Order to Rome, to adopt the most effective measures in the crisis; and, after lengthy discussions in the *aula* of the Jesuit cloister in Rome, it was resolved that, as long as the persecution and banishment of the Order should continue in Germany, the lay fraternities must take their place, and double their zeal and activity for the purposes of the Order; and for this purpose funds were voted to these societies bearing the various names, "Society of the United Brothers," "Association for Prayer," and "Fraternity of Good Catholics," and the leading members received fixed salaries, so that they could devote their entire time to the work, and effectively perform the orders and carry out the missions assigned to them. This apparent readiness to yield to the decrees of the Government was a surprise to many who had expected a violent opposition, which was shown in but few places.

In some instances, however, their withdrawal was made under protest, with an endeavor to justify themselves, and prove that their expulsion was an insult to the Catholic community, which had fought so bravely in defense of the country against France. But, in reply to this, they were reminded that it was these very victories which the Jesuits were now trying to turn into defeat by inaugurating such measures and cultivating such feelings as would stir up a religious war in Germany, and

thus make easy to the French that war for "revenge" for which they are now impatiently panting.

And it will be remembered that this decree of expulsion was not a Prussian measure, but one affecting the whole Germanic Confederation, and decided on by the legal representatives of the entire country—although a hue and cry has been raised and sustained with such persistency against Bismarck, that it would seem as if Prussia alone were responsible for this action; and thus, indeed, the whole opposition of the Catholic Church of late has been waged in its intercourse with the Government. Measures which have been quietly submitted to in other German lands, have met in Prussia with the most decided resistance, so that the world at large still crystallizes this quarrel as one between Bismarck and the Jesuits. But they had been expelled from Catholic Bavaria years before, on account of their intermeddling with the affairs of State. This decree they had obeyed as they do all those which do not please them; they had obeyed it on the surface, and disobeyed in deed, wherever they could find the slightest chance or pretense so to do. The Minister of Public Worship now felt it his duty, under the action of the Imperial Parliament, to look more closely after these evasions of the law, and therefore bid a cloister of Jesuits in Regensburg, under the protection of the bishop there residing, to disband and disappear within three days. Only those who were natives of the city were allowed to remain. Here the battle waged so hotly that Count Fugger claimed his right to remain where he pleased, because of his princely birth. The case was taken to the Ministry, which insisted on his expulsion.

A favorite occupation of the Jesuits is, that of preceptors in titled houses of the nobility, and even up to the inclosures of royalty; by which means they learn a vast number of secrets of State, and acquire an influence over their pupils and at court, which makes them at times so powerful in the State, and dangerous to it. All these, of course, found means by figuring, not as Jesuits, but as private teachers and priests, to remain in their places. The Bishop of Mayence distinguished himself by a bold piece of sophistry, in which he proved a little too much for the profit of his cause. He openly invested the Jesuits in his diocese with the rights of the secular clergy, and

declared in solemn protest that they could not be expelled, because they had ever been clothed with the privileges of the pulpit, the confessional, and the mass, and were thus acting priests. But the astute prelate assumed a little too much ignorance when he pretended not to know that these were just the instruments which the Government thought it necessary to take from their hands, because they were using them as a means to indoctrinate with virus the ignorant rural population especially, and to mislead the youth of the schools into disaffection and disloyalty to the State.

The Prussian town of Paderborn is the seat of a bishopric, and contains a theological seminary, a grand cathedral, a valuable complex of buildings for Church purposes, etc., and is the head-quarters for all the Jesuits of Westphalia, whose great school is there. It was, of course, not very easy to give up all these costly possessions to the heretics, and they therefore managed their temporal matters in the following skillful style: They sold all their valuable possessions for the petty sum of about eight hundred dollars to a certain gentleman of the neighborhood, who turns out to be the brother of the Bishop of Mayence, the most talented and belligerent of the North-German bishops. But an innocent little clause in the contract shows that these valuable possessions were by no means given away, for in return for the sorry figure of sale the purchaser binds himself to support for life certain of the Jesuit fathers on his large estates, under the innocent titles of private preceptors, inspectors, etc. It is very clear that not a dollar's worth of any thing in Paderborn has been sold; it is yet all in their hands by something more than a mere quibble of law; and they expect to hold it till the day when they shall return to enjoy it, or if not they, then their mantle-bearers, for the Jesuits long ago learned how to watch and wait.

In certain sections of the country there were manifestations of sympathy toward the Jesuits from a class from which they might have the least reason to expect it. The industrial sections of Berlin are largely peopled with a class in sympathy with the socialistic views of the Internationals. These patriots, who are so very liberal in all things, even to helping themselves to other people's property under the cry that "property is theft," felt that the law expelling the Jesuits was an attack



on personal liberty, and they therefore condemned it. Saxony is the industrial focus of all Germany, and has a large artisan population strongly imbued with these unfortunate views, that any body who possesses any thing is their natural enemy. These people, in their way, are magnificent capital, but it is, unhappily, for demagogues alone. One can scarcely suppress a smile at seeing these men, the most of whom are boldly irreligious, if not practically infidel, getting up a mass in the Catholic Cathedral of Dresden for the repose of the soul of Loyola, the founder of the Order of Jesuits. This tender sympathy between the extremes of society is easily explained by the fact that they make common cause in a common desire, namely, the destruction of the Government, in the hope that, from chaos, something may turn up for them; and the Catholic priesthood does thus not disdain to use for its purposes a class of society which it would stamp out for its lawless independence in matters of religion in a day, if it had the power.

Another valuable leverage for the Jesuit intrigues was that of national antipathy, and how well they have used this to their profit may be seen in all the troubles and bitter feeling engendered in Prussian Poland. Had it been fitting, in their estimation, to stir up this turmoil on the ground of national oppression, they have had scores of years in which to do it. But instead of that the Catholics of Prussian Poland have been as active as any other class of the community, until very lately, in the laudable effort to Germanize the country in its schools, Churches, and industrial and commercial interests. But they suddenly discover now that the Prussians are great tyrants, that the German is a barbarous tongue, and that every patriotic Pole should use all his influence to contravene German interests in whatever sphere they may be found.

The open and well-known Jesuits quickly left the country, but their tracks were soon perceived and felt in other, and even distant, regions. The famous Polish emigration in Paris, always so prominent in all uproars and revolutions, even down to that of the Commune, suddenly became active in all its layers, high and low, in fanning the flame of discord both in France and in the province of Posen. War against the Germans was a popular cry in both countries, and this was their device. A serious effort was made to start a new organ among



the Poles with a view of combating the opposition to the Poles and the Jesuits, and this was to be subsidized by subscriptions from the aristocracy of the Polish emigration in Paris, who also looked for aid from no less a personage in France than the Duke d'Aumale. The Ultramontanes in Posen soon stood in active correspondence with their sympathizers in Paris for purposes of the press, and though for the time they could do nothing more, the notorious "Univers"—since suppressed for some two months, even by the present Jesuitical *régime*, for the bitterness of utterances—secured the services of the superior of a Jesuit College in Posen as regular correspondent, who, of course, could relate the most thrilling stories about the persecution of the Catholic Church in that province. That these agencies have all done their work well is proved by the complications of the Prussian Government with the Archbishop Ledochowski, which finally resulted in his imprisonment for continued and persistent violation of the Government laws.

It was soon perceived, also, that the decrees regarding the Jesuits were circumvented in various ways. A few of the prominent ones, whose existence was patent, took their departure, but they left their mantle behind them in scores of localities and multitudes of forms. In the monastic schools it was found that the very youth were already bound by vows that allied them to certain Orders affiliated to the Jesuits, and forbade their leaving the cloisters. The authorities felt it a duty, in accordance with the new Imperial Code, to visit these institutions, examine their statutes, and take an inventory of their property. They were evidently numerous, and bore various names. In Bonn alone were found three cloisters of women devoted to "Eternal Veneration;" these were known as the "Ladies of the poor Child Jesus," the Franciscan nuns, and the "Merciful Sisters of St. Charles Borromeo." These and a great many other female congregations, so-called, were engaged in various places in the work of teaching in the public and the private schools, and in some cases seemed to have full possession of these institutions. It was clearly perceived that their influence was wholly Jesuitical, and that little else than disloyalty could be expected from youth trained under their auspices. It was therefore resolved, painful as was the task,

to subject these schools to a severe examination, and remove all who seemed to be using their places for disloyal purposes. This resulted in some places, as in Düsseldorf, in almost total displacement of the female teachers in the people's schools.

The newly-acquired provinces of Alsace and Lorraine also gave the Government a full share of trouble, for they were well supplied with Jesuits who could use the two-edged weapon of religious and national prejudice to embarrass the execution of the laws. In Strasbourg their property was sold, and they were to all appearance gone, when it was found that they had bought a new site in the name of a certain lady who figured as the owner of a house in which the "Christian Brothers" were continuing the Jesuit College, with virtually no change but that of name. Nearly if not quite all the bishops of these provinces protested against the law in such a way as clearly to identify them with the Jesuits. In Metz the Jesuits had a large establishment, with over five hundred students, and a perfect mine of real estate. Two entire streets were said to belong to them. They were desirous of transferring their quarters to the town of Nancy, in France, near by, but the bishop of that burg found that he had a surfeit without them, and they were accordingly received by a certain Countess de Roncourt in her castle, whither some eighty Jesuits, with their pupils, emigrated.

The most of the German Jesuits went to Austria, Belgium, and France. Those of the famous Monastery of Maria-Laach were ordered to cease their activity immediately, and depart within six months. A large number of them left, and still there remain about twenty priests, some hundred and ten itinerant teachers, and twenty lay brothers, under the plea that they do not belong to the Order. It appears that a number of noblemen in Holland placed their castles at their disposal, as did some in Limburg, so that crowds of Jesuits are just over the border of the German States, and in this proximity can work their wires with efficiency and dispatch. Belgium is the most priest-ridden country in Europe, and, as the home of the General of the Jésuits, Father Beckx, has of course opened its doors to crowds of them. About two hundred and fifty are said to have arrived in Paris in one day, and the very same

Frenchmen who drove out the innocent German artisans with fire and sword, accorded a hearty welcome to these traitors to their country. The English Catholics, under the lead of Archbishop Manning, condemned openly the expulsion of the Jesuits, and that famous prelate made a speech full of gall and bitterness against Bismarck. Not a few of the Jesuits found their way to England, and the most famous settlement of them there is to be met with in Dilton Hall, not far from Liverpool, a large estate given up to them by Lady Brotherton.

And last, though not least for us, it is announced that the old diocesan town of Munster, in Westphalia, has sent the most of its hordes of Jesuit fathers to supply the missions in America, by which is simply meant, that most of them have been detailed to duty in the United States. Would that these were all! Indications are, indeed, too patent, that a steady stream of them is setting toward this country, under various names. The genuine fathers, regularly graduated with the degree of "S. J.," which they openly flaunt to the breeze, are among us holding their Missions by open announcement, at which, as recently in Troy, N. Y., they defend their tenets and blind their ignorant adherents. They are founding their educational institutions all over the land, and are marshaling into their lines their subordinated orders—just those which Prussia has been obliged to interfere with as Jesuit in all but name. For it matters little whether they are called "Christian Brothers," or "Charitable Sisters of the poor Child Jesus," or Paulists, or Redemptionists, their aim is all the same, namely, to thrust their adherents into every educational avenue which they can command; and these, thanks to the liberty which we accord to all comers! are many and various. And the sooner we learn that these soldiers of the Church are here for battle, and furnish our own weapons to meet them, the better for us and our country.

# ART. VI. — SYNOPSIS OF THE QUARTERLIES AND OTHERS OF THE HIGHER PERIODICALS.

## *American Quarterly Reviews.*

**AMERICAN CHURCH REVIEW**, April, 1874. (The Church Press.)—1. The First Resurrection, (concluded.) 2. Periods of Transition in English History. 3. Religious Societies. 4. The Roman Patriarchate during the Arian Troubles. 5. The Satires of Juvenal. 6. Catholicism and the Vatican. 7. On the English Reformation.

**BAPTIST QUARTERLY**, April, 1874. (Philadelphia.)—1. Psychology. 2. Religious Freedom in Russia. 3. Causes and Final Causes. 4. Progress and Results of Cuneiform Decipherment. 5. The Relation of Plato's Philosophy to Christian Truth. 6. Our Mission as Baptists. 7. Autobiography of John Stuart Mill.

**BIBLIOTHECA SACRA AND THEOLOGICAL ECLECTIC**, April, 1874. (Andover, Mass.)—1. The Foundations of Theology Sure. 2. Galilee in the Time of Christ. 3. Baptism of Infants, and their Church-membership. 4. Herbert Spencer's Religion. 5. On a Passage in Matthew xxvi, 50. 6. History in Alphabets. 7. Remarks on J. G. Mueller's *Die Semiten*. 8. Parthia the Rival of Rome.

**CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY**, April, 1874. (Cincinnati.)—1. The History of a Great Mind. 2. Should Church Property be Taxed? 3. Conversion. 4. The Religious Future of the Negro. 5. The Catacombs of Rome. 6. The Test of Christianity. 7. The Millennium.

**CONGREGATIONAL QUARTERLY**, April, 1874. (Boston.)—1. Walter Scott Griffith. 2. The Historical Relation of New England to the English Commonwealth. 3. Portland Churches. 4. May a Woman Speak in a Promiscuous Religious Assembly? 5. May Women Speak in Meeting? 6. The First "Susquehanna Association." 7. An Ecumenical Council of the Congregational Churches. 8. Congregational Theological Seminaries in 1873-74. 9. Congregational Necrology.

**HISTORICAL AND GENEALOGICAL REGISTER**, April, 1874. (Boston.)—1. Memoir of the Hon. Edmund P. Tilton. 2. Marriages in the County of York, Me., 1686-99. 3. Record-Book of the First Church in Charlestown, Mass. 4. Boston (Eng.) and John Cotton in 1621. 5. The Pilgrim Fathers of Nazing, (Eng.,) with Genealogical Tables of the Eliot Families of Roxwell and Nazing. 6. Early History of Hollis, N. H. 7. Ancient Wills: Will of Solomon Grant. 8. Marriages by Jeremy Belknap, D.D., in Dover, N. H., from 1767 to 1787. 9. English Captives in Canada. 10. Letters of Gov. Thomas Seymour and Thomas Eyre in Time of Queen Anne. 11. Transfer of Erin. 12. Early Bells of Massachusetts. 13. The Daniell Family. 14. Family of William Sawyer, of Newbury. 15. Gen. Washington's Letter to Gov. Jonathan Trumbull on the Death of his Father, Gov. Jonathan Trumbull, Sen.

**NEW ENGLANDER**, April, 1874. (New Haven.)—1. Primitive Culture. 2. Is Schism a Necessity? 3. The Emotions in Music. 4. Buddhism and Christianity. 5. Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg. 6. Sectarism, Alliance, and the Basis of Fellowship. 7. What is the True Doctrine of Christ's Second Coming? 8. Address of the Central Committee of the Old-Catholics for North Germany to the Catholics of Germany.

**PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY AND PRINCETON REVIEW**, April, 1874. (New York.)—1. Presbyterianism and the People. 2. The Pauperism of our Cities; its Character, Condition, Causes, and Relief. 3. Modern Skepticism. 4. The New Faith of Strauss. 5. Catholic Toleration in the State of Maryland. 6. Arbitration as a Substitute for War. 7. The Office of Evangelist. 8. Taxation of Churches, Colleges, and Charitable Institutions. 9. The Disentombment of Troy.

**QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH**, April, 1874. (Gettysburgh.)—1. Schmidt's Dogmatic Theology. 2. Illustrations of Providence in the History of the Church. 3. The Disfranchisement of Students. 4. The Controversy between the Theist and the Scientist. 5. Women in the Church. 6. The Evangelical Alliance. 7. Mercersburg Theology. 8. Mr. Mill's Autobiography. 9. The Pietistic Controversy.

SOUTHERN REVIEW, April, 1874. (St. Louis, Mo.)—1. Dogma and Literature. 2. Wonders of Deep-Sea Exploration. 3. The Ceramic Art. 4. History of Infant Baptism. 5. The Women of the Arabs. 6. The Best Government the World Ever Saw; or, Christian Statesmanship. 7. Mary Somerville. 8. The Cummins Movement.

UNIVERSALIST QUARTERLY, April, 1874. (Boston.)—1. The Emancipation of Capital. 2. Fulfillment. 3. The Natural and the Supernatural. 4. Psychology, Vital and Dynamic. 5. The Opinions of John Wesley. 6. On Toleration. 7. Origen's Hermeneutics.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, April. (Boston.)—1. The Ancien Régime in Canada. 2. The Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, May 20, 1775. 3. The New Trials of the Roman Church. 4. Iwan Turgéniew. 5. The Life of Timothy Pickering.

In a late visit to the South we spent a short time in the beautiful city of Charlotte, Mecklenburgh County, North Carolina, and rejoiced at seeing the locality where the first Declaration of Independence of Great Britain was declared, anticipating by more than a year, not only in essence, but in the very words used, the Declaration written, as history pretends, by Thomas Jefferson, and adopted by Congress July 4, 1776. What was our mortification, however, to find in the "North American" of April an explosion of this claim into thin air!

Article fourth, by James C. Welling, solves the curious historical myth of

#### "THE MECKLENBURGH DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

"In the year 1819 the 'Raleigh Register' surprised its readers, and the general public interested in historical inquiries, with the announcement that the people of Mecklenburgh County, in the State of North Carolina, had, on the 20th day of May, in the year 1775, openly declared their Independence of Great Britain, and in terms so similar to those employed by Mr. Jefferson in penning the National Declaration of July 4, 1776, as to create the suspicion that he had borrowed a portion of his phraseology from the earlier paper. The printed copy of the alleged Mecklenburgh Declaration of Independence, as then given to the public for the first time, nearly forty-four years after the event it signalizes, was accompanied with an *historical statement purporting to have been written contemporaneously with the original promulgation of the manifesto*, [that is, May 20, 1875,] and to recite the circumstances in which the manifesto had its origin and motive.

"According to this statement it would appear that, in the spring of the year 1775, the leading personages of Mecklenburgh

County held several detached meetings, in which the sentiment was freely expressed that 'the cause of Boston was the cause of all,' and that the first shock of British power in its encroachments on American liberty, if not resisted there, would ultimately overwhelm the people of the whole continent in a common calamity. In this state of public sentiment, and moved, it is said, by the solicitations of others, Colonel Thomas Polk, the commanding officer of the Mecklenburgh militia, issued an order to each captain's company in the county to elect two persons from their number, who should act as delegates at a meeting to be held in the town of Charlotte, the county seat, on the 19th of May, in that year, 'for the purpose of devising ways and means to aid and assist their suffering brethren in Boston, and also generally to adopt measures to extricate themselves from the impending storm.'

"It is stated that a delegation from the militia companies met, in conformity with this order, at the time and place appointed, and, by a fortuitous coincidence, the news of the battle of Lexington, fought on the preceding 19th of April, was brought by express to the town of Charlotte on that same day. The tide of popular indignation, swollen, it is said, by this exciting intelligence, could no longer be restrained within the bounds of moderation, and also, 'after a full and free discussion,' the following Declaration of Independence was unanimously adopted by the delegates."—Pp. 256-258.

The "Declaration" consists, as given, of five resolutions, saying, among other things: "We do hereby declare ourselves a free and independent people, and of right ought to be a sovereign and self-governing association, under the control of no power other than that of our God and the general government of the Congress; to the maintenance of which independence we solemnly pledge to each other our mutual co-operation, our lives, our fortunes, and our most sacred honor."—P. 258.

THIS DECLARATION WAS SENT TO CONGRESS.

A few days afterward, proceeds the chronicler, (still purporting to write on the 20th of May,) Captain James Jack, of Charlotte, was deputed as a messenger to convey a copy of these resolves and proceedings to the Continental Congress then sitting in Philadelphia, as also to deliver a letter addressed to the North Carolina members in that body—Messrs. Richard Caswell, William



Hooper, and Joseph Hewes—requesting them “to use all possible means to have the said proceedings sanctioned and approved by the general Congress.” On the return of Captain Jack, says the compiler of these annals, still professing to write under the date of the alleged Declaration, he reported that the proceedings were “individually approved by the members of Congress, but that it was deemed premature to lay them before the House.”—P. 259.

Thus this document, dated May 20, 1775, and never published until 1819, professes to narrate the facts that took place subsequent to its date! It was also in the “*Raleigh Register*,” accompanied by the following certificate of authenticity:

The foregoing is a true copy of the papers on the above subject left in my hands by John M’Knitt Alexander, deceased. I find it mentioned on file that the original book was burned April, 1800; that a copy of the proceedings was sent to Hugh Williamson in New York, then writing a history of North Carolina, and that a copy was sent to General W. R. Davie. J. M’KNITT.—P. 259.

This J. M’Knitt was son of the within-named J. M’Knitt Alexander, who, for satisfactory reasons, often omitted his surname.

HOW ADAMS AND JEFFERSON RECEIVED THE MYTH.

“The paper, at its appearance, was greeted with universal expressions of amazement. Many among the most prominent actors of the Revolutionary era were then still living, and to them it came with an especial surprise. A copy having found its way to John Adams, he called the attention of Mr. Jefferson to the matter in a letter, under date of June 22, 1819, in which he described it as ‘one of the greatest curiosities and one of the deepest mysteries that had ever occurred to him.’ ‘How is it possible,’ he added, ‘that this paper should have been concealed from me to this day? Had it been communicated to me in the time of it, I know, if you do not know, that it would have been printed in every Whig newspaper on this continent. You know that, if I had possessed it, I would have made the hall of Congress echo and re-echo with it fifteen months before your Declaration of Independence.’

“The eloquent advocate of the Revolution expressed himself in these emphatic terms under the impression, of course, that the Mecklenburgh resolutions were genuine, and that the historical statement accompanying them was authentic. But

Mr. Jefferson, in his reply, written under date of July 9, 1819, avowed the opinion that the paper purporting to emanate from Mecklenburgh was but little better than 'a very unjustifiable quiz.' In support of this opinion, he instanced the following grounds of suspicion: 'It appeals to an original book, which is burned; to Mr. Alexander, who is dead; to a joint letter from Caswell, Hewes, and Hooper, all dead; to a copy sent to the dead Caswell, and another sent to Dr. Williamson, now probably dead, whose memory did not recollect, in the history he has written of North Carolina, this gigantic step of its County of Mecklenburgh.'

"Mr. Adams, in writing again to another of his correspondents, Mr. William Bentley, on the 5th of July in that same year, and therefore before Mr. Jefferson's reply could have been received, intimated the opinion that Mr. Jefferson must have seen the paper at the time of its appearance in 1775, because, adds Mr. Adams, 'he has copied the spirit, the sense, and the expressions of it *verbatim* into his Declaration of the 4th of July, 1776.'"—Pp. 260, 261.

#### THE NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE INVESTIGATES.

A committee of the General Assembly of North Carolina was appointed at the session of 1830-31 to "collate and arrange" all the documents accessible to them "touching the Declaration of Independence by the citizens of Mecklenburgh," as also to collect new evidence in support of its genuineness and authenticity. The committee performed their task and submitted a report, in which they expressed the opinion that the testimonials they had gathered respecting the authenticity of the Declaration would be sufficient to "silence incredulity."—P. 263.

Seven witnesses of fertile memory furnish evidence which all desire to have furnished of dim, far-gone recollections.

#### SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY.

In 1853 there was published the following certificate of the above-named J. M'Knitt Alexander, which originally accompanied the above copy of the "Declaration" sent to "Davie:"

It may be worthy of notice here to observe that the foregoing statement, though fundamentally correct, may not literally correspond with the original record of the transactions of said delegation and court of inquiry, as all those records and papers were burnt with the house on April 6, 1800; but previous to that time

of 1800 a full copy of said records, at the request of Dr. Hugh Williamson, then of New York, but formerly a representative in Congress from this State, was forwarded to him by Colonel William Polk, in order that those early transactions might fill their proper place in a history of this State, then writing by said Dr. Williamson in New York.

Certified, to the best of my recollection and belief, this 3d day of September, 1800. J. M'K. ALEXANDER.—P. 290.

This is a damper. The original document was burnt, and the existing copy is *from memory*, through a very equivocal medium, of a document that ceased to exist in 1800.

#### TRUE PATRIOTISM OF THE MECKLENBURGHERS.

The real patriotism of the Mecklenburghers needed no myth to signalize it. In 1838 a document was discovered by Mr. Peter Force, Congressional Librarian, signed by Eph. Brevard, and dated, not May 20, 1775, but May 31 of that year, declaring all the laws of Great Britain "suspended," and making provisions for the vacancy created by such suspension. The "resolves" say: "That all commissions, civil and military, heretofore granted by the crown to be exercised in these colonies are null and void, and the constitution of each particular colony wholly suspended. . . . As all former laws are now suspended in this province, and the Congress has not yet provided others, we judge it necessary, for the better preservation of good order, to form certain rules and regulations for the internal government of this county, until laws shall be provided for us by the Congress. . . . Whatever person shall hereafter receive a commission from the crown, or attempt to exercise any such commission heretofore received, shall be deemed an enemy to his country."—Pp. 269, 271. This bold act was truly performed at Charlotte.

#### SUBSEQUENT LOYALTY OF SAID MECKLENBURGHERS.

The royal Governor of North Carolina, Josiah Martin, denounced the above resolutions of May 31, signed by Mr. Brevard, in the following words—words which, before the discovery by Mr. Force, were applied by historians to the mythical "Declaration:"

I have seen a most infamous publication in the "Cape Fear Mercury," importing to be resolves of a set of people styling them-

selves a Committee of the County of Mecklenburgh, most traitorously declaring the entire dissolution of the laws, government, and constitution of this country, setting up a system of rule and regulation repugnant to the laws and subversive of his Majesty's government."—P. 275.

A few months later, August 20, 1775, the Provincial Congress of North Carolina, including the four principal leaders in the Mecklenburgh movement, all signed what they called a *Test* of their loyalty to the crown, beginning with: "We, the subscribers, professing our allegiance to the king, and acknowledging the constitutional executive power of government, do solemnly protest, testify," etc.—P. 284.

Upon Governor Martin's manifesto said Congress *unanimously* passed the following resolve: "'Resolved, unanimously, that the said paper is a false, scandalous, scurrilous, malicious, and seditious libel, tending to disunite the good people of this province, and to stir up tumults and insurrections dangerous to the peace of his Majesty's government, and highly injurious to the character of several gentlemen of acknowledged virtue and loyalty; and, further, that the said paper be burned by the common hangman.' So sedulous were the members of this Congress, including the delegates from Mecklenburgh, to keep themselves in the odor of loyalty! . . . As if apprehensive that some one or another of the associated Colonies then represented in the Continental Congress might wish to proceed further and faster in the widening revolt than was compatible with their own notions of duty and safety, these delegates, including those from Mecklenburgh, determined to take precautions against being committed to any rash measures in that direction. A plan of confederation among the insurgent Colonies had been broached by Dr. Franklin in the Continental Congress on the 21st of July, 1775, for the purpose of consolidating the desultory opposition they were then waging against British aggression, and this plan was submitted to the North Carolina Congress. But North Carolina was not ripe for such a decisive step, and accordingly the committee appointed to consider this subject reported on the 4th of September, 1775, that they had taken into consideration the plan of general confederation between the United Colonies, and are of opinion that the same is not at present eligible. And it is also

the opinion of the committee that the delegates for this Province ought to be instructed not to consent to any plan of confederation which may be offered in an ensuing Congress, until the same shall be laid before and approved by the Provincial Congress. That the present association ought to be further relied on for bringing about a reconciliation with the parent State, and a further confederacy ought only to be adopted in case of the last necessity.'—Pp. 285, 286.

MECKLENBURGHERS PRUDENT AS WELL AS BRAVE.

"How entirely they shared the prudential views of their associates in that Congress will sufficiently appear from the fact that, in common with all the other delegates, they united in the *unanimous* adoption of an ultra-loyal address to the inhabitants of Great Britain, containing the most vehement asseverations, not only of their 'loyalty,' but of their 'devotion' to the British crown. A few extracts will suffice to show the temper of this document: 'Traitors, rebels, and every harsh appellation that malice can dictate or the virulence of language express, are the returns which we receive to the most humble petitions and earnest applications. We have been told that independence is our object; that we seek to shake off all connection with the parent State. Cruel suggestion! Do not all our professions, all our actions, uniformly contradict this? We again declare, and we invoke that Almighty Being who searches the recesses of the human heart and knows our most secret intentions, that it is our most earnest wish and prayer to be restored, with the other colonies, to that state in which we and they were placed before the year 1763.' The alleged signers of the Mecklenburgh Declaration of Independence who were present in that body—Messrs. Polk, Alexander, Pfifer, and Avery—united in this solemn purgation of their consciences from all taint of disloyalty to the British crown. . . . We have seen that Mecklenburgh County, by her resolves of May 31, had departed from the forms of the British colonial government, and had set up a temporary *régime* of her own. Other counties and the entire Colony had, in some respects, imitated her example. But mark in the following passages of the same loyal address how careful the members of this Congress were to guard these acts against misconstruction:



‘Whenever we have departed from the forms of the Constitution our own safety and self-preservation have dictated the expedient; and if, in any instance, we have assumed powers which the laws invest in the sovereign and his representatives, it has been only in defense of our persons, properties, and those rights which God and the Constitution have made inalienably ours. As soon as the cause of our fears and apprehensions is removed, with joy will we return these powers to their regular channels; and such institutions, formed from mere necessity, shall end with that necessity which created them.’ . . . This language certainly does not sound much like ‘the Mecklenburgh Declaration of Independence.’ And yet Colonel Thomas Polk, the alleged ‘herald’ of that ‘Declaration,’ joined in this address to the British people; John M’Knitt Alexander, the certifier of the ‘Declaration,’ united in these protestations of unswerving loyalty; Waightstill Avery and John Pfifer, alleged signers of the ‘Declaration,’ shared in these loyal prostrations before the British throne.”—Pp. 286-288.

Mecklenburgh was herein more prudent than that incarnation of prudence, Benjamin Franklin.

#### THESE MECKLENBURGHERS GOOD CALVINISTS.

Our historic delight in the above-mentioned visit at Charlotte was not at all diminished by the recollection that we had read a claim made by Dr. Hodge that these authors of the first Declaration of Independence were true-blue Calvinists, and that their act redounded to the glory of Calvinism. The following foot-note, page 262, by the reviewer, suggests where the claim may have been earlier made:

What gossamer fancies the human mind can weave when it invents both its facts and its explanations of them may be seen in a curious tractate published by Rev. Dr. Thomas Smyth, of Charleston, S. C., in the year 1847, under the title of the “True Origin and Source of the Mecklenburgh and the National Declaration of Independence,” in which, assuming the genuineness of the former, he argues that the authors of both, in the common use of certain peculiar expressions, may have drawn their inspiration from a common source, to wit, the Confessions, Covenants, and Bands of the Scotch Presbyterians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries! Needless to add that Dr. Smyth made this remarkable discovery with a pair of Presbyterian spectacles.



And still earlier :

What intractable materials the mythopoesis can work into its legends we may see in a tradition preserved in the Brevard family, that their ancestor, Dr. Ephraim Brevard, was inspired to write the Mecklenburgh Declaration by the Westminster Confession of Faith!—P. 292.

Yet it is no doubt a true view that religious repugnance was an efficient force, added to the love of freedom, in rendering Calvinists readily hostile to the English crown, as it does the Irish Catholics of the present day. On the other hand, religious affinity was a subtracting force in the minds of Episcopalians and Methodists. George III. sustained Wesley and his preachers so far as he dare, and may, in fact, be said to have been in secret heart, or rather conscience, a Methodist. The following anecdotes of the son of Charles Wesley, who bore the name of his father, Charles, illustrate our meaning :

In his manners Charles had the ease and elegance of a courtier ; in music he seemed to be inspired, so that the organ under his touch appeared to be possessed of both intelligence and feeling ; but of the affairs of ordinary life he knew nothing. . . . His extraordinary powers as an organist recommended him to the attention of the monarchs George III. and George IV., with both of whom he was evidently a favorite. Some of the things which he related to me I have inserted in the Life of his father, and perhaps may be forgiven if I also relate them here. He told me that he once offered himself for the vacant office of organist at St. Paul's Cathedral ; but when he waited upon the ecclesiastical dignitaries who had the appointment, he was abruptly repelled with the announcement, " We want no Wesley here ! " George III. heard of this rude and unseemly rebuff, and sent for the disappointed candidate to Windsor, that he might know from him the particulars of the case. After hearing them he said, " Never mind, sir ; the name of Wesley is always welcome to me. "

At another time, when he was with the king at Windsor, after his Majesty had lost his sight, he said, " Mr. Wesley, is there any body in the room besides you and me ? " " No, your Majesty, " was his reply. " Then I will tell you what I think, " said the king. " It is my judgment that your father, and your uncle, and George Whitefield, and Lady Huntingdon, have done more to promote true religion in England than all the dignified clergy put together. "—*Life of Thomas Jackson*, pp. 227, 228.

## English Reviews.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW, April, 1874. (London.)—1. Influence of Wiclif upon Huss and the Bohemian Reformation. 2. The Church and the Synagogue. (No. 1.) 3. History of the Vatican Council. 4. The Sermons of Richard Hooker. 5. Reorganization of the Prussian Evangelical Church. *Reprinted Articles*.—1. The Ruling Elder a Presbyter. 2. Calvin and Calvinism.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW, April, 1874. (London.)—1. The Odes of Horace and Recent Translators. 2. The Antiquity of Man. 3. Landseer. 4. The Slave-Trade in Africa. 5. Japan. 6. Coal. 7. English Grammars. 8. The French Reformed Church.

BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW, April, 1874. (London.)—1. Authors and Publishers. 2. The Antiquity of Man. 3. The Prospects of Persia. 4. Provision for Public Worship in Large Towns. 5. Aspects of the Agricultural Labor Question. 6. The Electric Telegraph. 7. The New Parliament. 8. David Livingstone.

## RELIGIOUS STATISTICS OF ENGLAND.

“A subsidiary but interesting feature of these statistics is the view they give of the relative strength of the leading religious bodies of England and Wales in the towns dealt with, so far as it can be measured by the accommodation they respectively supply. The fourteen principal denominations in the one hundred and twenty-five towns are represented as follows:

	Sittings.		Sittings.
Church of England.....	1,204,877	Presbyterians.....	82,641
Wesleyans.....	376,738	New Connection Methodists...	77,558
Congregationalists.....	349,459	Unitarians.....	42,549
Baptists.....	251,691	Society of Friends.....	32,401
Primitive Methodists.....	150,015	Calvinistic Methodists.....	30,810
Roman Catholics.....	147,145	Plymouth Brethren.....	22,460
United Methodists.....	112,444	Bible Christians.....	10,183

“The relative increase of the twelve principal religious bodies, as compared with 1851, can only be stated in the case of one hundred and twelve towns, the other thirteen being without any returns for that year. We subjoin the result:

	1851.	1872-3.	Increase per cent. in 22 years.
Church of England.....	828,873	1,122,366	35.3
Wesleyan Methodists.....	261,428	351,448	34.4
Congregationalists.....	208,431	330,396	58.5
Baptists.....	156,355	239,471	53.2
Roman Catholics.....	78,882	140,491	78.1
Primitive Methodists.....	68,373	137,986	101.8
United Methodists.....	51,753	108,382	107.5
New Connection.....	44,219	59,119	33.7
Presbyterians.....	33,222	78,261	135.6
Unitarians.....	30,877	40,765	31.4
Society of Friends.....	28,531	30,911	8.3
Calvinistic Methodists....	11,819	32,062	171.2

“It is hardly necessary to observe that these percentages must be taken *cum grano*. The Wesleyans, though still standing

second to the Church of England in point of religious accommodation, have not increased in these towns so fast as some other bodies, owing to the secession which took place many years ago, and which resulted in the union of the Wesleyan Association and Wesleyan Reformers, under the name of the United Methodist Free Churches. In any estimate of progress it is therefore only fair that the two bodies should be combined, in which case the increase per cent. rises to 46.7. Taking the whole Methodist family together, they represent 688,997 sittings, being a little more than two fifths of the number supplied by the Church of England, and about 24 per cent. of the entire accommodation. The rapid increase of the Primitive Methodists, who have doubled their means of public worship in twenty-two years, is especially gratifying; this indefatigable body being the poorest of the several denominations, and finding their sphere of labor almost exclusively among the lower strata of society. Relative to the other denominations, the 'Nonconformist' remarks:

Twenty years ago the Presbyterians were comparatively weak in England, and have in the interval trebled their means of public worship. They are here included in one body, though consisting of three, the Church of Scotland, the English Presbyterians, and the United Presbyterians—the latter two verging upon amalgamation. Congregationalists and Baptists stand nearly in the same relative position as in 1851, though the increase of the former has been somewhat more rapid. As to the Roman Catholics, we can only repeat that their considerable increase is mainly owing to continuous Irish immigration, and that the accommodation of their places of worship represents a larger constituency, in proportion to other denominations, in consequence of its being more utilized. It is further to be observed that, while the comparison between two distinct divisions like the Established Church and the Free Churches, as a whole, is perfectly fair for statistical purposes, (and quite natural, so long as the former is placed in a position of supremacy,) the increase per cent. is not an infallible test when applied to the Church of England and the several denominations singly. The larger a religious body the smaller is likely to be the rate of increase per cent. This consideration ought to be borne in mind in examining the above totals.—Art. iv, pp. 415-417.

“The general inference is that a majority of the church-going population of England and Wales is to be found outside the Established Church; and it is shown that the chief safeguard against the sacerdotal reaction is to be found not within the

Anglican communion, where indeed Sacramentarianism and Ritualism have lately made rapid progress, but in the numerous and extending Protestant denominations outside, the constitution of all of which is adverse to the theory of a priestly caste, and based upon the recognition of Christian freedom and independence. It is, moreover, claimed for the Free Churches that they are not only the champions of a pure Christianity and free religious thought, but the zealous supporters of political progress, and a liberal policy in national affairs. If the large towns are the chief centers of industrial enterprise and intellectual activity, it is reasonably concluded that, as the Non-conformists preponderate in all of them, they will, even more than has been the case heretofore, materially help to mold the national life, and preserve it from that putrefaction which arises from the injurious influence of a numerous sacerdotal class, favored and sustained by the State, coincident with the perils which are entailed by the enormous increase of wealth and prosperity among the population."—Art. iv, pp. 420, 421.

#### WASHINGTON AND LINCOLN.

"Wherever great deeds are the result of moral earnestness, rather than of intellectual force, there the personal character always attracts a special and affectionate interest. George Washington could perhaps, hardly with justice, be called a great soldier. But he was something better: he was a great man. And his character has always had more interest than his actions. The same thing may be said of the only other American President, yet arisen, who is likely to rival Washington in the affections of American patriotism. Abraham Lincoln was not a man of great intellect. But he was a man with a very clear moral insight into the secret of his country's woes, and with a courage that rose precisely in proportion as his convictions of duty were deepened."—Art. viii, p. 490.

#### EVOLUTIONARY CREATION.

"Mr. St. Clair accepts the evolution hypothesis of Darwin and Spencer, and in fact presents with remarkable clearness and succinctness the evidence on which it rests, and the phenomena which it seeks to explain. He admits the subjective character of species, and the origination of variety under the pressure

of external conditions, and the tendency of the variety most in harmony with its environment to prevail over that which is less so. He treats the preservation of homologous parts in the great families of animated nature as signs of hereditary relationship rather than as indications of a vast plan. He allows the prodigious influence of sexual selection on the development of special peculiarities in both sexes. He refers rudimentary organs and partially developed peculiarities to the same general theory of general evolution of all things, and resists the criticisms by which many of these positions have been assailed. So far the volume is a valuable text-book to the doctrine of evolution, as every statement is confirmed, or even made in the language of one or other of the distinguished writers who have been chiefly associated with the modern promotion of the idea. Here, however, he parts company with many of them, and proceeds to argue the mental necessity, in which the theory lands the student, of supposing a Creator of boundless wisdom and beneficence. He endeavors to maintain that *evolution is the method of creation*, that the design-argument is unaffected, and even re-constituted, by the hypothesis; and so far from accepting the 'purposelessness' of nature, he handles with great acumen those which have been advanced; and shows that—as, for example, in the fetal teeth of the whale—if the whole of the long process of modification be regarded as the Divine method in which needful and excellent varieties are obtained, and certain peculiarities dispensed with, the changes which are effected would not have been possible unless the force were present, which would be certain to eventuate in some other correlated peculiarity. Mr. St. Clair lays greatest emphasis on the properties of living substance being *foreseen* in all their infinite complication, and as designed to evolve their innumerable varieties. He shews that the simple, broad facts of evolution, or rather the commonly accepted phenomena of heredity and variation, ought to inspire admiration and wonder. Why not go further, and see in the laws and properties of matter the direct operation of the Creator, alike of things and of their forms and modes of behavior? Whence came the properties of nitrogen, and the undulations of ether, and the protoplasmic energy? Neither the universality nor constancy of a relation like that of heredity throws a ray of light upon its mystery.

We agree that the *acceptance of Darwinism need not deprive us of our Creator*, nor ought it to blind us to his intelligence or goodness; but we are satisfied that Mr. Darwin has given a most insufficient exposition of the origin of the moral nature of man, and that the attempt to refer Christianity to the same general theory does much to unwind the strands of the whole argument. We will not contest the point here, but simply remind Mr. St. Clair that it is not enough to reply to the objection to evolution based on its abolition of the soul and its immortality that evolution is not answerable for these difficulties, and to say that other hypotheses about the human embryo and the birth of man are beset with like puzzles. We congratulate the author on the ground of his conscientious and scientific treatment of a profound and intricate problem. He suggests, from the correlation of the physical and vital forces, that if the final evolution of energy is consciousness and will, it is reasonable to suppose that the starting-place, the origin of all force, is *infinite* mind and will. This is an ingenious *argumentum ad hominem*, but we are far from accepting any such transmutation of force as is implied. If we should be compelled by Dr. Bastian or others to believe in the purely physical origin of life, and if the correlation of the phenomena of mind with the physical forces be ever established on irrefragable basis, we should hail the suggestion of Mr. St. Clair. At present, we are content to lay it by for possible use."—Pp. 555, 556. *Notice of "Darwinism and Design ; by George St. Clair, F.G.S.*

DE WITT TALMAGE.

"Perhaps the besetting sin of preachers is dull propriety, and in our thankfulness for any revolt from it, we are disposed to be very lenient toward sensationalism, especially when it bears marks of genuineness. But Dr. Talmage is almost too much for us. His extravagance is so incessant, and so often verges upon profanity or buffoonery, that even his manifest earnestness does not redeem it. He seems to be always casting about for something that may shock by its violence—the extravagances of men like Latimer are his ordinary mood. He gives his hearers no rest—every sentence is 'above proof.' What can we think, for instance, of a sermon on 'The White Hair of Jesus,' in which his appearance, as described in Rev. i, 14, is made to



suggest the *sorrow*, the *beauty*, and the *antiquity* of Jesus. It is neither exegesis, nor reverence, nor common sense. Nothing can excuse such travesties of the most sublime and reverent representation of Scripture, nor can any degree of cleverness or earnestness prevent such preaching from turning religion into contempt. If our American brethren like it, all the worse for them. We cannot think it of the fellow-townsmen of Henry Ward Beecher and Richard Storrs. There are, however, in the book better things than this. It is earnest—even passionate—in its appeals against sin and for Christ; but even the utmost earnestness and fidelity need not have recourse to such flagrant violations of both taste and reverent feeling.—*Notice of Talmage's Sermons.*

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#### ART. VII.—FOREIGN RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

##### ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

THE conflict which, in consequence of the Vatican Council and the proclamation of the doctrine of Papal Infallibility has arisen between the Roman Catholic Church and a number of States in which the Church is constitutionally recognized as an established Church, is more and more assuming dimensions which make it one of the greatest and most momentous controversies of the age. Although the so-called Catholic party, which endeavors to carry out the behests of Rome in the legislative assemblies, and, in general, in the political and social life of the European countries, has now a better organization and exerts a greater influence than at any previous period, the Governments, the Protestants of all shades of opinion, the Liberal Catholics, and, in general, all who do not belong to the Catholic party, are on the other hand unanimously determined not to concede the demands of the hierarchy and the Catholic party. There is as yet but little disposition on the part of the Governments and the Liberal parties to solve the difficulty by adopting the American principle of a complete separation between Church and State. The prevailing opinion is, that as the ministers and institutions of the Catholic Church are supported by State moneys, the further payment of these moneys must be made contingent upon a strict compliance with the laws of the State, and any violation of these laws on the part of the bishops and priests must be punished as any other transgression of State laws. Two countries in particular, Prussia and Switzerland, are at present engaged in carrying through this principle with a consistency which shrinks from no measures, however severe. In Prussia the new Minister of Public Worship, Dr. Falk, in January,

1873, introduced in the session of the Prussian Diet the draft of the celebrated four new laws which hereafter will regulate the relation of State government of Prussia to the established Churches, and in particular to the Roman Catholic Church. They provide that all clergymen of the State Churches, in order to be qualified for an appointment, must have passed through a regular course of instruction at the German Gymnasias and Universities, and that the so-called *Seminaria Puerorum*, a Roman Catholic institution in which boys from an early age are receiving a kind of monastic education for the priesthood, be abolished. They aim at restricting and confining within certain bounds the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical superiors over their inferiors, and define the functions of the new "Royal Court for Ecclesiastical Affairs," which is in future to act as a court of appeal from all decisions of ecclesiastical superiors. They also abolish many of the provisions by which the State formerly endeavored to render the secession from one of the State Churches as difficult as possible. Although the Evangelical Oberkirchenrath of Berlin (Supreme Ecclesiastical Council) did not approve all of the provisions proposed by the Minister of Public Worship, and also some Protestant members of the high aristocracy denounced them in the Herrenhaus, (House of Lords,) the debate on them in the Diet was almost exclusively a combat between the Catholic party and the Government. The former was supported in their opposition to the laws by the Polish deputies, by a few ultraconservative Protestants, and the Socialists, but when the vote was taken in the Chamber of Deputies they were defeated by a vote of about 245 against 110. The Herrenhaus, which on a similar occasion had been given to understand that the Government would not brook any factious opposition on the part of the high aristocracy, but if necessary would overcome it by the creation of new peers, also adopted the law by a two thirds majority, (93 against 63.) The Catholic bishops, at a general meeting held in Fulda, determined not to submit to the law, which they represented as being at variance, in essential points, with the divinely ordained constitution and the freedom of the Church, and as threatening the Church with a greater danger than any to which it had been exposed since the days of Constantine. At the new election of a Prussian Diet in October, 1873, it was found that the Catholic party which supported the demands of the bishops largely gained in nearly all the Catholic districts, electing their candidates in an overwhelming majority of the districts. As, however, their only trustworthy allies among other political parties of the Diet, the old Conservatives, were almost annihilated in the new election, the Government had for its ecclesiastical polity as large a majority in the new chamber as in the old. The speech from the throne expressed the regret of the king that the new laws which were to regulate the relations of the State Government to the State Churches had encountered the unjustified opposition of the Roman Catholic bishops. It also announced that the Government, unmindful of this resistance, would fully carry through those laws, and would promptly take all the other necessary steps in

order to prevent the interests confided to its care from suffering any injury. When one of the leaders of the Catholic party, Peter Reichen-sperger, a member of the Supreme Court of the Kingdom, moved that the House of Deputies declare that the ecclesiastical peace, which had been destroyed since 1871, could not be restored by the passage of measures like the recent Church Laws, but only by a return to the principles which had long been practically tested, his motion was rejected by 288 votes against 95. As the Government of Prussia takes the ground that it is not the office of the State to decide which of the two parties claiming to be the true Catholic Church has the best title to the name, it considers it fair to let the Old Catholics have a fair proportion of the moneys which the State allots for the support of the Catholic Church. The budget of the Minister of Public Worship, which was discussed in January, 1874, proposed to give to the Old Catholic bishop, Dr. Reinkens, an annual salary of 16,000 thalers, and the Chamber approved of this sum, notwithstanding the violent attacks of the Catholic party. On February 3, 1874, the Archbishop of Posen, Count Ledochowski, was arrested for persistent violation of the Prussian laws, and in March his arrest was followed by that of the Archbishop of Cologne and the Bishop of Treves. In April, 1874, the Royal Ecclesiastical Court of Berlin declared the imprisoned Archbishop of Posen deposed from his office. The Government, in the meanwhile, had proposed, and the Prussian Diet adopted, laws introducing civil marriage, and providing for the administration of vacant dioceses. The relation of the other German States to the Catholic Church is about the same as that of Prussia, and the Reichstag is guided in questions of a religious character by the same principles as the Prussian Diet.

At the election of a new Reichstag at the beginning of 1874, the Ultramontane party gained as great successes in Bavaria and several other small States as in Prussia. In Bavaria they elected their candidates in all but three or four of the Catholic districts, and only in the Grand Duchy of Baden, where two thirds of the population are Catholic, they were defeated, retaining only two of eighteen districts. In the Reichstag they number one hundred and two of three hundred and ninety-seven members, exclusive of thirteen Poles who, in all religious questions, vote with them. It may be regarded as certain that the laws which will be adopted in Prussia will sooner or later receive the sanction of the German Reichstag. The Grand Duchy of Baden, which, next to Prussia and Bavaria, has the largest Catholic population, has already introduced the same laws as Prussia, and even taken more decisive steps for protecting the Old Catholics in the enjoyment of their rights as members of the established Catholic Church. In Bavaria the Government has, for the present, refused to recognize Dr. Reinkens as Old Catholic bishop. The progress of the Old Catholic Church as a separate organization is making slow but steady progress. A number of new congregations have been organized, and some of the old ones have largely increased in numbers; thus the congregations of Cologne embrace more

than two thousand five hundred heads. The first Synod of the Church was held in May, 1874.

In Switzerland, the revision of the Federal Constitution, which has been adopted by a majority of the cantons and a majority of the popular vote, indicates the continued ascendancy of the principles which all the cantons, with the exception of the seven in which the Ultramontane party is still in the majority, have adopted with regard to the Church of Rome. In the largest canton, Berne, all the Catholic parishes are now administered by Old Catholic priests, and the necessary steps have been taken for the establishment of an Old Catholic theological faculty in connection with the University of Berne. As the Pope, in his Encyclical of November 21, 1873, severely condemned the measures adopted against the Catholic Church, the Federal Council, on the twelfth of December, informed the Papal nuncio, Agnozzi, that in consequence of the conduct of the Pope toward Switzerland the Confederacy would no longer recognize a Papal diplomatic agent.

In Austria, the first general elections according to the new electoral law for a new Reichsrath, which embraces the representatives of the German and most of the Slavic provinces, took place in October, 1873, and resulted in a considerable majority of the Liberal party. In Austria, the Catholic party is as yet far from being so strong as in Prussia. It controls many of the rural districts, but in the vast majority of the towns it is almost powerless. Though the sympathies of the Imperial family are supposed to be strongly with the Catholic party, the Emperor has found it necessary to appoint a ministry which, in most questions, agrees with the Liberal majority of the Reichstag, though in some it keeps back, preferring to advance at a slower rate. As the Concordat of 1855, which gave to the Catholic party very extensive prerogatives, has been abolished, a re-organization of the relations between Church and State had long become necessary. The drafts of four new laws were therefore introduced by the ministry in the session of the Reichsrath which began in January, 1874. They are far from being so sweeping as those adopted by the Prussian Diet, and did by no means fulfill the expectations of the Liberal party. Their aim appeared to be to establish a more extensive superintendence of the State over Church affairs, and especially over the property of the Church, and at the same time to hurt as little as possible the feelings of the hierarchy. The latter, however, looked upon the proposed laws as being no less injurious to the best interests of the Church than the Prussian laws, and determined to make to them a desperate opposition. The Pope himself, in an Encyclical Letter dated March 7, 1874, declared that in reality these laws were of the same spirit and character, and prepared for the Church in Austria the same ruin. Nevertheless, the House of Deputies, on March 9, adopted the law concerning the regulation of the external affairs of the Church by 224 votes against 71. In the Upper House all the Archbishops and Bishops of the Empire took their seats, and the Cardinals Rauscher, Schwarzenberg, and Tarnoczy strongly denounced

the laws, but could not prevent their adoption. On the seventh of May the Emperor signed the first two of the four laws which had been introduced by the ministry, and they had thus become valid. In the new session of the Reichsrath, which is to be held in the latter part of the year, the third and fourth of these laws are to be discussed, as well as some amendments which have already been introduced by Liberal members who desire more stringent laws against the Catholic Church. One of these amendments, which demands the expulsion of the Jesuits, appears to be favored by a large majority of the Deputies.

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#### ART. VIII.—FOREIGN LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

THE Greek Church has of late not only entered into closer intercourse with other denominations of Christians in Western Europe and America, but it begins to have a theological literature which is based on a thorough acquaintance with the standard works of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches. In addition to the works of this kind mentioned in former numbers of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, a manual of Church History deserves to be mentioned, published last year by Professor Kyriakos, of the University of Athens, for the use of theological students of the University. (*Δοκίμιον Εκκλησιαστικῆς Ιστορίας*, Athens, 1873.) After stating in the introduction the scope of his work, and reviewing the literature on Church history, the author divides the history of the Christian Church into four sections. 1. From the foundation of the Church to Constantine the Great, (A. D. 1–313:) 2. From Constantine the Great to the separation of the Eastern and Western Churches in the ninth century, (A. D. 313–860:) 3. From the separation of the Churches in the ninth century to the Conquest of Constantinople, (A. D. 860–1453:) 4. From the Conquest of Constantinople to the present time, (A. D. 1453–1870.) In the history of each of the first two periods the author treats in five chapters of the external history of the Church, of the Church doctrine, of ecclesiastical literature, of the constitution of the Church, of ecclesiastical life and divine worship. From the beginning of the third period the history of the Oriental Church becomes, of course, more prominent. In the third period five chapters treat: 1. Of the separation of the Churches and the attempts at reunion; 2. Heresies and theological controversies; 3. Theological literature; 4. Ecclesiastical constitution, life and worship; 5. Introduction of Christianity among the Slavi, and in particular among the Russians. A sixth chapter treats of the Eastern sects which seceded from the Greek Church, and a seventh chapter of the history of the Western Church. The fourth period is divided into four chief divisions: I. History of the Oriental Church, in three subdivisions; 1. The Oriental Church in the Turkish Empire; 2. History of the Oriental Church

in Greece; 3. History of the Oriental Church in Russia. II. History of the other Oriental Churches. III. History of the Protestant Churches. IV. History of the Roman Catholic Church. Books of this kind have an important mission; they acquaint the theological students of the Greek Church with the religious movements in the Protestant and the Roman Catholic Churches, and thus aid in removing the state of lethargy in which this Church has been so long.

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#### ART. IX.—QUARTERLY BOOK TABLE.

##### *Religion, Theology, and Biblical Literature.*

*Holiness the Birthright of All God's Children.* By REV. J. T. CRANE, D.D., of the Newark Conference. 16mo., pp. 144. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden. 1874.

Had we been privileged to peruse Dr. Crane's *brochure* before publication we should doubtless have endeavored to convince him that there is no such difference in his views as to require him to place them in so frank an antagonism to Mr. Wesley's. Mr. Wesley holds that regeneration is at first so incomplete that traces of depravity remain in the soul, as is evidenced by the "sins willfully committed" (according to our twelfth Article) "after justification." Dr. Crane admits that "after justification" there are "weak faith," "temptation," and "sin," but denies that their base is a "residue" of our natural pravity within us. This may seem to some a shadowy difference, but it leads him to a brave contest with Mr. Wesley's sermon on "Sin in Believers," which has been accepted as standard by our Methodism the world around. We think it must still remain standard.

We venture the following statement. Mr. Wesley and Dr. C. agree that, at justification, there is conferred a degree of "power" over sin and against temptation. Both would agree that according to the degree of that "power" is the degree of the sanctification. Indeed, we think one of the best definitions of sanctification is: *The power, through divine grace, more or less complete, and more or less permanent, so to resist temptation and avoid sin as to live in the fullness of Divine favor.* Where the correlation between the inner state of the soul is such that there is no power to avoid sinning, "and that continually," the depravity is entire. Where, *secondly*, there is power through grace, by faith, largely but partially and precariously to avoid sin, with usually but a dim sense of Divine approval, then we should by parity infer that the pravity was not entire but partial. If it were the case of



one who had been previously in the *entirely* depraved state, we should imagine that it was a trace of that previous entire state. And viewing this to be about the condition of the ordinary justified person, we look upon this deficit of his spiritual power as a remains of his previous entire inability. Where, *thirdly*, the power is such as to enable one, with the exertion of unremittent care and energy, to maintain, with a clear and regular continuity, the avoidance of such sin as diminishes the light of God's smile upon us, we might with trembling trust call that entire sanctification. Where, *fourthly*, such is the correlation between the state of the soul and temptation that the avoidance of sin is a matter of perfect normal and natural ease, and may be rationally predicted as forever and absolutely permanent, (even though there is a free power for sin, and though sin be most abnormally the actual result,) there is clearly no depravity. And this is Adamic perfection. But it is quite irrelevant for Dr. Crane to quote Adam and Eve before the fall to illustrate either of the previous cases. Finally, where the soul is entirely removed from the sphere of sin, perfectly filled with God, and framed within a body incapable of sin so that sin becomes impossible, the holiness is finitely absolute. This last stage of complete, indefeasible bliss shall be at the resurrection. It is that period predicted by our Lord as emphatically *the regeneration*. Matt. xix, 28. It is that glorious day to which St. Paul, earnestly looking, beholds the whole creation groaning for the manifestation of *the sons of God*. Regeneration is, indeed, truly a specific term in theology, and yet it comes under the grand genus of the final renovation. Then for the first moment the impairment we, one and all, have derived from Adam and sin, shall be completely repaired. Hence our regeneration here, as individuals, is but initial, as part of the entire regeneration completed at the resurrection. Let not then our beloved brother be impatient because God is so slow as to leave an imperfect "residue" within us. "God is patient because God is eternal."

To perceive the difference between justification and entire sanctification let us take another view. At justification, or pardon, God beholds the soul as being in Christ perfectly innocent, perfectly pure from the guilt of sin. In *that sense* he is, at that moment, *perfectly holy*. Then such measure of the Spirit is given as God pleases; and even the slightest measure of spiritual life thereby bestowed is regeneration. Assuming, then, that the soul is in the above sense *perfectly holy*, is he possessed of such *perfect power over the future commission of sin as to constitute entire*

*sanctification?* If such a case should be, it would be a rare exception. Experience shows that such a power is the usual result, both of growth and of fuller measures of the Spirit, and "gift of power." And now, what is the measure of what can be called "entire sanctification?" Our answer would be: *Such a measure of power over sin as holds us, with more or less continuity, in that same perfect fullness of divine approbation as rested upon us when justification first pronounced us, through Christ, perfectly innocent of sin.* Happy, transcendantly happy, is the man with whom such fulness is permanent! With others it may be for a season; with others, a vibrating experience; and rarer than is usually supposed is the case of its permanence.

We think it accords with Wesleyan theology to say, that the amissibility of even the most entire sanctification in our probationary life is based in a "residue" of our hereditary moral debility. Just because it is part of the great racial impairment waiting the great racial repairment. And just because, also, it is such a correlation of the soul with temptation, belonging to our nature, inherited from the fall, as leaves us, as Mr. Wesley repeatedly states, inferior to Adamic perfection. Whatever inferiority we possess below unfallen Adam, must be part of that loss we have suffered from fallen Adam.

Sanctification is, perhaps, less the taking away any thing from our inward nature than the bestowment of a repressive power over our inner sinward tendencies. On the rail-track the sprung iron sometimes turns up a dangerous elastic "snake's head," that, unless fastened down, will smash the train. The natural man's heart contains a circle of elastic "snakes' heads," pointing from circumference to center, that nothing but divine grace can press completely down. The Spirit of God, aiding our firm volition, applies a pressure that shuts them down more or less completely; and according to the completeness of the shut-down is the entireness of the sanctification. That Divine grace ever completely takes away the snakes' heads, or even their elasticity, during probation, is more than we can affirm. Whatever be the conscious feeling of the professedly sanctified man, our impression is, that spectators often perceive the snake's head when he little thinks it. St. Paul found it necessary to *keep his body under*—that is, to keep the snake's head repressed; and it was that repression, not the *removal*, that constituted his sanctification. The unremoved snake's head is evidenced by the energy still required to keep it in repression; and apostasy discloses the

snake's head present and elastic as ever. It is, perhaps, only in the sense that the complete repression of the snake's head would be its cessation as a snake's head, so that it is a snake's head no longer, that there may be said to be in sanctification a cessation of our hereditary pravity.

What constitutes the difference between the sin of the unregenerate and the sin of the regenerate? We answer: the former is the hostile act of an enemy, the latter the offense of a child. For the former God has justice, for the latter correction. When faith is strong and fertile, that childship is manhood. When faith is "weak" and barren, the soul is dwarfed in moral manhood and becomes a babe. When faith expires, the child of God becomes a child of the devil. In the heart of the regenerate, faith, however weak, is a deep, moral protest underlying the sin he commits; a potential repentance, likely soon to manifest itself in action. The difference, therefore, between the sins of the unregenerate and regenerate is not intrinsic but relative; it arises from the different conditions of enemy and child. The denying the Christian's sins to be sins is a fatal procedure. Dr. Hodge charges an Antinomian tendency upon perfectionism, but carefully adds that it has no such effect among Methodists. Any inclination to deny sin and guilt in the believer would certainly introduce such tendency. We must beware how we sustain our regeneration or our sanctification, not by avoiding sin, but by white-washing the sin we commit.

Dr. Crane's book is written in a pure, fresh, and living style. However he overrates justification, he is about right in his statement of sanctification. His tone and temper are worthy the imitation of his respondents, whose spirit in some instances seems hardly justified, much less sanctified.

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*The Trinity.* By Rev. F. H. BURRIS, A. M., member of the South Kansas Methodist Episcopal Conference. With an Introduction by Professor JOSEPH HAVEN, D.D., LL.D., Author of "Mental Philosophy," etc. 12mo., pp. xxvii, 216. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1874.

If Professor Haven gives us a true view of the historical phases of the Trinitarian doctrine, we think that subject is well worth the critical attention of our professors of Historical Theology. If it be a true exposition of the Athanasian creed that the *three-one* is three as three men are three, yet are one only as the human race is one, then we have the baldest of tritheism.

Professor Haven gives the following as the substance of Mr. Burris's doctrine:

1. That there is but one God, the Father of all. 2. That Christ is the Son of God, begotten of the Virgin by the Holy Ghost; that in this Son, thus begotten, God dwelt—the *whole Deity*, and not merely the second person of the Trinity, as usually taught. 3. That the Holy Ghost, sustaining thus to Christ the relation of Father, is none other than God the Father; in other words, is the *spirit* of God, and no more a distinct person from him than the spirit of a man is a distinct person from the man himself. 4. That the Divine Trinity—the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—are not a trinity of persons, but the three essentials of one God in Christ—the Father being Deity; the Son, the human nature in which Deity becomes incarnate; the Holy Ghost, God working in us through his Son—a trinity first coming into existence when God became incarnate in the person of Jesus.

This appears to be about equivalent to Sabellianism. It teaches not an *essential* and eternal, but a *phenomenal* and temporal, Trinity. There is no eternal trine distinction in the Divine Essence. The Trinity is not only revealed first in the New Testament dispensation, but there it first comes into existence, being simply the one God in a threefold manifestation; each manifestation being a personality because endowed in language and thought with a personal pronoun; each person eternal only in the Divine Essence underlying the impersonation.

We will not now inquire how far this agrees with Scripture. And our readers may be surprised at our query, how far it is heterodox according to our standards? The eternal Sonship of Christ has been a doctrine heretofore strenuously maintained by most Methodist authors. Watson had a controversy with Clarke on the subject, and in the spirit of that controversy gave a large space to that topic in his Institutes. If we rightly remember, Timothy Merritt, of New England, lost a re-election by the General Conference because he wrote an article questioning that doctrine. We once heard Dr. Bangs express his disapproval of the strenuousness of Watson on the dogma. We will now call attention to a fact which we think *has never been noticed* in this connection. Mr. Wesley, in remodeling the thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England for the American Methodist Episcopal Church, *expressly struck out the doctrine of the eternal Sonship of Christ*. This will appear by the following comparison between the English article, Latin and English, and our Wesleyan Article.

Filius, qui est Verbum Patris, ab æterno a Patre genitus, verus et æternus Deus, etc.

The Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, etc.

The Son, who is the Word of the Father, the very and eternal God, etc.

Dr. Clarke refers to a conversation with Mr. Wesley in which the latter, though inclined to the Churchly view, laid no emphasis upon it. One can hardly doubt that, in striking out the clause in the American articles, he meant to leave a freedom on the ques-

tion. Perhaps this is in accordance with the fact that Wesley, omitting the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, retained the so-called Apostles' only. We are not clear, therefore, that the doubting the eternal Sonship is with us unorthodox. Moses Stuart, Albert Barnes, and, we believe, New England Calvinists extensively, believe that the term *Son of God* takes its origin from the incarnation, (according to Luke i, 35,) and applies to the divinity of the second person only by extension.

Mr. Burris (pp. 173-5) compliments our Commentary, on Luke i, 35, as alone of the commentaries touching upon the fact that the text seemed to make the Holy Ghost the father of Christ. Our note, in order to avoid that conclusion, interprets the Holy Spirit as the pure Spirit of the Father. On fuller examination we must thank Mr. B., not so much for paying an over-generous compliment, as for calling us to a reconsideration of the subject. We must rather incline to the views of the Conception furnished by Pearson on the Creed. Conception is a feminine act, "and belongeth not so properly to the Holy Ghost, of whom the act, cannot be predicated. For though Christ was *conceived by the Holy Ghost*, yet the Holy Ghost did not conceive him, but said unto the Virgin, 'Thou shalt conceive.'" Luke i, 31. The part of the Holy Spirit was, that he "immediately and miraculously enabled the blessed Virgin to conceive our Saviour." "And if at any time I have said Christ was begotten by the Holy Ghost, and if the Ancients speak as if he generated the Son, it is not to be understood as if the Spirit did perform any proper act of generation, such as is the foundation of paternity." In a learned note, Pearson quotes with apology Tertullian's phrase *semen Dei*. Pearson adds, "I know not whether it be the greatest folly, to *make the Holy Ghost the Father*, as these men have done, in supposing a seminal conjunction; or to make the Holy Spirit mother of Christ, as the Nazarenes did." The true doctrine of the Church, rejecting with disgust all thought of seminal impartation, holds the Holy Spirit to have simply empowered the person of the Virgin to conceive from her own corporeal substance. Inspiration reveals that the agent was the Holy Spirit for the very purpose of rejecting all unholy association of thought.

The Apostles' Creed says, indeed, "Conceived by the Holy Ghost;" but it also says, "I believe in God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ his only Son." Very plainly, then, the primitive Church did not hold the Holy Ghost to be the Father of Christ. In accordance with this view we see no reason for inter-

preting Luke i, 35, as meaning other than the third person of the Trinity. Yet the obvious meaning of the words of the Creed, "Jesus Christ his only Son, who was conceived," etc., "born of the Virgin," etc., would seem to be that the Sonship commenced with the incarnation.

A phenomenal Trinity is undoubtedly far more easy to our rational conception, but that it duly solves the language of Scripture is a matter of profound doubt. That it is consistent, without a new interpretation, with the first or second of our Articles, we suppose Mr. Burris will not claim. Mr. Burris takes stand on his scripture interpretation professedly on the ground that he has tried to believe the Athanasian Creed, but could not. How far the effort to harmonize our theology with our supposed "intuitions" will drift the public mind in the phenomenal direction, the future must decide.

*The Holy Bible according to the Authorized Version, (A.D. 1611.)* With an Explanatory and Critical Commentary, and a Revision of the Translation, by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M.A., Canon of Exeter, Preacher at Lincoln's Inn, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. Vol. IV. Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, The Song of Solomon. 8vo., pp. 702. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.

The present volume includes many of the most interesting and important passages of the old canon. The notes by such contributors as Cook, Ellicott, Plumptre, and others, are well worth reference and study. They are modest, moderate, learned, able, and conservative without bigotry. The ample margins, however, might have been less spacial, and more completely filled; while so large and loosely-printed a text is very unnecessary. We do not need the work as a large print of King James's translation, but as a repository of the best modern thought on the ancient record. The work deals often in a very gentle, yet conclusive, way with the rationalistic questionings of the authenticity of the various books and passages.

The pseudo-criticism invalidating the Solomonian authorship of the book of Ecclesiastes is, for instance, shown to be invalid. The text of the book positively asserts that Solomon was its author. And as there is no intimation whatever that the plain statement was figurative, the obvious inference would be that the book was either Solomon's or a forgery. The entire historic tradition of the Jewish Church accepts it as Solomon's according to its own statement, and has elevated it into the sacred canon. Yet out of so plain a statement as "I was king in Jerusalem"



two arguments have been drawn to show that the work was written, not by Solomon, but by some later writer.

1. The past tense *was* implies that he *is* not king at the time of writing. To this our author gives two replies, which are each ample to refute the objection, and yet are neither, we believe, the best answer. His first reply is, that the Hebrew preterite may really include the present, which is true. His second reply is a quotation from Louis XIV. of his phrase, "When I *was* king," uttered in despondent recollection of his once victorious days. The true reply, we think, is this: Solomon is writing this book of religious ethics, not merely for his contemporaries, but also for the future; and in simple grandeur he says to his successors, "I, who made these various moral experiments, had full chance for a complete trial, conclusive for all time, for 'I was king in' the holy capital." That this would be the true meaning of the words, even if written by a later author, is, we think, certain. Otherwise, that later author is made to assume that Solomon was dethroned near the close of his life. But how absurd to suppose that a book should be inserted in the sacred canon by a writer so perfectly ignorant of Solomon's real history, as recorded in the Bible itself! How absurd to suppose that so gross a contradiction of the canon could have place in the canon!

2. The second argument is drawn from the phrase "in Jerusalem;" which phrase, it is objected, implies that there was another Hebrew capital, namely, Samaria, and, therefore, it indicated a time later than Solomon. The replies of our author seem rather incomplete. Our own replies are: 1) The objection implies a very unsupposable blunder in the supposed later author. He makes Solomon king after his own death; after Rehoboam, his son, was reigning; and after the kingdom was divided into two. That the author of a standard piece of Hebrew literature should write so ignorantly, and then that production should be adopted into the canon, is inadmissible. 2) "King in Jerusalem" may just as well be antithetic to Tyre, or to any other neighboring capital, as to Samaria. Why not Solomon "king in Jerusalem," just as well as "Hiram king of Tyre?" The whole argument is based on the simple and ordinary mentioning of the capital instead of the kingdom. 3) But the real reason is this: The phrase "in Jerusalem" occurs five times, and it is used simply to indicate to future readers the scene where the royal moral experimentations were made. How absurd to suppose that, throughout the first and second chapters, the locative phrase "in Jerusalem" is intended

to assure the reader that Solomon did not prosecute these trials in Samaria!

Weakest of all is the objection from the phrase, "All that were before me in Jerusalem;" namely, that the words presuppose many *kings* in Jerusalem before Solomon. Our author well replies that it is not previous *kings* that are implied, but previous persons furnished with the means of trying what good there is in the world—whether philosophers, rich men, or grandees of any rank. Solomon "was king," and endowed with completer means than ever any experimentist "in Jerusalem before" him. But the decisive argument, which we have nowhere seen, seems to us to be this: The objector makes a standard Hebrew author put words into Solomon's mouth that imply that many Hebrew "kings" had reigned "in Jerusalem" before him! So that every one of these mighty efforts of *criticism* (?) runs into the same ground of supposing an unsupposable blunder in their imaginary later author.

In regard to style and philosophy, the objectors make a more serious showing. As to style, there is admitted to be a great diversity from the other writings of Solomon. This objection is obviated, with tolerable fairness, by the length of time between it and Solomon's earlier writings, the experiences and revolutions through which his mind had passed, and the peculiarity of the class to which the book belongs. Literature furnishes many instances of equal diversity of style in the same author. As to philosophy, the replies of our author are moderate, fair, and, on the whole, satisfactory. Not all the difficulty disappears; but that no trace of difficulty should remain can hardly be demanded.

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*The Way, the Truth, and the Life.* Lectures to Educated Hindus. Delivered on his late Visit to India, by JULIUS H. SEELYE, Professor in Amherst College. 12mo., pp. 146. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.

The production of these Lectures has a very interesting history to it. Being in Bombay, on a late trip round the world, Professor Seelye was invited to pause in his journey, and "give some addresses to the educated natives." Large audiences of that class gave hearing to his utterances, which were extemporaneous; and when he had done, he was requested by "native gentlemen" to write them out, "one of whom, an eminent Brahmin scholar, offered to bear the expense of the publication." Four were by him written out; and a Lecture of his on Miracles, once delivered in Boston, and which had already been circulated

in India, was added. They were very properly republished here; being nearly as suggestive to us Americans as to the Hindu Brahmins.

First, it is not a little interesting to see the American and the Hindu Aryans meet face to face in high and courteous communion. They were blood brothers. The ancestors of both once fed their cows on the high Asiatic plateau. Their radical language was the same. Through what different histories had they passed since both left their old highland home! This Aryan scholar, traveling from the antipodes round and back to the antipodes again, must pause, and clothe the religion he professed in language worthy a scholar to utter and scholars to hear.

It is interesting, again, to see Christianity face to face with intellectual Brahminism. And it shall not be Christianity robed in pompous rituals and churchery, or stealing in under compromise, claiming to be almost Brahminism under another form. This is Christianity in its naked principle, unshrinkingly affirmed and pressed upon intellect, heart, and conscience. Professor Seelye, though with a graceful English style and a high scholarly bearing, presents the medicine without a sugar-coat. Whatever intuitive reason may say, the lecturer presents the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the expiatory Sacrifice, as the evangelical theology of our day maintains them. Mr. Bushnell thinks that our missionary has a doubtful task before the intellect of Asia, unless he can take Expiation out of Reconciliation. Professor Seelye assumes that upon the Hindu, as upon the American, the Cross, presented in its expiatory character, has its power. The Trinity is presented as a lofty mystery; the Incarnation, as a sublime, yet affecting supernaturalism. The result is said, somewhat indefinitely, to have been a "success." We wish we could know how much the success went beyond a courteous interested hearing, and a generous subsequent politeness. How truly did the cultured Brahmin audience *feel* the true force of these truths?

Finally, how important it is that the best talent in the Church should be placed at the great missionary posts. We wish we were Pope, or something of that sort, to send Professor Seelye peremptorily to India for life, or at least during success. Perhaps, however, the very fact of one's being "a missionary" closes educated ears against him. That we have had, and have, no little ability in that mission we know. And we see a wisdom in impressive episcopal visitations there. It is well, indeed, to develop Churches and Conferences from the humbler and the humblest classes; but

it is also well to be able at once to attract and to face, with winning and commanding eloquence, scholarship, and evangelical power, the intellectual aristocracy of our brother Aryans.

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*The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit; or, Philosophy of the Divine Operation in the Redemption of Man.* By Rev. JAMES WALKER, D.D., Author of the "Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation," etc.

Dr. Walker's "Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation" is his masterpiece. It must stand as a Christian classic. Every theological student should read it; and for the thoughtful doubter it is one of the aids and antidotes. The publisher informs us that over eighty thousand copies have been sold in America, and more than fifty thousand in England; while translations into German, French, Italian, Welsh, and Hindostanee, have circulated it through Europe and extended it into Asia.

His later publications, "God Revealed in Creation and Christ," "The Living Questions of the Age," and the volume under notice, exhibit the same traits, but do not equal it in standard excellence. In discoursing on the Spirit Dr. Walker commences with the Trinity, and seems to us rather Anti-Nicene than Athanasian. He contemplates the connection of the Spirit with Christ as immediate and permanent; with the apostles, as commencing at the Pentecost, (previous to which they were "in the Old Testament state,") and as bestowing upon them the special endowments fitting to their work. The choosing Matthias as an apostle he considers as a precipitate act performed by the apostles in their unendowed state, and forestalling the personal act of Christ, who subsequently chose Paul as the twelfth apostle. It strikes us, then, as strange, that Paul claims to be an apostle, but never to be one of the twelve. Dr. Walker then contemplates the work of the Spirit in believers and with the impenitent. A supplement discusses the nature and power of the prayer of faith. An appendix furnishes excursions upon a number of interesting points.

Dr. Walker is a decided evangelical, with so far a tinge of rationalism that his mind darts out from the beaten track in a search after truth in new regions. He is catholic and earnest in his sympathies. We miss in his work a discussion of the work of the Spirit in the inspiration of the written word. His views of the Spirit in the soul of the believer are fresh and strong; but we miss a clear and emphatic specification of the Spirit speaking directly to the soul, as from mind to mind, *Thou art a child of God*. His words once or twice might bear this interpretation; but if he had

the clear, bright, beautiful Wesleyan view, he would have expressed it in no slighting manner. With him the Spirit's witness seems inferential, not direct.

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*The Secret of Christianity.* By S. S. HEBBERD. 16mo., pp. 210. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard, & Dillingham. 1874.

A contribution to Comparative Theology, exhibiting fine scholarship and original thought clothed in clear and vigorous diction. Mr. Hebbard claims to be the first to designate a specialty by which Christianity is peculiar among all religions. We think there are several. For instance, *Christianity alone claims to be a system based on miracles performed within the historic ages, revealing man's eternal destiny, and showing how that destiny may be a blessed one.* So that Christianity fairly claims to be the only religion. Mr. Hebbard—and who Mr. Hebbard is we do not know—however, shows with no little force that Christianity is a sole and singular power ruling in human moral history. Between the opposite forces of Oriental mysticism and Western humanism Christianity has arbitrated, giving each alternate dominance, yet checking the extremes of both. During the Middle Ages Orientalism reigned in the form of a supernatural absolutism, and the Reformation was the revival of humanism, independent thought, and experiential science. This humanism results in the marvelous career of modern utilitarian “progress.” But humanism is rapidly approaching its extreme. A healthful reaction lies in the not very distant future, which will result in an age of faith.

We should be glad, if space permitted, to analyze some of Mr. Hebbard's splendid generalizations. In particular, we would call attention to his thesis that idealism is more truly the parent of valid science than its rival sensuism. Whether Christianity is to be considered as a *result* of the evolution of alternate Orientalism and humanism, or whether it is a primordial controlling power over both and all, he does not, if we rightly recollect, declare. But in either case he evidently believes, indeed maintains with eminent force, that absolute religious truth is embodied in Christianity alone. We heartily recommend the work to thinkers.

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*A Comparative History of Religions.* By JAMES C. MOFFATT, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Part II. Later Scriptures. Progress and Revolutions of Faith. 12mo., pp. 316. New York: Dodd & Mead.

We have already called attention to Prof. Moffatt's very interesting survey of the comparative theologies of the world. His plan in the present volume is new and striking. Assuming the unity

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of the human race, and its origin after the flood in Western Asia, he also assumes that there is a oneness centralizing the religions of the world. Taking primitive Monotheism as the historical and spiritual center, mankind may be viewed (in language not his but ours) as a sort of universal Church, and all the divergences from the center are as heresies. The evolutions of these heresies, which are several times repeated in human history, are traced and analyzed. The Monotheism diverges into Polytheism in various well-defined modes. The simplicity of primitive devotion is overlaid with ritual. The family ministry is supplanted by a despotic priesthood. Then comes a break, a reformation, which either evolves in rationalism or returns to a renovated simplicity. By a tracery of the principles that pervade human history the whole becomes more easily comprehensible and is readily laid out in synoptical plan.

The whole view is inspired with a liberalism not usually found hitherto in Calvinistic authors, yet perfectly consonant with a true evangelicism, and entirely in the spirit of our Arminian authorities. The "Theology of the Reformation," so-called, has been stern in its view of the "heathen" world. But the milder view is more Christ-like, and truly more conducive to the missionary spirit and success. The student in comparative theology will do well not to overlook this work.

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*Forgiveness and Law, Grounded in Principles. Interpreted by Human Analogies.*  
By HORACE BUSHNELL. 12mo., pp. 256. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.

Were we to give what we think a true title to Mr. Bushnell's book we should write it, *An attempt to harmonize Scripture and our Intuitions in a theory of the Suffering Work of Christ*. In our notice of Dr. Hodge on Darwinism, on another page, we referred to the fact of an increasing tendency at the present hour toward bringing religious doctrine to the test of our intuitive judgment. This intuitive nature is our stronghold against Atheism and Materialism, in which, intrenching itself, Christianity must conquer. But after such self-intrenchment what shall be done against those attacks made upon theological doctrines from the intuitional ground? How can theology quote intuition when in her favor, and reject it when against her?

The work of Mr. Burris, on another page, proposes a phenomenal Trinity, because he "has tried to believe Athanasianism and could not." Mr. Bushnell, in the present volume, proposes a theory



of atonement which shall dispense with a substitutive undergoing of penalty. His grounds are, that this substitution is contradictory to our intuitions of justice and right. Subsidiarily, and for the same reasons obviously, he rejects eternal retributive conscious misery, and substitutes eternal diminution, approximating and perhaps reaching final deconsciousization or complete cessation.

On the strongest substitutional texts Mr. Bushnell adopts a mode of interpretation that would leave our intuitive judgments a very free play. He holds them to be simply Oriental intensives of expression—glowing utterances of the Eastern imagination—which Western rationality, in transforming into our literature, truly transforms into absurdity. A great many thinkers will carefully cogitate where that exegetical method will land them before adopting it. Besides, should similar expressions be found by any modern decipherer in any newly discovered Asiatic writing, would they not be understood to express the substitutive doctrine? See our notice of Seelye's Lectures on another page.

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*Introduction to the Pauline Epistles.* By PATON J. GLOAG, D.D., Minister of Galashiels. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1874. 8vo., pp. 480. [Special edition imported for use in this country by Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. New York. Price, \$5 25.]

Dr. Gloag has written treatises on Assurance of Salvation, on Justification by Faith, on Genesis and Geology, and on the Resurrection. To us he is best known by his Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, a work of thorough erudition, sound judgment, and solid Calvinistic orthodoxy. His previous studies upon Acts have well prepared him to enter on the present work, which is characterized by the best qualities of the writer. It is an introduction to Paul's Epistles, at once scholarly and clear. Of the thirteen epistles conceded by all antiquity as Paul's, he discusses the authenticity, the qualities, and the main topics, giving an occasional full discussion upon some of the most interesting problems which he encounters in his analyses. Thus we have interesting excurses, among others, upon Paul's Relation to Judaism, the Lord's Supper and the Agapæ, Paul's Thorn in the Flesh, and the Man of Sin. He firmly and ably sustains the authenticity of the so-called pastoral epistles. But the Epistle to the Hebrews, which would be a fourteenth epistle of Paul, presents phenomena that disturb not its place in the Canon, but throw reasonable doubts over the Pauline authorship. Dr. Gloag knows how to be decisive, and he knows how to stand in—to use a favorite term

of his—"dubity." The doctrine of Hebrews is Pauline, but the style is not. External evidence is balanced, and so is Dr. Gloag's judgment; and so is ours.

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*A System of Christian Rhetoric.* For the Use of Preachers and other Speakers. By GEORGE WINFRED HERVEY, M.A., author of "Rhetoric of Conversation," etc. 8vo., pp. 628. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1873.

This is one of the very best books of its class, and in its specific field without a peer. Its aim is novel. It reconstructs the whole science of Rhetoric, not simply by discussing the bearing of its rules on the preparation and delivery of sermons, but by recognizing distinctly and fully the need of Divine aid—the influence of the Holy Ghost—in every part of the preacher's work. The first of the four "Books" which constitute the volume is on "Inspiration in Preaching," its effects on the mind and heart of the speaker, and how it affects thought, style, and delivery. This "Partial Inspiration," as he names it, he defines to be "that assistance of the Divine Spirit which our Lord promised to his ministers in the apostolical commission." Claiming the promise as pertaining to the entire work of the preacher, he reasons that this Divine aid is indispensable to true success, and closes this part of the discussion by setting forth the means whereby this Inspiration is to be sought—Trial, Humility, and Self-denial; the Study of Scripture, Prayer, and Praise. This outline of the first book exhibits the spirit and design of the work. The three books which follow discuss Invention, Style, and Elocution. The author evidently prepared himself by extensive research in collecting his materials, and has made good use of them. We commend it as a most elaborate and complete work on the subject of the composition and delivery of sermons. In its outward seeming the volume is a goodly one, save that it contains more typographical errors than the books of the Harpers usually exhibit.

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*The Pastoral Epistles.* The Greek Text and Translation. With Introduction, Expository Notes and Dissertations. By PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, D.D., Principal of the Free Church College, Glasgow, author of "Typology of Scripture," etc. 12mo., pp. 451. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1874. New York: Special Edition imported and sold by Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong. Price, \$3 75.

Dr. Fairbairn is very favorably known in this country as well as in Britain, especially by his able work on Typology, in which he shed a large amount of fresh light upon an important and difficult point in exegetical theology, and also by his work on Law in Revelation, a work of less, yet of great, merit. His present volume, the product of his labor as professor of theology, bears marks of

his penetrative and original intellect. He is fertile of thought, but his developments uniformly tend to illustrate, rather innovate upon, the great doctrines of the Evangelical Church.

After an introduction of thirty-five pages we have the Greek, after Tischendorf, and a new translation by the annotator. The Notes then cover pages 69-404. Then follows an Appendix, pages 405-451, containing suggestive dissertations upon incidental points. The Notes aim to be more practical and doctrinal than those of Alford and Ellicott, but go thoroughly into philological analysis when there is important demand for it. The Introduction defends the Pastoral Epistles from the modern "criticism," and maintains, with most English commentators, a second imprisonment of Paul. The work is valuable alike for the scholar and general reader.

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*The Superhuman Origin of the Bible Inferred from Itself.* By HENRY ROGERS, author of "The Eclipse of Faith." 12mo., pp. 465. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.

When the author of "The Eclipse of Faith" puts forth a book, thinkers may generally accept a provocation to thought. The present volume surveys the Bible from various points of view, and finds a variety of aspects that are contrary to all expectation of it as a mere human book, and solvable only on supposition of its divinity. The Bible is thoroughly demonstrated to be a *unique* book. And thus Mr. Rogers shows (in confirmation of our statement, in noticing Mr. Heberd on another page, that there are many points in which Christianity stands alone) that our sacred volume stands out of comparison with all other religious oracles.

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### *Philosophy, Metaphysics, and General Science.*

*Principles of Mental Physiology.* With their Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind and the Study of its Morbid Conditions. By WILLIAM B. CARPENTER, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., F.L.S., F.G.S., etc., etc. 12mo., pp. 737. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1874.

Dr. Carpenter is one of the most eminent living physiologists, and seems to be a Unitarian of the Martineau intuitionist school. Hence, however intimate he holds to be the connection, or even apparent identity, of mind and body, he holds, by virtue of his faith in consciousness, to the existence of an *ego* superior to matter, destined to immortality, and resting under laws of responsibility. The typical point of the *ego* is the will, to which he attributes with great clearness and explicitness the attribute of free-

dom; and rising from will, as dominant in man, and source of our knowledge of force, he identifies a Supreme Will over the universe, the controller of all force, the possessor of omnipotence.

Our elder psychologists confined themselves almost exclusively to the study of the interior consciousness and the classification of the various phenomena therein ascertained. As botany is a classification of plants according to their properties, so psychology was a classification of thoughts. This work was quietly, explicitly, and accurately done. When our physiological brethren speak contemptuously of this process of analysis and its results, their speech must be promptly attributed to a very profound and culpable prejudice. None but a very sordid, materialistic bigotry will deny that the operations of the human mind are, purely and of themselves, a most important and worthy object of study. Yet when this work is truly done, none the less may we be thankful for all the aids, and all the additional knowledge that physiology can furnish, to our knowledge of the operations, laws, and nature of mind. For this purpose Dr. Carpenter has furnished us a very valuable work. The relations of the human frame, and especially those parts of our material system that come in nearest contact with mind, are here presented with much clearness and copiousness.

The earlier chapters draw their resources from comparative animal physiology, tracing nerve, brain, and mind, as existing in advancing grades of perfection, from the base to the summit of the animal world. At the base of all stands our venerable infinitesimal friend, still alive and moving, the nerveless, sinewless, boneless, yet not mindless, *amœba*. If antiquity is nobility this minute aristocrat may look upon the human race with archaic contempt. He is, so far as the microscope can reach him to tell us, a pure inorganic "jelly-speck." Yet he possesses an energetic will; and, by pure force of volition acting directly upon his own simple substance, he is able to protrude forth an extemporaneous limb in any direction, either for walking or reaching. When he finds any thing of aliment, he resolves himself into a stomach, and encompasses and assimilates the supply. He seems to exemplify the assumption, that the intelligent will needs neither nerves nor brain to execute an energetic purpose.

Rising through the upward series of living nature, a slender nerve system commences with Mr. Darwin's ancient friend, the *ascidian*, and culminates in the insect world, especially the bee. The brain proper, which had heretofore been represented by a nerve knot, (ganglion,) begins with the earliest vertebrate, gradu-

ally increasing and overlying the ganglions, until it culminates in man. The brain, in Dr. Carpenter's view, is the organ rather of inner thought, as the nerve is the organ of external. Through the brain and sensory the impressions are "translated" into thought by the *ego*.

Mind, in its complete nature, is not simple and indivisible. As in the ascending grades of animal species, new amounts of brain are laid on, new functions are superimposed, new layers of mind are deposited. Conversely, if the brain of a bird or frog be surgically removed, the large amount of active intelligence is destroyed, but a sensation life is still left. Nay, Dr. Carpenter teaches that after sensation is withdrawn an automatic power of unconscious motion is often left, so that the limb, once accustomed to be moved by mind, moves for a while on its own account after mind has disappeared.

We seem here to have from physiology some confirmation of the trinal (trichotomic) nature of man, which many theologians and metaphysicians have maintained. This trinity imports that intermediate—beneath man's spirit, but above his pure body—is a territory called the *anima*, the animal soul, much or all of which is able to perish, or at least disintegrate into its primitive elements, when the convulsion comes that disparts spirit and body. Those automatic forces by which the heart beats, the blood circulates, the lungs respire, and the stomach digests, are included under the *anima*. Here, too, belong the bodily sensitivities, including the appetites, which man shares with the animal, and which belong to this world's existence. Dr. Carpenter strictly assumes that all impressions become sensation or thought only by being "translated" thereinto by the *ego*. This *ego* we may hold to be the pure spirit whose center is the unity of self-consciousness and will; and of will the attribute is the mastery of force. All the impressions upon the sensitive body become sensations by the interpretation of the spirit, so long as the forces of the spirit are able to hold the corporeity in organic human form, and in subordinate connection to itself. Death is the loosening of the hold of the forces of the spirit upon the body, by which the body and *anima* are mortal, and the *ego* becomes disengaged and enters the sphere of spirit. During man's life, then, he is compositely, organism, *anima*, and *Ego*; body, soul, and spirit; vegetable, animal, and angel.

Dr. Carpenter holds that the doctrine of a "vital principle" must be abandoned, and be replaced by the doctrine of vital force. All force he views as, in origin, will-force. Universal force is omnipo-

tent will-force, being the attribute of the supreme *Ego*. Correspondently all our corporeal vitality by which our organic systems are controlled is correlative to general force under control of the *ego*.

Dr. Carpenter significantly compares the nerves to telegraphic wires, which convey the sensation from the sensitive corporeal surface to the *ego*. It is a suggestive illustration for the immaterialist. The telegraphic wire is insensible. The electricity it conveys is not the thought. The thought does not run along the wire. The wire merely conveys from one mind to another the symbols which mind alone at either end interprets and thinks. Thought alone can comprehend thought, and the true thought process is within the pure community of thought. And it will not do to say with the ultra idealists that there is no personal subject of thought, but that the universe is only a succession of pure thoughts. For at each end of the wire is a living organism in which the idea is thought, and in the organism is the *ego* by which the thought is appropriated and claimed as its own. Descartes' "I think" is not rightly interpreted by Huxley as merely equivalent to "there is thought." It imports not only "there is thought" generally, or somewhere or other; but, there is thought located here and not elsewhere; and thought that here is being thought by this one particular self which calls itself I, and by nothing else. The "I" is as positively asserted as the "think," and is individualized more precisely. The *Ego* is, therefore, demonstrated by self-consciousness.

Dr. Carpenter is copious upon "unconscious cerebration." We lately expressed our view on this subject in noticing a lecture of his. A lawyer wakes in the morning and finds to his astonishment that he has, during the night, written out and left upon paper a very able legal argument on a complicated case, applying the principles of law to a great variety of contingent facts. Now if any man believes that the mere physical machinery of the brain performed all this process without a single *thought* in the steps, just as Mr. Babbage's machine turns out an arithmetical result, his faith is certainly miraculous. Dr. Carpenter is copious also, and valuable, upon the subject of spirit-rapping, table-turning, and other forms of manipular supernaturalisms, which are peddled about by traveling showmen in England and America. He gives us a number of well-told stories, which both enliven his pages and illustrate his principles. Still, as we noticed in a former Quarterly, there are large classes of supernaturalistic cases, not manipular, which his principles do not solve, and such stories he quietly and wisely lets alone.



Dr. Carpenter, without decisively adopting Darwinism, seems powerfully impressed with the phenomena which are easily explained by the theory of development. Even our intuitions, which he reads as the inscriptions of absolute truth, are the product of hereditary experiences derived from the race through past ages. Where the point of immortal existences commences, and what class of beings it includes, he gives no opinion. Mr. Greg, in his *Enigmas of Life*, suggests the drawing of the inclusive boundary line to embrace the lower animals, like the dog, who exhibit genuine tokens of a moral nature, and aim at good behavior. But Dr. Carpenter draws a sharp line, with powerful scientific clearness, between instinct and reason, and solves those apparent developmental rationalities which brute races contract by intimacy with man, on the principle of association. Indeed, he seems to maintain that only the cultured grade of our own race are elevated to the plane of responsibility. Ignorance and vice, inclosed in their own environments, have no moral freedom, and are below the platform of responsibility. The natural inference, indicated but not expressly stated, would be the Platonic doctrine of a selective immortality. Men developed to the plane of responsibility, and rightly discharging that responsibility, are immortal. The ignorant and the wicked perish, and the good are immortal, by the law of the "survival of the fittest."

Dr. Carpenter, of course, cannot finish without a lecture to the theologians. His preachment is not as rabidly arrogant as we have been accustomed to get from the Spencers and Huxleys, but it is sufficiently self-conceited for practical purposes. He commences, for instance, with the statement, that "there has been for several centuries past a constant endeavor, on the part of the upholders of theological creeds and ecclesiastical systems, either to repress scientific inquiry altogether or to limit its range." This atrocious misreading of history Dr. Carpenter profoundly believes to be fact, just because it is the current assumption in scientific circles. From the time of Egypt to the present day the bases of educational institutions have been laid in religion, and the educators were the priesthood. Of all Europe the universities had a religious foundation, and the clergy formed the faculties. So it has been in America. It is not until lately that infidelity has ever built a college. Under this religious patronage arts and sciences have been munificently endowed, and the scientific departments have often been filled by clergymen.

It is true, that when any new scientific statement is unfolded

which seems to collide against any particular previous opinion, whether scientific or biblical, it undergoes both a scientific and a biblical severity of scrutiny. Dr. Johnson trenchantly says, that "all new truths ought to be persecuted." Under this exaggeration the Doctor forcibly expresses the truth that every new development ought to be met with a healthful skepticism, and undergo a rigid critical sifting before it is allowed to take its place among established truths. Scientists act upon that view, sometimes with disastrous mistake, sometimes with admirable success. No physician above forty years of age, it is said, accepted Harvey's first announcement of the circulation of the blood. But let a biblical exegete express a doubt, and a vociferous barking is raised that "upholders of creeds" are trying "to repress scientific inquiry!" Perhaps the biblical interpretation is really a gloss borrowed from the former teachings of science, so that there is a real collision between science and science.

The length of our notice indicates our interest in this work. Without indorsing it very unequivocally, we can unequivocally recommend it to the study of the lovers of mental science.

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*The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.* Being an Examination of the First Principles of his System. By B. P. BOWNE. 12mo., pp. 283. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden.

The earlier chapters of this work were first published, as is mentioned in the Preface, as articles in the *New Englander*. On the strength of having individualized these articles, and calling public attention to their rare merits, the "*Independent*" plausibly claims to have "discovered Mr. Bowne." He is a graduate of the New York University who has not attained his A.M.; and a member of our New York Conference. He furnished the ringing article on Strauss in our April Quarterly. He is now in Halle, Germany, prosecuting philosophical studies; and if the present dashing *brochure* is any fair indication, he has a brilliant future before him.

Dr. McCosh some time since remarked that there were some immense gaps in Mr. Spencer's philosophy. We believe that most acute readers, not perverted by a proclivity for Atheism, have seen the same fact, and foreseen that there was a work to be done by some "coming man." Into those gaps Mr. Bowne has laid his trenchant battle-ax, and cleft the shaky system with unseemly gashes beyond all hope of surgery. With a merciless hand he exposes the pompous pretensions, the contradictions, and the inconsequent logic, of the boasted "modern Aristotle."

If to deny an omniscient, holy, personal Ruler of the universe, and maintain that there is no purpose or intellect exemplified in the formation of the cosmos, be Atheism, then Mr. Spencer is an Atheist. If to deny the substantial duality of body and spirit, and to maintain that thought is simply a property of the corporal organism, be Materialism, then Mr. Spencer is a Materialist. By his philosophy man is a solitaire in a cosmos of substance and laws, and all idea of supernaturalism and revelation is on too low a plane to be taken into consideration. It may be, indeed, admitted that Mr. Spencer draws the best possible practical inference from his Atheism. Since we can trust no hereafter, let us, he proposes, make the highest and most noblest use of the present. Hence he devotes his intellect to, what he esteems, philanthropic purposes. He does not ask, How can I worm my body through the world to the largest gratification of my individual self? His assumption is: We, the human race, are a joint stock company in trouble; let us study how we can altogether be best off. We are temporary voyagers on a common shipboard, destined to certain wreck; let us study how the trip, while it lasts, may be pleasant for one and all. He believes that the true way to do this is, a profound study of the situation, and a strict observance of the rules thence deduced. He has an enthusiasm for certain plans and optimistic progresses of his; so optimistic that we might wonder that he does not suspect that both ship and ocean were planned by some great OPTIMUS, and that the very evils are made to be a part of the conduces to good. If there were not permanent laws, how could there be a Spencer to analyze them? If there were not evils and progresses, how could the great heart of a Spencer plan, with humane enthusiasm, to aid the progress? And if it be a sublime thing for a Spencer thus to come into wise sympathy with nature's laws, and evils, and progresses, how much greater, and not less rational, would it be, could he, like a Kepler, hold himself in sympathy also with the limitless Mind over all. Perhaps Keplers and Spencers, ordained or permitted, are a part of the plan.

It is here, as a primordial philosopher, trenchantly laboring to blot the Optimus from the universe, and giving us a mindless, moralless, self-contradictory Dead-head, yclept the Unknown Absolute, instead, that Mr. Spencer loses our sympathy. All the best deductions of our reason, and all the highest intuitions of our nature, scout the whole execrable falsehood and foolery. Mr. Spencer does his work at the expense of a perfect self-envelop

of self-contradictions and self-stultifications. Hence it is, that Mr. Bowne, after reducing his logic to absurdity, cannot help reducing the absurdity to contempt.

We shall give no analysis of Mr. Bowne's brilliant and unanswerable onslaught. It has the disadvantage of being a correlative book. It presupposes another book to have been read which but the few read. But to those who have read Mr. Spencer's first volume, and too much of the loose Atheism afloat, we present this as a powerful refutation and exposure. We will give but a specimen of its style with a preface of our own.

"Were a reindeer to conceive of God he would conceive him as a big reindeer; just so theologians make God a stupendous man." Such, in various shapes, is a current atheistic argument. Our usual reply has been, that the reindeer being below the plane of at all conceiving God, is out of the question. The very specific difference of man is, that he is on the high plane of a capacity to conceive of God, just because he is in the image of God, and, therefore, rightly conceives God by starting from the conception of himself, while the animal nature is not. In order to conceive a God at all, the reindeer must be raised to the intellectual level of man, and must be able to think the Infinite. The argument is like saying, if a beaver conceived the solar system he would conceive it as a beaver dam. Of course he could never conceive it at all, and be a mere beaver.

Mr. Bowne carries the war into Africa in the following style:

There is an old satire often used against religion; so old, indeed, that what little point it ever had has been lost for ages. It runs back to the time of Xenophanes, and has been repeated in various ways ever since. Xenophanes used oxen and lions for comparison. Mr. Theodore Parker improved on this, and introduced the novelty of a buffalo. He supposes that a buffalo, arguing as the natural theologians do, would conclude that God has horns and hoofs. I have even known a mole to be used to illustrate this powerful irony. Of course the ingenious and witty conclusion was, that a mole could only argue to a God with fur and paws. Mr. Spencer believes that "volumes might be written on the impiety of the pious," and he accordingly proceeds to lash said impiety by dressing up the old satire in this form:

"The attitude thus assumed can be fitly represented only by developing a simile long current in theological controversies—the simile of the watch. If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition that the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness, and that a watch possessed of such consciousness insisted upon regarding the watchmaker's actions as determined, like its own, by springs and escapements, we should only complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical terms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated as atheistic watches any that did not so venture to formulate it, we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own arguments a step further."—P. 110.

This is extremely severe, no doubt; and if theologians taught that God has legs

and arms, parts and passions, the satire might have some point; but since they expressly forbid such an assumption, it is difficult to tell where the force of the "grotesque supposition" lies. For if that philosophical buffalo, that ingenious mole, and that "grotesque" watch, should argue, not to horns and hoofs, fur and paws, and "springs and escapements," but to intelligence in their maker, they would not be very far astray. If this thinking, conscious watch should infer that it had a thinking, conscious maker, it would be on the right track. Only remember that religion does not attribute organs and form to God, and the logical value of the "grotesque supposition" is all gone; though, to be sure, the wit remains to please us. And now that Mr. Spencer has kindly developed the simile, I know not that his own attitude can be more fitly represented than by its further development. Suppose that this grotesque watch should turn know-nothing, and insist that a belief in a thinking, conscious watchmaker is fetichism, and should begin to "vituperate" all watches who were stupid and superstitious enough to believe in a watchmaker, instead of adopting the higher and truer view that watches evolve themselves from the unknowable by changing "from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations;" why clearly the watch would make a fool of itself, especially if it "vituperated" at any great length. And all this but illustrates Mr. Spencer's presumption by carrying his own argument a step further. I mean no disrespect to Aristotle, either the ancient or the modern; but I must think that, until this metaphorical watch turned know-nothing, and began to vituperate its simpler neighbors, it ticked off better logic than Mr. Spencer has done.

To all this we may venture to add: In order even to state to himself the problem of a "maker," the watch must possess an intellect which no being below man possesses. He must be intellectually a man. And being such, he must at once know that a maker must possess limbs and organs suitable to his work. He must know, therefore, that mere mechanical "springs and escapements" could not manufacture any thing. He must, therefore, also know that a watch could not manufacture a watch. We may further add, that men make God like themselves only in respect of those Intellectual powers which are the necessary capabilities of a perfect Creator; but in every other respect men hold him to be infinitely unlike themselves. And this Intellect they ascribe to God, not because they possess it themselves—for they possess many things which they do not ascribe to him—but because, by whomsoever possessed, it is the sole possible condition to the production of a cosmos in which the marks of objective intellect are infinitely numerous.

The shower of fluent ironies and involuntary sarcasms which Mr. Bowne pours upon Mr. Spencer's performances affords a subterfuge for a practiced adversary. Prof. Youmans, the able editor of the "*Journal of Popular Science*," skillfully skims off a few of these phrases, quotes them as the essence of the book, and denounces Mr. Bowne as a "bigot," etc. Prof. Youmans has mistaken his man. Mr. Bowne is no "bigot," but a singularly acute thinker, a brilliant writer, a thorough student, and an opponent whom Spencerism and all its cognates are likely to feel to their

center. Though Prof. Youmans may have given the best reply the case admits, still Mr. Spencer stands refuted in his main points, and Mr. Bowne stands the unanswered master of the field. And there he will stand for a long æon, whatever the anti-church of skepticism is pleased to say about it.

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*What is Darwinism?* By CHARLES HODGE, Princeton, N. J. Pp. 178. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.

The purpose of this trenchant little volume is not to investigate Mr. Darwin's individual opinions, nor to discuss the intrinsic nature of what is called Evolution, but to ascertain what is the character of the evolution taught in Mr. Darwin's books, especially in its relations to Theism as held by the Christian world. The discussion is courteously and fairly, but fearlessly, conducted. Dr. Hodge brings overwhelming proofs from the words of Mr. Darwin, of his friends, of his opponents, and of leading Atheists, that evolution as by him taught negatives teleology and involves Atheism. He does not say that there can be no theistic doctrine of evolution; but he does say, and amply proves, that, as presented by Mr. Darwin, evolution includes Atheism.

Mr. Darwin repeatedly and uniformly places his own evolution in opposition to teleology. He takes the crucial case of the eye, and undertakes elaborately to show that its structure exhibits no trace of design. And, *à fortiori*, no other object in existence can be held as a production of intelligent purpose. He takes, and no doubt permanently occupies, the ground of Herbert Spencer, that to attribute mind or *morale* to God is anthropomorphism. It is presumptuous for us to endow the Absolute with intelligence; it is blasphemy to call him or it just or holy. Thus, of the belief that an intelligent Being designed the eye, he says: "May not this inference be presumptuous? Have we any right to assume that the Creator works by intellectual powers like those of man?" All the God, then, Mr. Darwin admits, is an unintelligent, non-moral something, an infinite King Log.

That such is Mr. Huxley's view is amply shown by extracts from his works adduced in this volume. Dr. Hodge, indeed, finds an intense denial by Mr. Huxley of Atheism, and a repudiation of the impossibility of miracles, and Dr. H. is "unable to see" how the opposite statements are to "be reconciled." We quoted the same words of Mr. Huxley some time ago in our Quarterly, and placed them to his credit as a sincere disclaimer of Atheism. But Dr. Hodge himself notes that even Herbert Spencer professes to



reject Atheism. If Mr. Huxley holds the same supreme unintelligence, and pleases to style it *Theos*, he can, with easy mental reserve, indignantly repudiate *Atheism*. As to his rejection of "the impossibility of miracles," does not Dr. H. forget what he so very well knows, that Mr. Mansell had shown, even before Mr. Spencer wrote, how reconcilable the unintelligent Absolute is with Theism, miracle, revelation, redemption, Christianity? That reconciliation Mr. Spencer rejects, and, so far as we know, Mr. Darwin does not accept. When, moreover, Mr. Huxley repudiates "the impossibility of miracles," it would be of some importance to obtain his definition of both "the impossibility" and of the "miracles," as by him named, before we apprehend any difficulty in reconciling them with Spencerian Atheism.

Dr. Hodge fails, we think, rightly to apprehend Mr. Huxley's denial also of materialism in his lecture on Protoplasm. He quotes several passages from the lecture, in which Mr. H. asserts the existence of matter alone, exclusive of spirit, in the constitution of man; quotes them as if irreconcilable with his denial of being a materialist. But there are two senses of the word materialist: materialist in opposition to *idealist*, and materialist in opposition to *spiritualist*. It is in the latter sense that Mr. H. is accused, and truly accused, of Materialism; but it was in the former sense that, by an admirable dodge, he denied. In the sense really charged he never really denied. In meeting the charge he pompously assumed to parade out a sovereign method for relieving the world from the slough of Materialism. And how does he furnish the relief? By showing that the idealistic view of substance is quite as tenable as the materialistic one. In short, he gives us the Berkeleyan theory of matter for the said *method*. But that is not denying that he maintains the pure corporeity of man, and rejects the doctrine of soul and immortality.

The fact is, these gentlemen are truly idealistic-materialistic: idealistic as maintaining that all we know of the external world is to be identified with the sensation; materialistic in denying the duality of mind and matter, and affirming the "*unisubstanceism*," as Dr. Buchanan calls it, or "*monism*," as others call it, of Spinoza. So John Stuart Mill calls matter "the permanent possibility of a sensation." Herbert Spencer would probably, with more caution, insert "persistent" in the place of "permanent," in order to avoid affirming that the whole may not any day evanesce into nihil. Thought and substance are hence one; thinking is being; subject and object are the same; the universe is a pure thought-

system. Then we easily arrive at nihilism, in which being and not being, something and nothing, existence and non-existence, are identical. Matter and spirit differ only in words; being different terms, or views, of the same thing. So Herbert Spencer, at the close of his first volume, discusses the question whether the cosmos is matter or spirit, and decides that it is indifferently either. So Mr. Huxley, in his *Protoplasm*, maintains that the idealistic view is just as tenable as the materialistic, only the latter alone renders a handy scientific nomenclature possible. His lecture, then, he can facetiously call an essay against Materialism; we only wonder that Dr. Hodge should be mystified by the *equivoque*.

Dr. Hodge repeatedly and justly appeals to our "intuitions" as the conclusive stronghold against his materialistic opponents. And that is, at the present day, the most impregnable post for all spiritual Christianity. But how can Dr. Hodge's own theology stand before the judgment-seat of our own intuitions? Certain it is, that in the contest between Arminianism and Calvinism, one great power of the former has been in an appeal to the intuitive pronouncement against the view presented by the latter of the Divine government. How far can we base our Christianity on intuitive assumptions, and then reject the intuitive negative upon our special theology? We have said more on this point in our book notice of Bushnell, upon another page.

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*The Doctrine of Evolution: Its Data, its Principles, and its Theistic Bearings.* By ALEXANDER WINCHELL, LL.D., Chancellor of Syracuse University. 12mo., pp. 148. Harper & Brothers. 1874.

The object of Dr. Winchell's tractate is to give a fair statement, *pro* and *con*, of the evolutionary argument. But the net result is to show that the real evolution revealed by science in the progress of the creation is not unintelligent; is not merely a generative process, but the unfolding of an intellectual plan revealed in space and time. The various species of animals are not the offspring of a few (or one) primitive germs. Evolution is a series of progressive steps preordained in the Divine Mind and manifested in the external world. Such an evolution, produced in the collective human mind, we may see in the progress of successive inventions framed to accomplish a given work. So we may say it is, for instance, in the art of navigation. The swimming-log upon which a savage floats—the canoe pushed by poles—the skiff propelled by oars—the ship with its sails—the steamer with its boiler, disdaining oar or sail—present in their suc-

cessive advances a true navigator's evolution. Yet it is not a generative series, but an evolution of successive improving gradations of the same type, correspondent with, and produced by, a process of thought in a collective body of successive human minds. And so there is valid reason to believe that the series of the animal creation represent not a mere genetic process, but a series of independent advancing gradations of forms, created after their proper types in the Divine mind. The whole evolution is a foreknown plan.

Why do we predicate *plan* of the evolutionary cosmos? Because it exhibits in the correspondence of parts to parts, and parts to whole, all the characteristics of *PLAN*. We judge every thing by its quality; and we judge the creation to be a *plan* because it possesses the qualities of a plan. Why do we attribute this plan to a causal mind? Because it exhibits the qualities of an intellectual effect. An intellectual effect demands in reason an intellectual cause; and such a cause alone does reasonably and fully account for the effect. So that, as Dr. Winchell very cogently says, "*The Cause of causes is revealed qualitatively to every rational being.*"

And this plan appears not only in the structure, but in the successions, of creation. In embryology the human infant appears successively as a fish, a quadruped, a monkey, and a man. This may represent the evolutions of the animal world, whether genetic or separately gradational. These typical advancing changes in the structure of the human fœtus suggest that man is indeed a microcosm, a miniature of the creation. But do they any more prove, as Darwinians assume, a genetic series than a created series of gradations? This plan appears *persistent*, for different species are prohibited from propagating an intermediate species; and however culture or accident may force a species to vary, it soon stops at certain limits and hastens back on the withdrawal of the force to its regular type. And this plan appears attested by the history of the ages of creation written by the Divine hand on the geologic strata. On this momentous and decisive point Dr. Winchell is very conclusive.

For its intended "popular" purpose, Chancellor Winchell's book possesses effective qualifications, and will make its due impression. But we regret that its clear thought is enveloped in too scientific a terminology. His sentences are often perfect representations of thought just because he has expressed them in the concise terms that modern science has invented for such purpose. But for the large body of popular readers they are in an esoteric

dialect. In this respect the style of Dr. Hodge, in his book on a cognate subject, stands in rather advantageous contrast; very inferior, indeed, as a scientific statement, but more adapted for popular effect. Dr. Winchell's studies in the connections between Theism and Science are very valuable contributions to the great discussion of the age.

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*The New Chemistry.* By JOSIAH P. COOKE, Jr., Erving Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy in Harvard University. 12mo., pp. 326. New York: Appleton & Co. 1874.

"What is this 'Law of Avogadro?'" says a venerable alumnus, who, because he studied Brande or Turner some forty years ago, thinks he knows chemistry; "it must be that the grand old science has gone into dotage or barbarism." But let him read Professor Cooke, and he will find that, instead of retrograding, the genius of modern discovery says, "Behold, I make all things new." Let not our alumnus therefore repine but rejoice, even though he finds himself behind time. To fetch up he may, indeed, be obliged to enter a second time into his (alma) mother's womb and be born; that is, if he has been taking a Rip Van Winkle nap meantime, he must consent to be like unto a green freshman and pass through a fresh graduation.

By clearness of popular style, at the expense of scientific conciseness, Professor Cooke will put alumnus through an easy and rapid regeneration. He will be initiated into the mysteries of the three great Laws that lie at the basis of the renewed old science. He will be reverently taught (for Professor Cooke, though a Harvard man and a new-fashioned chemist, seems like an old-fashioned Theist) that "the laws of nature are the thoughts of God." He will learn the secrets of molecules and atoms, which, wonderful as they are, are provisional indices to still greater wonders looming in the dim future. He will get ominous hints that the chemical mastery of atoms will yet so subject organic forms to the compounding power of science as to render the production of even vital forms a possibility. And so we may yet live, at least in our posterity, to see the sign nailed up, "Horses and men made here to order." All this will happen the next day after the philosopher's stone, freshly discovered, has transmuted *papier maché*, and even greenbacks, to pure gold! We give a couple of extracts:

THE ATOMIC THEORY.—No one who has followed modern physical discussions can doubt that the tendency of physical thought is to refer the differences of substances to a dynamical cause. Nevertheless, as I said before, the atomic theory is the only one which, as yet, has given an intelligible explanation of the facts of

modern chemistry, and I shall next proceed to develop its fundamental principles. I wish, however, before I begin, to declare my belief that the atomic theory, beautiful and consistent as it appears, is only a temporary expedient for representing the facts of chemistry to the mind. Although in the present state of the science it gives absolutely essential aid both to investigation and study, I have the conviction that it is a temporary scaffolding around the imperfect building, which will be removed as soon as its usefulness is past.—P. 103.

**VITAL PRINCIPLE.**—Carbon is peculiarly the element of the organic world, for, leaving out of view the great mass of water which living beings always contain, organized material consists almost exclusively of carbonaceous compounds. Hence these substances, with the exception of a few of the simplest, were formerly called organic compounds, and in works on chemistry they are usually studied together under the head of organic chemistry. It was formerly supposed that the great complexity of these substances was sustained by what was called the vital principle; but, although the cause which determines the growth of organized beings is still a perfect mystery, we now know that the materials of which they consist are subject to the same laws as mineral matter, and the complexity may be traced to the peculiar qualities of carbon. In like manner the notion that these so-called organic substances owe their origin to some mysterious energy, which overrules the ordinary laws of chemical action, for a long time precluded from the mind of the chemist even the idea that they could be formed in the laboratory by purely chemical processes; so that, although the analysis of these compounds was easily effected, the synthesis was thought impossible. But within a few years we have succeeded in preparing artificially a very large number of what were formerly supposed to be exclusively organic products; and not only this, but the processes we have discovered are of such general application that we now feel we have the same command over the synthesis of organic as of mineral substances. The chemist has never succeeded in forming a single organic cell, and the whole process of its growth and development is entirely beyond the range of his knowledge; but he has every reason to expect that, in the no distant future, he will be able to prepare, in his laboratory, both the material of which that cell is fashioned, and the various products with which it becomes filled during life.—Pp. 292, 293.

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*Logic: Deductive and Inductive.* By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. New and Revised Edition. Pp. 731. New York: Appleton & Co. 1874.

As a logician hailing from the school of "modern thought," Professor Bain is the learned and worthy successor of John Stuart Mill. He brings before his readers the best results, critically estimated, of Hamilton, Whately, De Morgan, and, more original than all the others, Professor Boole's *Mathematical Analysis of Logic*. Professor Bain's Book Fifth is a new and valuable "exhibit" of the application of logic in the sciences; a showing much needed by the student, to mediate in his mind between the abstract principles and the concretes of real life. This "exhibit" will do much to enable the scholar to realize the actual place of logical science and its value in the scheme of studies. We felt the need of such an "exhibit" years ago, and under the title of *A Chip of Logic*, furnished a few pages exhibiting the actual use of the syllogism in various practical pursuits in life. This work Mr. Bain has performed with fullness and effect.

The work, though in proper form for class instruction, is, we

suppose, too large for ordinary curriculums. But the advanced student, the amateur, and the teacher, will find it a very valuable treatise. In the "book on fallacies," the professor seems to show a slight disposition to make his treatise an aid to the refutation of what we esteem a better philosophy than his. We should like to see a counter chapter written and placed by its side, so that the student could have before him both the Bain and the antidote.

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*Annual Record of Science and Industry for 1873.* Edited by SPENCER F. BAIRD, with the assistance of Eminent Men of Science. 12mo., pp. 714. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874.

A scientific annual for popular purposes, designed to give a synoptical view of the progress of discovery and invention, is a *desideratum* for every thoughtful man outside the scientific body. In the present volume we had marked a goodly number of select items to lay before our readers, but space will not permit. We are informed (on p. 82) that "cells" are no longer to be recognized as the components of animal substance, the "wall" being exploded; the nitrogenous protoplasmic albumenoid substance is the main affair, which, however, is not, with Huxley, to be identified with life.

Touching the geologic man, the most eminent French *savans*, Quatrefages and Haney, give an interesting account of the Canstadt race, which includes some of the oldest geological crania, and is marked by peculiar cranial traits. Traces of this race appear in modern history, owing probably to an ancestral mixture of blood. Some eminent men have inherited these peculiarities, showing that it was no inferior race.

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*Religion and Science.* A Series of Sunday Lectures on the Relations of Natural and Revealed Religion, or the Truths Revealed in Nature and in Scripture. By JOSEPH LE CONTE, Professor of Geology and Natural History in the University of California. 16mo., pp. 324. New York: Appleton & Co. 1874.

Professor Le Conte was formerly of the University of South Carolina, and his present lectures grew out of Bible lessons at that University, from his classes growing so large as to require him to do all the talking. His book is a decidedly valuable outgrowth. He is a contributor to Prof. Youmans' *Monthly Journal of Popular Science*. He is a decidedly evangelical believer; in fact, a firm, good Calvinist. With him the mysteries of science have been a preparatory for humility in investigating the mysteries of God. Theologians will find many a new illustration shed upon theology by the professor from his scientific position.



*History, Biography, and Topography.*

*The Life of Rudolf Stier.* (From German Sources.) By JOHN P. LACROIX. 12mo, pp. 332. New York: Nelson & Phillips.

Stier's great work, the Words of the Lord Jesus, the first volume of which was issued more than thirty years ago, has made him so well known in England and America, that it is certainly high time for the production in English of a biography of him that shall bring us into some tolerable acquaintance with the beautiful character and life of the man himself. It is a pleasure to note that the first "Life" of this eminent Christian German theologian is by the hand of an American and a Methodist. It is an unpretentious volume, yet a labor of love, portraying in modest style and simple terms the career of Stier; and, while fairly outliving history and labors, as seen by the world, throwing open before us the inner life of his soul. This free undraping of his life is the prime motive of the book, and, as Professor Lacroix very truly observes, few lives will bear it so well as that of Stier. The author finds ample materials for his work in the voluminous biography by Stier's sons, and other German publications, together with letters from friends and relatives, to which should be added his own familiarity with Stier's labors and published works. He uses them with such discrimination, candor, and ability, that, as his pages exhibit the growing transformation of a gnarly, eminently willful man into a humble Christian, with soul all aglow with divine love, our interest in him and admiration of him continually increase, and we are led more and more to magnify the grace of God, which has this great power. Besides this, the volume has additional interest from Stier's relations to such men as Schleiermacher, De Wette, Gesenius, Nitzsch, Tholuck, and Rothe, some of whom were so diverse in character and thought from himself, while it exhibits the marvelous industry of one who, though an invalid, as teacher, pastor, and author, did full work in each capacity.

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*The Catacombs of Rome, and their Testimony Relative to Primitive Christianity.* By Rev. W. H. WITHEROW, M.A. 12mo, pp. 560. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden.

This volume has been long announced upon the advertisement pages of our Quarterly, as in preparation. Its delay has mostly arisen from the strenuous determination of the author that it should be fully competent to run the gauntlet of the highest crit-

icism. He has fully availed himself of the rare epigraphical library of Toronto, Canada, and of the generous aid of Dr. M'Caul, "one of the most eminent living epigraphists," so that we feel fully assured that full reliance may be reposed in the accuracy of the work. It stands alone among works of the subject as being brought into a popular manual size, and as being, not a *brochure* upon some special phase of the subject, but a symmetrical summary of the whole matter.

No less than one hundred and thirty-four engravings, furnished by the publishers, enable the reader to walk, pictorially, into that city of the dead, by the side of whose streets, in the perpendicular walls, lie sepulchered the saints and martyrs of the young Christianity. He is solemnly made to feel that he is in holy company. Yet, though it be a solemn it is a delightful place, for the inscriptions recorded upon their tombs breathe a delightful spirit of immortal hope. They all do but sleep. Yet truly, though sleeping here, they are living beyond the stars. Soon, O soon may it be, their dust here reposing will be called to a glorious revival!

This is an age of disentombments, Egyptian, Asiatic, and European. But to the Christian believer no such revelation surpasses these new discoveries of early Christian history and most significant intimations of early Christian doctrine and practice. We believe that Mr. Withrow, well known as he is to our readers as a contributor to our Quarterly, has produced a work to be classed with higher literature, and well worthy to be deeply studied, not only by Christian scholars, but by the more thoughtful part of our entire Christian people. More we should say, but we expect an article on the work from a hand amply competent to deal with both the book and the subject.

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#### *Educational.*

*Thirty-second Annual Report of the Board of Education of the City of New York for the Official Year ending Dec. 31, 1873. 8vo., pp. 431. New York: Cushing & Bardua. 1874.*

We have in this volume a proof that our State and city realize in some degree the duty of the State to care for the education of its citizens. Other States, as New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Michigan, have passed laws to secure universal education before New York.

It is a just and true assumption that it is the duty of a Republican Government, with an eye to its own self-preservation, to see that every person entitled to be a citizen has the proper educational qualifications duly to exercise the duties of a citizen. On this fundamental assumption our common-school system has been founded, and should be perfected, maintained, and extended to every part of our Republic. The claims of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, that the Church must not surrender to the State the work of education, is but qualifiedly true. It is quite as true that the State has no right to surrender to the Church the performance of the duty of seeing that every voter has intelligence enough to give a responsible vote. It is not the direct duty of the Church to impart secular education, as in mechanics, penmanship, and reading. The moral and spiritual is her sphere. She provides for secular education in colleges and universities only as subsidiary to the moral and spiritual. But in our common schools, where the large mass of the scholars are still under home and Sunday-school tuition, the Church must do her duty through such agencies as she possesses, and concede to the State the secular right of securing secular education for the largest possible number that circumstances allow.

It is a great verbal error to call this right of the State to require every citizen to possess some educational qualifications for citizenship "compulsory education." A large amount of demagogue declamation and thoughtless prejudice have been aroused by this phrase. It should be phrased, *The rights of all to education*. We read not long since in a leading "Republican" paper an editorial ranking such a tyranny as "compulsory education" with the despotisms of Popery. But how far more despotic it is to prohibit public indecency by requiring *compulsory clothing*, or to forbid slander by *compulsory speech*. For purposes of common good the State does absolutely interfere with the clothing upon our persons and the tongue in our mouths. And what more benign rightful exercise of State authority can there be than to require in behalf of the child, in behalf of the parent, in behalf of society and State themselves, that the soul of the child be not darkened with ignorance, and its prospects of honorable life be prematurely blasted. A parent has no more right, under pretense of freedom, to impose upon society an ignorant child, than he has, under the same pretense, to walk the streets naked. A parent has no more right to turn upon the country an ignorant man, than a showman has a right to turn loose a beast of prey in our

city streets. That child is to vote upon the destinies of my country, my children, and myself, and what right has he to be a base and willful idiot? It is my right that he should be educated, and if he will not become so freely, he should be made to do so forcibly.

It might at first sight seem best that the uneducated should be disfranchised; in other words, that there should be an educational test of citizenship. But, first, this is more easily said than done. Universal male suffrage is established, and to retrace that step is harder than to return from Avernus. And, second, universal suffrage is right, and an educational basis, absolutely required and secured, is the right and just condition. *Educate all and enfranchise all* is the true motto. And no man who insists on universal franchise can decently deny the obligation to universal education. The obligation is reciprocal on the part of the individual to be educated, and on the part of the State to see that the education be obtained.

The true view is, in behalf of the child, that he is vitally injured, oppressed, and ruined by being unfurnished with the means, and, in default of his own self-respect, with the coercion, to be educated. This is the *right*, and this the *claim*, conscious or not, of every child, that the community into which he is born should see that he be equipped for a proper membership of that community. This is the ground that public sentiment, instructed by press and pulpit, should overwhelmingly maintain. We have gone strong for the rights of men, and for the rights of women. It is time now, boldly, energetically, and unanimously, to go for the RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. We assert the RIGHT of every child, and we claim *the securement of that RIGHT* from the State, and, if need be, from the National Government, to the possession of that necessary qualification for manhood, a competent education. If that be despotism, gentlemen demagogues, make the most of it.

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#### *Literature and Fiction.*

*Twelve Miles from a Lemon.* By GAIL HAMILTON, Author of "Woman's Worth and Worthlessness," etc. 12mo., pp. 320. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874.

If Gail Hamilton's tongue rattles like her pen, blessed be deafness. We dip into page after page of these mortal three hundred and twenty, and find it all the same, rittlety, rittlety, rattle. After finishing the brief but tedious job, we are powerfully inclined to

ask: "Well, dear Gail, what do you imagine all this proves?" But such a question would, of course, only pull out the stopple; and out would spirt a new stream, fresh, flippant, saucy, and endless as ever. "Our soul loatheth this light food." We hunger for some solid metaphysic; give us Edwards On the Will, or St. Thomas Aquinas in vellum.

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*Foreign Theological Publications.*

*Die Praxis der Sonntagsschule*, etc. (The Sunday-School System: a Guide for Superintendents and Teachers.) Von L. TIESMEYER, Pastor an St. Stephani in Bremen. Barmen. 1874.

This book should not be overlooked by the Quarterly. It is very significant as a championing of the Anglo-American Sabbath-school by a Prussian State-Church pastor. The Anglo-American influence has led to two things—the establishing of Sunday-schools proper, and the reviving and reanimating of the Sabbath catechetical services. The former are rapidly on the increase, especially in societies where the children are too numerous to be conveniently taught as a single class by the pastor. Mr. Tiesmeyer refutes the objections to the subdivided schools, and urges upon the German Church to give increased attention to this cause, as the best practical method of awakening the general Church to a new life. It approaches the children with the magic of personal influence, it counteracts caste, it utilizes the vital forces of the membership, and it happily reacts through the children upon the family. The book cites valuable facts: Since 1864 over twelve hundred Sunday-schools have been established in Germany. They are taught by forty-seven hundred teachers, and attended by some eighty two thousand children. The highest Church Board in the Prussian Government has pronounced in their favor. Other ecclesiastical bodies have done likewise. The Brandenburg Consistory stands almost alone in forbidding its pastors to favor the cause. In Berlin there are thirty-one Sunday-schools, attended by eight thousand children. These and other kindred data are certainly encouraging signs. And is it not eminently fit that, while Germany enriches other lands with so much precious erudition, she should receive in return a healthful impulse in practical life?

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*Hermeneutik des Neuen Testaments*. (Hermeneutics of the New Testament.) Von Dr. A. IMMER, Professor an der Universität Zu Bern. Wittenberg. 1873.

The science of Scripture interpretation is as yet in a very imperfect state. What principle should predominantly guide the exe-

gete? the speculative? the historico-traditional? the subjectively-intuitional? If all of them in unison, then what is the higher term in which they are synthesized into unity? The book of Dr. Immer lays greatest stress on the historico-traditional principle. It consists of three parts—the first laying the general foundation, the second discussing the particular processes, the third relating to the religious comprehension of the Word. Pastors and Bible students, whether agreeing with the author or not, will find welcome help in his book.

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*Darwin: ein Komisch-tragischer Roman.* (Darwin: a Tragi-comic Romance. Jena. 1873.

When the seductive graces of light literature are so abundantly desecrated to the service of doubt and sensualism, why may they not also be turned in the better direction? So thought Alex. Jung, and in the book before us has made the attempt. Darwinism, pessimism, and the whole scope of the ape-philosophy, are particularly vulnerable, and offer a fine field for ridicule and irony. Mr. Jung's narrative will perhaps furnish a healthy antidote to many pessimistically inclined young minds, upon whom a scientific argument would fall powerless.

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*Von Magdeburg bis Königsberg.* (From Magdeburg to Königsberg.) Berlin: Heilmann. 1873.

Under the above title—in allusion to the place of his birth and to that of his chief life-work—Dr. Karl Rosenkranz, an able and very prolific writer, of the central school of Hegelianism, gives us a quite pleasant and gossippy history of his earlier manhood. The excessive egotism of the work only renders it the more piquant. Dr. Rosenkranz was early estranged from the Church by daring speculations, and has never fully returned to it. But he has been an earnest man and a hard worker, and his intimate relations with eminent men and with momentous thought-movements render his life a subject of general interest.

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### *Pamphlets.*

*Priestly Pretensions Disproved; or, Methodism and the Church of England.* By Rev. EDWARD HARTLEY DEWART. 16mo., pp. 48. Toronto: "Guardian" Office. 1873.

The able editor of the *Christian Guardian* has added one more to the refutations of the "Churchmen" in regard to Methodism.



It is amusing, as well as pitiful, to see with what stolidity the gentlemen of the Episcopalian sect stick to exploded fictions. Once in a year or two they take some letter or paragraph from Wesley, and trumpet it forth as an annihilating blast upon all Methodism. In their sweet simplicity they fancy they have discovered something hidden, revealed a fresh-found mare's nest, not knowing apparently that all these recondite novelties are on sale at our Book Rooms, and retailed by our publishers as energetically as they are able, cheap for cash, and have been, perhaps, so for half a century.

Mr. Dewart amply shows that, in the Anglican sense of the word separation, Wesley separated from the English Church years before his death. He furnishes abundant and irrefutable proof that, were Wesley living at the present day, he would sanction the independence of the Wesleyan Church in England and Canada as positively as he did, while alive, the independence of an American Episcopal Church.

There is, perhaps, even more proof than Mr. Dewart himself chose to cite. There is clear proof that Wesley anticipated that Methodism in England would become entirely independent, and made provision for it by ordaining bishops both for England and Scotland. (Tyerman, vol. iii, p. 443.) He did this because he disliked the Presbyterian form of government and preferred the Episcopal. He meant that the future English Methodist Church should not be, as it now is, presbyterial; but that it should be the English Methodist Episcopal Church. In this respect English Methodism positively rejected Wesley. So that the English and Canadian Wesleyans are herein not only un-Wesleyan but anti-Wesleyan. We say nothing as to the importance of this fact. We do not therefor question the validity of their Churchdom. But we do say that it is an historical fact, that the only Methodist Churches which are organically Wesleyan, as having retained the Episcopacy Wesley preferred and bestowed, are the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, of these United States.

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*Minutes of the New York East Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*  
Twenty-sixth Session. Held at Simpson M. E. Church, Brooklyn, April 8-15,  
1874. Published by Order of the Conference. GEO. A. HUBBELL, Editor.  
New York: For Sale by N. Tibbals & Co., 37 Park Row. 1874.

Our dear old mother, the New York East Conference, did at her last session, while we were courting a gentle climate in Florida, bestow upon her distant, but dutiful son, the editor of the Quar-

terly, a kiss and a smite, both equally parental. These two souvenirs are contained in the following adopted report of the Committee on Periodicals:

The Quarterly Review, in the Book Notices, Synopsis, and Editorial Contributions, fully maintains its unsurpassed character and reputation, but your Committee are of the opinion that a higher order of ability and scholarship might be obtained than has always been displayed in the contributed articles.

Two objects we have ever assumed to be desirable in the maintenance of our Quarterly: 1. To furnish a body of current high theological literature. 2. To develop, as far as possible, the best writing talent of our own Church. This last can be done only by maintaining that standard which shall not discourage by unattainability, while it shall task the power of attainment. With money at command, (which the Church is able, if she preferred, to supply,) we could very easily buy the best talent of Europe and America, and furnish a Quarterly equal in its articles to any thing in Europe or America. But then we should in this case be simply publishers of a World's Quarterly, and the second of the above two objects would be essentially lost. On the other hand; it is possible we have had too indulgent a standard. Rejection is not a pleasant work. Yet not one third, probably, of the articles we have in our editorial life received has been published, and probably not one in five of the book manuscripts. The editor, therefore, in the course of years, is liable to raise up on all sides a circle of individuals, and even sections, offended by real or supposed exclusion, until he finally stands like the man in the almanac, with all the signs of the Zodiac aiming at him. We thank our mother Conference for her admonitory support in performing the unpleasant part of our duty more firmly.

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*The American Episcopal Church; or, the Claims and Mission of Methodism considered.* By O. H. WARREN. 12mo., flexible cover, pp. 80. New York: Nelson & Phillips.

The "American Episcopal Church" is our own Methodist Episcopal Church. It is so styled by Mr. Warren in commemoration of the fundamental fact that it was constituted specially for America, and was the first Episcopal organization ever here established. The Protestant Episcopal Church was later organized by Episcopal ordination, first refused in England, and then wrung out from Scotland. We may further note that Wesley, who established our American Episcopal Church, and Cranmer, who founded the Anglican, did so upon the same fundamental prin-

ciple, namely, that germinally both the episcopal and presbyterial orders are one. But it by no means follows that we are presbyterian. Wesley disliked presbyterianism, and held that the three orders are truly found developed in the New Testament, not as obligatory, but as sanctioned. Hence Mr. Warren truly and successfully shows that Wesley truly ordained Coke to the office of Bishop.

Mr. Warren lays down four characteristics of a true Church. These characteristics are tests which exclude contentions and ambitious secessions, or willful violations of peace and order in organizations already existing. The views of the entire pamphlet are sound, expressed in good diction, and animated with a candid spirit.

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*Miscellaneous.*

*Holiness to the Lord.* By Rev. LEWIS R. DUNN, Author of "The Mission of the Spirit." 16mo., pp. 219. New York: Nelson & Phillips. 1874.

Mr. Dunn's book does not much stir up the metaphysics that underlie practical theology. Moving in the plane of popular thought, he seeks to elucidate his subject to the ordinary inquirer, and to inspire the soul with the power of his theme. It is clear in style and suing in spirit.

*The Heart of Africa.* Three Years' Travels and Adventures in the Unexplored Regions of Central Africa, from 1868 to 1871. By Dr. GEORGE SCHWEINFURTH. Translated by ELLEN E. FREWER. With an Introduction by WINWOOD READE. In Two Volumes. With Maps and Wood-Cut Illustrations. 8vo., pp. 559 and 521. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874.

Two magnificent octavos, furnishing a narrative replete with interest and rich contributions to African geography.

*The Alhambra and the Kremlin.* The South and the North of Europe. By SAMUEL IRENEUS PRIME, Author of "Travels in Europe and the East." 12mo., pp. 482. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

A richly illustrated volume by a practical traveler, with an eye that knew what to see, and a pen that knew how to describe.

*Northern California, Oregon, and the Sandwich Islands.* By CHARLES NORDHOFF, Author of "California: For Health, Pleasure, and Residence," etc. 8vo., pp. 256. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874.

*Five-Minute Chats with Young Women and Certain Other Parties.* By Dr. DIO LEWIS, Author of "Our Girls," etc. 12mo., pp. 426. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874.

*A Life that Speaketh.* A Biography of Rev. George P. Wilson. By DANIEL CLARK KNOWLES. 16mo., pp. 229. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden.

- The Biblical Museum: A Collection of Notes Explanatory, Homiletic, and Illustrative, on the Holy Scriptures. Especially Designed for the Use of Ministers, Bible Students, and Sunday-School Teachers.* By JAMES COMPER GRAY, Author of "Topics for Teachers." Vol. III, containing the Acts of the Apostles and Romans. Vol. IV, containing the Epistles, 1 Corinthians to Philemon. 12mo., pp. 384 and 384. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co.
- The Relations of the Kingdom to the World.* By J. OSWALD DYKES, D.D. 2m o., pp. 210. New York: Robert Carter & Bros. 1874.
- Memorial Volume.* Sermons by the late ROBERT S. CANDLISH, D.D., Minister of Free St. George's, and Principal of the New College, Edinburgh. With a Biographical Preface. 12mo., pp. 315. New York: R. Carter & Bros. 1874.
- American Pioneers and Patriots.* Christopher Carson, familiarly known as Kit Carson. By JOHN S. C. ABBOTT. With Illustrations by Eleanor Greatorex. 12mo., pp. 342. New York: Dodd & Mead. 1873.
- American Pioneers and Patriots.* Peter Stuyvesant, the Last Dutch Governor of New Amsterdam. By JOHN S. C. ABBOTT. Illustrated. 12mo., pp. 362. New York: Dodd & Mead. 1873.
- Ten-Minute Talks on All Sorts of Topics.* By ELIHU BURRITT. With an Autobiography of the Author. 12mo., pp. 360. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1874.
- The Period of the Reformation, 1517 to 1648.* By LUDWIG HAUSER. Edited by WILHELM ONCKEN, Professor of History at the University of Giessen. Translated by Mrs. G. Sturge. 12mo., pp. 702. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874.
- A Lawyer Abroad.* What to See, and How to See. By HENRY DAY, of the Bar of New York. 12mo., pp. 348. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874.
- The Word of Life.* Being Selections from the Work of a Ministry. By CHARLES J. BROWN, D.D., Edinburgh. 12mo., pp. 330. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.
- The Healing Waters of Israel; or, the Story of Naaman the Syrian.* An Old Testament Chapter in Providence and Grace. By J. R. MACDUFF, D.D., Author of "Morning and Night Watches." 16mo., pp. 298. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874.
- The Bazar Book of Health.* 18mo., pp. 280. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1873.
- The Gift of the Holy Ghost the Believer's Privilege.* Also, Select Sermons on Christian Experience. By Rev. E. DAVIES, Author of "Believer's Hand-book," etc. 24mo., pp. 70. For sale by E. Davies, Reading, Mass.
- The History of Greece.* By Professor Dr. ERNST CURTIUS. Translated by ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD, M.A., Fellow of St. Peter's College, Cambridge. Vol. IV. 12mo., pp. 530. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1874.
- The Office and Duty of a Christian Pastor.* By STEPHEN H. TYNG, D.D., Rector of St. George's Church, in the City of New York. Published at the Request of the Students and Faculty of the School of Theology in the Boston University. 18mo., pp. 178. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- The Historic Origin of the Bible.* A Hand-book of Principal Facts from the Best Recent Authorities, German and English. By EDWIN CONE BESSELL, A.M. With an Introduction, by Professor ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK, D.D., of Union Theological Seminary, New York. 8vo., pp. 432. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.
- Notes, Explanatory and Practical, on the Epistles of Paul to the Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians.* By ALBERT BARNES, author of "Notes on the Psalms." Revised Edition. 12mo., pp. 275. New York: Harper & Bros. 1873.
- On Holy Ground.* By EDWIN HODDER, Author of "Memories of New Zealand Life." 12mo., pp. 326. New York: Nelson & Phillips. 1874.

*Glances of our Lake Region in 1863, and other Papers.* By MRS. H. C. GARDNER. 16mo., pp. 420. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden.

*An Introductory Hebrew Grammar.* With Progressive Exercises in Reading and Writing. By A. B. DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, etc., in the New College, Edinburgh. 8vo., pp. 166. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Co. 1874. Price, \$3 00.

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*From the Plow to the Pulpit.* 12mo., pp. 120. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874.

- Autobiography of Thomas Guthrie, D.D., and Memoir.* By his sons, Rev. DAVID K. GUTHRIE and CHARLES J. GUTHRIE, M.A. In two volumes. Vol. I. 12mo., pp. 424. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874.
- Crossing the River.* By the Author of "The Memoir of the Rev. William Marsh, D.D." and of "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars." 18mo., pp. 118. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.
- True Stories of the American Fathers.* For the Girls and Boys all over the Land. By Miss REBECCA M'CONKEY. Ten Illustrations. 16mo., pp. 329. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden.
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- Harper & Brothers' Descriptive List of their Publications.* With Trade-list Prices. 8vo., pp. 283. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874.
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- The Women of the Arabs.* With a Chapter for Children. By Rev. HENRY HARRIS JESSUP, D.D., Seventeen Years American Missionary in Syria. Edited by Rev. C. S. ROBINSON, D.D., and Rev. ISAAC RILEY. 12mo., pp. 372. New York: Dodd & Mead.
- The Great Conversers, and Other Essays.* By WILLIAM MATHEWS, LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in the University of Chicago. 12mo., pp. 310. Chicago: S. G. Griggs & Co. 1874.
- The World on Wheels, and Other Sketches.* By BENJAMIN H. TAYLOR. 12mo., pp. 258. Chicago: S. G. Griggs & Co. 1874.

Our list of publications this quarter is eminently rich in quantity and quality, and our Book-Table is unprecedentedly extensive. We regret that notices of the following works have to be postponed to our next Quarterly:

- Maudsley on Mental Disease.* Appletons.
- Dr. Krauth on Infant Salvation.* Lutheran Publishing House.
- Evangelical Alliance.* Harpers.
- Beardsley's President Samuel Johnson, D.D.* Hurd & Houghton
- Dr. Schneck's Mercersburg Theology.* Lippincott & Co.
- Dr. Krauth's Berkeley.* Lippincott & Co.